POL 628: Seminar in Comparative Parties & Elections

2008-04-27T23:49:00.000-05:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz II
Dr. Guo
04.27.08
Weekly paper

This week’s reading focused on changes in electoral systems of nations. The readings were divided between two different sub topics in the field on electoral system changes, the effects of potential changes in the electoral systems this area is covered by the Taagepera & Shugart, and Lijphart pieces, The other area the is examined in this weeks readings is the causes and situations that would lead a nation and legislature to adopt changes to their electoral systems. This aspect was examined by the pieces that were authored by Boix and Benoit. The selections were an interesting juxtaposition in the theoretical and more normative approach and the more real world approach. The more normative pieces talk about the effects on proportionality and representativeness that are associated with certain changes that can be made to the electoral system as well these pieces serve to prescribe ways to improve the electoral systems. The other two pieces approach changes in the electoral system in a more rational choice model. These pieces examine changes to the electoral system through the eyes of those that have the power to change the system; the incumbent legislatures. The litterature shows how these legislatures will only change when it is a rational choice for them to change in order to protect or increase their respective share of the legislature.
A very interesting aspect about changes in the electoral system that was noted by Taagepera & Shugart is that often it is beneficial to simplify the electoral system. The author states that unless there is a very egregious flaw in the electoral system it is often better to leave the system well enough alone rather than adding another layer of complexiety to the electoral system. The authors argue a very valid point that “complexity introduces an elitist inequity of its own, even if the purpose is increased “fairness”: the more complex a system becomes, the fewer people can comprehend it in order to make use its opportunities.” (228). The authors show that as an electoral system grows more complex it becomes increasingly harder to understand and therefore more difficult for the electorate and the parties to maximize their use of the rules of the electoral system so that might best represent their interests.
It is also shown that most of the time the same desire that it sought from adding an increased level of complexity to the electoral system can be found in a simpler fashion. The author uses several examples of this by suggesting that some problems can be fixed by increasing the district magnitude. The author’s note that unless the system in question regularly deviates from proportional representation by more than 10 percent then there is no need for another level of complexity to try and approximate the true level of proportionality. It is further shown that many of these extra levels of complexiety are designed to help a specific class or minority party and often this protection is no longer needed after around a decade or so, and that no electoral system should included rules to solve such a temporary problem.
The Boix and Benoit pieces show another perspective on how and why changes in electoral systems occur. They show that since the body that determines when and what electoral changes will occur in an electoral system are the exact same institutions that will be affected by these changes, it is only natural for the members of these institutions to try to protect their positions. Benoit states that “Electoral laws are quintessentially distributive institutions, improving the share of one group at the direct expense of another.”(366-367). This means that since the electoral systems are zero sum games any change in the system could result in a positive gain for one group and as a result another group must have a negative result. Those individuals that are in power would not seek to change the rules that got them elected into power unless they were at risk of loosing their power. The authors go on to explain this through rational choice models showing that when those that are in power fear that they might loose their power they change the rules of the electoral system so that might either maintain their control or at least minimize their losses.
Another point that was made by Benoit was that electoral systems freeze into a stable state around the same time that the party systems freeze. “As soon as the electoral arena became stable and the party system froze along certain cleavages, policymakers lost interest in modifying the regime.”(365). This shows that when a nation settles into a political culture the parties also learn to operate and succeed in this system and it is in this success and stability that the parties stabilize the electoral rules that brought the parties to power. When there is a reduced level of turmoil among the populace there are fewer voices calling for changes in the electoral system and the system stabilizes and changes are then few and far between. There is no need for the parties that are in power to change the electoral system that they work under since that might have potential negative impacts for the party. It is only when the party fears that it will loose under the current system exceeds their fear of the unknown consequences of a change in the electoral system that these changes occur.

Electoral System Change

2008-04-27T21:43:00.001-05:00

A large segment of the literature on electoral systems has viewed them as predominantly unchanging systems that affect the way parties behave. The readings for this week focus on change in electoral systems, and illustrate that electoral systems do change and can change more frequently than is thought (though as discussed in the readings this is not necessarily desirable). These changes stem from several different reasons and theories regarding these changes are widespread. Political scientists have used many features of electoral systems to explain party behavior, but rational behavior on behalf of the party can also explain how a particular electoral system is shaped.

A major question discussed in this week’s readings regards the role that established parties play in shaping electoral systems and the incentives for those parties to change the electoral system. Benoit (2003) provides a model for electoral system change in which parties are rational actors that seek to maximize benefits, their share of seats in the legislature. He argues that parties will seek to change institutional structures when changing these structures will “improve their expected seat share relative to the status quo” (374). A key variable in this model is the ability of a party or group of parties to enact a change in the electoral system. If enough parties in a multiparty system want to change the electoral system, then a change will occur. This ability or power is what Benoit calls “institutional fiat power,” which is the “voting weights held by each party for the purpose of changing the electoral law” (374). His model predicts that if the total fiat power exceeds more than what is need to change an electoral system and each party expects to gain seats under a new electoral system or rule change then the party system will change. In other words if a party holding seats perceive that a change in election law will gain their party more seats, and a coalition of parties agree that a change in election law will benefit them as well (the model does not state that the controlling party in government must be a member of this coalition), then an electoral system can change.

Boix (1999) articulates the above point in a somewhat different fashion. Boix (1999) also argues along the lines of strategic parties who shape electoral rules to their benefit (609). He extends his analysis back to prior to universal male suffrage and demonstrates that the entry of new voters and new parties into an electoral system has consequences for the electoral systems, two examples included are that the existing parties can either move to try and incorporate more votes at the expense of another established party or the existing parties will change the rules to a proportional representation system. In all of the cases Boix (1999) demonstrates hypothetically the existing parties anticipate the entry of new players into the electoral system. In empirical analysis Boix (1999) demonstrates that as the threat of socialist parties increase, the more likely the electoral system will switch to a PR system. Boix (1999) argues this is due to the winner-take all nature of plurality systems. The party systems changed due to the entry of new voters and parties and the reaction of the established parties to maximize their proportion of seats in parliament. The entry of the socialist parties into the electoral systems produced a lowering of the effective threshold because “Failure to reduce the electoral threshold would have led to an overwhelming victory of the socialist party” (609).

The two previous studies both argue that parties in electoral systems are strategic actors that want to maximize seats in the legislature. The final two readings for the week provide some insight and caution to electoral system changes from a different perspective, that of stability and representativeness. Both Lijphart (1994) and Taagerpera and Shugart (1989) advise against major changes in electoral stability.

Taagerpera and Shugart (1989) argue that the familiarity of an electoral system reinforces stability of the electoral system, but change is not unwarranted in all situations. Specifically they argue that simplicity is better serves electoral system from a democratic standpoint. “[C]omplexity introduces an elitist inequality of its own, even if the purpose is increased ‘fairness’: the more complex a system becomes, the fewer people can comprehend it in order to make use of its opportunities” (228). The essence of their argument is that change in electoral systems should be few. Only when striking disproportionality is evident should change in electoral system occur, such as in the case of “overamplification” of the winning party in which the winning party wins a “narrow” plurality of the votes but gains “landside victories in term of seat shares” (221)

Lijphart (1994) like Taagerpera and Shugart (1989) also argues that electoral system change should be few and that stability is grown from familiarity with electoral systems. He makes several recommendations to increase proportionality of electoral system but none are major changes that would disrupt the established electoral systems. In his closing remarks to his book he says “Healthy partisan competition requires that the electoral system – the basic rules of the democratic election game- be broadly supported and not be changed too frequently” (151). The exception to his rule is in new democracies when rules must be chosen to “guide the new democracy’s elections for a long time” (152).

Weekly Paper- Electoral System Change

2008-04-27T19:20:00.002-05:00

Alyson Kennedy
April 28, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Electoral System Changes

An electoral system can make a difference in which party wins, and how decisively it wins. Electoral systems can also influence which losing parties can stay around to compete again and which are eliminated for good. Electoral systems do not arise from a vacuum but from political debate and struggle…While they last, electoral systems, like constitutions and other institutionalized constraints, do shape politics. They can delay and exert pressure on policies and strategies, and this can make a difference” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 234).

As we discussed earlier in the semester, electoral rules are not wholly exogenous to a political system. While the institutional perspective maintains that electoral rules are key to shaping party competition and the behavior of parties and individual politicians, one must acknowledge that electoral rules are also endogenous to a system. That is, electoral rules are both shaped by and shape a political system. As political scientists, we place a great deal of emphasis on electoral systems, in part, because of their impact on other institutions. Electoral systems can have a variety of consequences, ranging from determining the number of parties that participate in government, to structuring incentives for individual politicians, and even to contributing to regime stability. As Duverger (1951) notes, electoral systems are important in terms of the mechanical and psychological effects they exert on voters and parties. This week’s readings examine the circumstances under which changes will be made to existing electoral systems and the shape such changes should take.

Before turning to an examination of factors contributing to electoral system change, it is first necessary to address the question (posed by several of this week’s authors) of why study electoral systems at all? Based on the preceding paragraph, weekly readings, and class discussions from earlier in the semester, one is left with the impression that electoral systems are extremely important in terms of their impact on other facets of the political system. However, both Lijphart (1994) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) contend that the ability of an electoral system to exert any significant impact on other institutions is relatively small. It seems unfair to downplay the importance of electoral systems; a better argument might be that the impact of electoral systems is felt indirectly (which, in fairness, is something to which Taagepera and Shugart allude). Electoral systems determine which parties become part of a governing coalition, which, in turn, determines policy. Electoral systems, then, are important in terms of their indirect impact on policy, if for no other reason.

Taagerpera and Shugart (1989) argue that electoral systems should be simple.[1] In their view, there are few circumstances under which changing electoral rules are appropriate. Even though changes in electoral rules may produce favorable results at the district level, for a small party, or relative to intraparty competition, often the change felt at the national level represents only a marginal improvement. Thus, these minor improvements are not sufficient for adding additional layers of complexity to an electoral system. Further, nations that already have complex rules really should not move to simplify them because the outcome would be marginally better; these countries would do well to stick with a system with which people are familiar. If, however, the decision to change the rules is made, leaders should aim for simplification, rather than adding another layer of complexity in an attempt to correct the problems that already exist. Taagepera and Shugart offer a normative argument regarding one aim for an electoral system (simplicity) and several suggestions for electoral engineering; they do not explain, however, the circumstances under which politicians will be motivated to change the rules or the situations in which those political actors not in power will succeed in lobbying for change.

Lijphart (1994) posits that achieving proportionality is the most important goal for an electoral system. He finds that, taken together, the effective threshold, electoral formula, assembly size, apparentement[2], and whether a country has a presidential or parliamentary system explains two-thirds of the variance in proportionality. While offering several suggestions for electoral system reform, Lijphart, like Taagepera and Shugart (1989), notes that changes to electoral rules should be infrequent in order to enhance stability and resist the whims of partisan interests.

By contrast, Boix (1999) argues that electoral systems change in response to the desires of politicians. The governing party (or parties) chooses electoral rules from which it will benefit. This party will not be motivated to change the rules unless something about the electoral arena changes that prevent it from continuing to enjoy the benefits of the original rules. While it is difficult to imagine that advanced democracies could ever experience anything as dramatic as the extension of suffrage or introduction of competitive elections, Boix’s analysis leaves room for changes in electoral rules in response to realignment or substantial changes in party organizations. Further, it would be interesting to extend his analysis to emerging democracies in order to note whether massive shocks to an electoral arena on the level of the advent of mass suffrage or the introduction of competitive elections lead to changes in electoral rules. Additionally, while Boix considers only alterations to the effective electoral threshold, it might be worthwhile to determine whether the government makes any other alterations to electoral rules in response to changes in the electoral environment.

In some instances, electoral systems are the outcomes of partisan goals; in other instances, they represent more general goals, such as representation or governability. Benoit (2003), in an argument similar to that of Boix (1999), notes that strategic political actors will attempt to change electoral rules when they no longer derive benefits from them. Political parties will choose the institutions that will allow them to maximize their seat share in the legislature. Change will continue so long as a party has the power to make changes and will gain more seats by doing so. Equilibrium is reached “when no party or coalition of parties with the power to adopt an alternative electoral system can gain more seats” by changing the electoral rules (374).

Broadly, this week’s readings speak to both the importance of electoral systems and the circumstances under which those systems will change. Electoral systems are important because of their impact on other institutions and, indirectly, for their impact on public policy. Electoral institutions will change when it is in the interest of the governing parties to alter the rules. In a general sense, these conclusions emphasize the idea that electoral rules are both exogenous and endogenous to a political system.

[1] Unless greater complexity leads to a much better outcome.

[2] In PR systems in which voters choose among competing party lists, apparentement is the extent to which parties are able to formally connect their lists, “which means that their combined vote total will be used in the initial allocation of seats” (Lijphart 1994, 15).

Electoral System Changes

2008-04-27T18:18:00.001-05:00

Scholars of political science have examined the impacts of electoral systems for years, and have relatively recently began studying another field in electoral studies. Nowadays, the conditions in which electoral systems are adopted and reformed have emerged as something new to study. Several researchers have helped lend a better insight on the rationale of promoting electoral reform.

In many of the articles and books focused on this type of research, electoral reforms are characterized as being encouraged by the self-interest of political actors. For scholars like Benoit (2004) or Boix (1999), parties are most importantly strategic actors trying to find electoral rules that would expand their power in general, and more specifically, their seat share. Parties look at what the resulting outcome would be of various electoral rules and choose the one that would give them the greatest political authority.

A main argument for majoritarian systems is the notion that when deciding between electoral systems, the most simple system is the best system. Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 236) subscribe to this principle but they seem try and avoid giving an opinion or choosing only one system by saying that they have “no emotional attachment to any electoral system”. First the authors say that electoral systems are best left alone. They contend that staying with what we know (however bad it may be) is probably better than going forth into the unknown. Yet, when speaking about a newly democratizing state, the authors hint at their being a better choice for small, multi-member constituencies, with some kind of proportional electoral formula. However, they still emphasize that it should be kept simple and there should not be too much sophistication with thresholds, adjustment seats, etc.

On the other hand, Lijphart (1994) does not seem to have any problems with particular electoral systems being too complex. He emphasizes the strengths of some of these features to include apparentement, two-tier districting, vote transferability, and national legal thresholds (Lijphart 1994: 145). Although Lijphart (1994: 151) does learn towards Taagepera and Shugart’s argument that in the case of existing electoral systems the preference should be for “incremental improvements, no revolutionary upheaval,” his advice for “electoral engineers in the new democracies” is to analyze all the options (1994: 152).

Following Lijphart and Taagepera and Shugart, Boix’s dependent variable is the effective electoral threshold, a measure that tries to capture the proportionality of the electoral system. Building upon Rokkan, Boix (1999) examines the choice of electoral systems in the set of countries that encountered at least a period of democratic government during the interwar years after the general introduction of adult suffrage. Change in electoral rules is composed as a strategic reaction by established elites to the changing political field. In conformity with this argument, older parties preferred the status quo until events persuaded them into thinking that current electoral laws permitted a new challenger to replace them. At this point they moved preemptively to endorse a reformed electoral system to minimize their political losses. When looking at it from this perspective, established parties operated strategically to maximize or at least to maintain their legislative strength in light of substantial changes to the distribution of preferences and number of political parties.

This line of reasoning is interesting in that it seems to point out the appropriate decision makers as well as to put forth a compatible and rational explanation of the variation one can observe in the choice of electoral rules. When established party leaders think that their grasp of majority support is decreasing, they wisely choose proportional representation. Or if they think their grasp of majority support is not decreasing, they keep with the single member district system.

Boix’s key contribution to studies of electoral systems is that instead of debating which type of electoral system is the best, we should just question how our view of electoral engineering alters when we admit that the those responsible for making changes are not benevolent planners. Boix essentially assumes that elites know and believe in Cox’s (1997) logic, and then asks what elites would do with this knowledge. However, this account of electoral choice as a predictable function of elite behavior depends on two implicit premises. It assumes that those elites had adequate information to be able to realistically estimate future voter preferences and the number of political parties. The function of uncertainty in the strategic calculations of party leaders is totally overlooked.

Order of Presentations & Discussions on April 21

2008-04-20T13:37:00.003-05:00

Order	Paper Presenter	Discussant
1	Chris Bailey	Alyson Kennedy
2	Daniel Chwalisz	Chris Bailey
3	Ginger Denton	Daniel Chwalisz
4	Bridget Hester	Ginger Denton
5	Alyson Kennedy	Bridget Hester

2008-04-19T19:04:00.000-05:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz
04/19/2008
Rough Draft (very rough, very rough draft)

Disclaimer:
As a preface to the majority of this piece it is assumed that members of the electorate are rational creatures and as a result if given perfect information would be strategic voters. This paper tests the effects on the voter to make rational and strategic votes given the complexity of the electoral system in which they are a member of the electorate. It is noted that the strategic voter has not been proven in the masses by the field of political science but it is an accepted theory inside the academic field of political science. The author does acknowledge that this is a potential argument against this paper and its finding but with out this assumption no further work in the area could occur until that the assumption is proven true and that is very steep task that has yet to occur by the field but nor has it been disproved.

Background Information:
Different democratic nations utilize different styles of electoral systems and these systems vary greatly in their respective degree of complexity. To what extent is does the relative complexity of an electoral style affect the knowledge and understanding of the general electorate of what they are actually voting for and their understanding of the process of the election. As well how does the relative complexity of the electoral style affect the over trust and belief of the electorate that the elections are in fact fair and representative of the will of the people.
Nations and states vary greatly in their electoral systems from the most simple single member districts that operate in a pluralistic manner, in this system the voter votes for a single candidate and the candidate the receives the most votes on the first ballot wins even if a majority is not reached; to a proportional representation system with transferable votes that utilizes complex math equations to determine the vote quota required for a party or candidate to receive a seat in the legislature and then complex mathematical equations to divide up the remaining unoccupied seats and select winners for these seats. The voter in this model must select their multiple preferences for the legislature and rank them in order of their preferred preferences for whom they wish to be the electoral winners.
Does this increased level of complexity in the electoral system affect the ability of the voter to make informed and strategic decisions on how to best utilize their vote to better attempt to reach their legislative goals. Does the level of complexity that is imbedded into the electoral systems in an effort to increase the represenativeness of the legislature actually harm the represenativeness? Does this complexity harm the represenativeness of the results by lowering the ability of the electorate to make fully informed decisions for their legislature due to the face that they do not fully comprehend the electoral system and how the rules governing the selection of electoral winners work so they are unable to know how to best use their vote to impact their desired outcome.
Even in simple electoral systems such as the pluralistic majoritarian single member district as is found in the United States there is great confusion as to the impact of the electorates vote. This was very clearly evident in the 2000 Presidential election where many people where upset and confused by the set up of the Electoral College. Many in the electorate believed that they voted directly for the president and the man that won the majority of the vote was the winner, as had occurred in nearly all of the American presidential elections. These members were unaware of the true rules governing the election that instead of voting for the president directly they were voting for the slate of electors that their respective legislature would select to vote in the Electoral College. This small difference in what the electorate was actually voting for allowed for Albert Gore to win the popular vote but loose the White House to George W. Bush because Bush garnished more votes in the Electoral College and thus became the President. In a system that is not as easily laid out as the American system what effect does the complexity of the electoral system on the ability of the electorate to fully understand the electoral system and its rules, and be able to make strategies accordingly.

Hypothesis:
As the level of complexity that is associated with the electoral system increases so to does it become harder for the electorate to fully understand the electoral system and as a result we will see greater confusion on the part of the electorate. With an increase in the level of complexity we will see a reduced level of knowledge of how the electoral system operates and therefore a reduction in the level of strategic voting by members of the electorate will be expected. As one of the side effects of the complexity of the electoral systems we will expect to see that the nations must spend extra efforts to educate the electorate on the rules that govern the electoral system. These extended efforts to educate the electorate would take the form of public service announcements and an increase in the amount of time that is allocated to teaching civics in the education system of the nation. Lastly as the level of complexity that is imbedded into the electoral system increases the electorate will have a reduced understanding and as a result the proposed benefit of increasing the represenativeness does not occur by increasing the complexity of the electoral system.

Experimental Design:
This experiment needs to be survey based and will start with a survey of twenty five democratic nations that use a variety of different electoral systems from the majoritarian systems to several different proportional systems. Inside of every each nation a random sample of one thousand likely voters who have also voted in at least three of the last five elections will be chosen to make up the sample. This will guarantee that the respondents in the survey are the individuals that are active voters and can be expected to continue to vote. These repeat voters are also the voters that you would expect would be the most strategic in their voting and have the greatest understanding of the electoral system. This is to be expected because of their repeated use of the system and the fact that the voter is willing to sacrifice the effort need to be a regular voter.
There might be arguments with this style of selection because it discounts the general public and instead focuses on the more active voters in the nation; this has the likely potential of skewing the understanding of the electoral system by the respondent in an upward manner. But by having these selection restrictions in finding the respondents also reduces the chances of a selection bias by including those individuals that are not interested in the political system of the nation and therefore lack a strong working knowledge of the electoral system and also choose not to participate in the elections that occur in the country.
The survey would take place inside of an election year for the respective country; it should occur in a year when the lower house is to be elected if the nation is a bicameral system. Also the survey should be conducted in the year that holds the highest voter turnout in the nation’s election cycle for example the survey would be conducted in the United States in a year in which the president is to be elected. This is because the entire U.S House of Representatives is elected that year and this election draws far greater attention from the media and the election has much stronger voter participation than does the midterm elections. This will assure that the survey is conducted in a time when the electoral system is drawing the most attention from the electorate and the electoral rules and how to utilize their vote in a method that will best affect their respective interests are at the front of the respondents mind.
Two potential problems that might arise out of this section of the design are the fact that there might be an upward bias in the knowledge of the electoral system due to the increased media coverage given to the upcoming election, and that it might be physically challenging to conduct the survey in a timely manner under certain electoral systems. The increased level of awareness by the general public might bias the survey in an upward fashion, this is not a terrible problem due to the fact that it is the most prime situation to study the effects of the understanding of the electoral system based on the rules is when the electorate is most aware of the system and how it operates. It might be a challenge to conduct the study in an election year in certain nation due to the fact that some of the countries due not have regularly scheduled elections. This makes preparations to conduct the survey harder as well it might limit the amount of time in which the survey might take place due to period of time that is allotted from the time an election is called until when the election occurs. This could also bias the responses in a downward fashion in these nations because of the limited amount of time that the electorate has to be exposed to a coming election, as opposed to nations that have a regularly scheduled election and there is a gradual build up of attention is given to the election in the period prior to its scheduled date. There really is no way around this problem so its affects are acknowledged but can not be corrected for.
The survey would consist first of a simple civics examination, this exam would center on the electoral rules of that nation. This exam would be a multiple choice exam and the percentage of correct answers would be recorded to be compared cross-nationally. Then an additional section would be a discussion with the respondent about whom they intended to vote for in the upcoming election. This discussion would be recorded and would contain questions that pry into the motives of the individual to vote for that candidate and look for any voting strategy that might be behind the respondent decisions and motives. These responses would be reviewed and scored by a pool of three scorers trained to look for signs of strategic voting and the average of their scores would be used as the score for the respondent. There are several potential problems that could arise out this design. First having to adjust the civics exam for each nation might potentially bias the results but it is unavoidable because of the differences in electoral system would make the constant exam useless. Another potential problem that arises out of this design is the potential measurement error that could occur by the process of recording the respondent’s level of strategic voting.
Then the amount of energy that is devoted by the nation to educating the electorate about the electoral rules would be another area of the study. To do this the amount of election related public service announcements that occurred in the year prior to an election would be recorded and compared cross nationally. Also the amount of time that is dedicated to studying civics in the education system can be compared. This would be for the education of all students from the start of school to the end of secondary education but not inclusive of the university and professional and trade schools. This comparison would help to show the amount of energy that the state feels is necessary for it populace to become informed citizens and able to fully participate in the electoral system.
An obvious potential problem with this system is the possibility that different cultures place a different value on education and having a well informed citizenry. A nation that values this higher than another would be expected to invest a far greater amount of time and energy into the education of its citizens and might not necessarily be a function of the complexity of their respective electoral system.

Economic Factors and Electoral Volatility

2008-04-19T15:03:00.004-05:00

The stability of a party system rests in part on the ability of its voters to form partisan attachments to a party. If these voters do not form this attachment the party system will remain unstable due to the shifting of voters between the parties, electoral volatility. This shifting of voters to and away from parties in a party system can be due to a number of reasons. This research design seeks to lay a foundation for future empirical work on one of these options, the presence of economic voting and its causal relationship to electoral volatility.

Introduction

Party system stability is crucial for the consolidation of democracy. “Where parties fail, it will hardly be a matter how efficient other institutions of state may have become. The new system will lack legitimacy and be vulnerable to takeover” (Innes, 2002). Tavits (2005) adds to Innes (2002) arguing, “when the existing party system is not strong or stable the potential for voter to be attracted to populist parties and demagogic leaders is considerably higher.” Parties are the vehicles that link the electorate to those who make decisions (Tavits, 2005; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Muller and Katz, 1997). Muller and Katz (1997) explores the party as a “linkage” arguing one way of conceptualizing a party is that parties provide a way for citizens to influence decisions, and provides for elites a way to communicate with the public.

When parties in government fail to produce this linkage, voters will turn their support and votes to other parties (Tavits, 2005). This shifting of votes is known as electoral volatility and is defined as: “the change in vote shares for individual parties across consecutive elections” (Tavits, 2005). The post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, compared to established western democracies, have experienced high levels electoral volatility since their transitions to democracy in the early 1990’s (Bielasiak, 2002). This high rate of volatility has lead to weak and unstable party systems in these countries. This essay explores electoral volatility in 12 post-communist Eastern European countries as determined by economic conditions. The question then is: What is the relationship between economic voting on electoral volatility in post-communist Eastern Europe?

The theory of economic voting is based on the assumption that voters cast their ballot with economic interests in mind. It employs the assumption of a rational voter as well. A rational voter is one who uses all the information available to the voter to make a decision and casts his preference at the ballot box. If the voter is using economic interests to cast his or her ballot, are they evaluating past performance of the economy and the decisions the incumbent government made, the retrospective voter; or are they evaluating the past performance of the economy but also with perceptions of how the economy will change in the future, and how does this affect volatility?

Theories of Economic Voting

The theory that economic conditions affect the voting behavior of the electorate is abundant throughout both comparative studies and American studies of voting behavior (Conover, Feldman and Knight, 1986; Pacek, 1994; Bohrer, Pacek and Radcliff, 2000; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Duch, 2001; Tavits, 2005; also see Kramer 1971). This general theory of economic voting can be divided into two competing but related perspectives about how the electorate responds to the economy. The retrospective theory of economic voting posits that voters hold accountable incumbents for the past performance in managing economic conditions in a country (Conover, Feldman and Knight, 1986; Duch, 2001;; Kelly, 2003). This theory is based on the Downsian model of voting in which “rational citizens base their choices mainly on assessments of parties’ past performance, from which they predict parties future performance” (Weyland, 1998). They punish the incumbent through the ballot box either voting for the status quo, a vote for the incumbent, or against the incumbent, in a show of essentially no confidence. Kelly (2001) accurately describes this perspective in her assessment of economic and political accountability of Peru: “The retrospective link between economic and political assessment evokes the traditional understanding of accountability, wherein incumbents are held responsible for past actions and policies.” In multi-party systems, a number of parties can benefit from an increase in vote share, which comes in part from the decrease of the incumbents vote share (Tavits, 2005).

A second perspective of economic voting, what has been termed prospective economic voting, posits that the electorate holds the incumbent accountable for performance of the economy and also for past decisions that affect future economic performance (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Duch, Palmer and Anderson 2000; Duch, 2001). From this perspective voters incorporate information from the past performance of the economy and current conditions that affect the future of the economy. “People develop economic expectations, which are formulated using retrospections as well as all other available information such as economic forecasts and economic indicators” (Kelly, 2003). The members of the electorate make calculated guesses about the future outcomes based on a plan for the future. “ Changes, such as political reforms and economic regulation or deregulation, may be incorporated because such change is viewed as incremental adjustments or refinements and do not upend the character of the political-economic system” (Cohen, 2004). Cohen (2004) argues that when uncertainty exists about the future voters are less likely to use prospective evaluations to judge government performance.

Previous Studies of Electoral Volatility

Electoral volatility in Eastern European party systems is especially common compared to the democratization periods of Western industrialized party systems, Latin American as well experiences higher rates of volatility (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Bohrer, Pacek Radcliff, 2000; Bielasiak, 2002). Bielasiak (2002) finds that “an open electoral marketplace has persisted” for post-communist regions. He argues voters’ favor the opposition parties because of economic transformations and social dislocation, though this is beyond the scope of his study of institutionalized party systems.

Tavits (2005) empirically tests economic factors as a cause for electoral volatility, specifically Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the rate of inflation, along with institutional and sociological variables. She finds that the two factors exert a significant effect on electoral volatility with GDP causing a one percent decrease in volatility for every increase in GDP. Inflation does not exert as significant effect as GDP but it still makes a substantial contribution to the degree of volatility. She does not test for unemployment or an economic reform variable, which I believe, has a substantial impact on volatility. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) also find that GDP and inflation are significant indicators of electoral volatility, again not test for unemployment or economic reforms. A seminal work by Pacek (1994) tests economic conditions and voter turnout rates for four countries just after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. He finds that higher rates of unemployment cause voters to switch their vote away from the incumbent. His sample size though is small and limited to elections that are not long after transition, and can therefore be expected to have high volatility as citizens. All the elections Pacek (1994) looked at occurred during and before 1992, Bielasiak (2002) argues that changes in electoral formula were confined to this period and founding elections took place in all four of these countries between 1991 and 1993 in the countries that Pacek (1994) included in his analysis.

Variables and Case Selection

To test the effects of the economy on electoral volatility a set of variables that capture retrospective voting and prospective voting and the economy as a whole are needed as well as a series of control variables to control for effects of other factors such as sociological forces and institutional effects. The dependent variable, electoral volatility, is calculated by the Pedersen index of electoral volatility. This measure measures the net change in votes from one election to the next(1). The independent variables I use are the rate of GDP growth rate, rate of inflation, unemployment, and the number of economic reforms the government has implemented during office. The GDP growth rate captures the rate at which the economy grew (or declined) during a political parties time in office. It will not be a measure of GDP growth rate at the time of the election but rather a change in growth rate while the incumbent party is in office prior to the election. Tavits (2001) voices some concern over economic variables and causality, the model I propose captures only the change during the tenure of the incumbent party. Therefore the causality is one way in that economic conditions will cause volatility. The rate of inflation also captures the economy by documenting the rate at which the price of goods goes up in a country. Again I propose only capturing the change during the tenure of the incumbent party. Unemployment provides a relationship to the economy in that it is the percentage of unemployed in the country. The number of economic reforms will capture the party in government’s attempts to reform the economy in a country. Control variables will include the effective number of parties in a system district magnitude. The countries in which the elections will be chosen from those that are classified as “partly free” or “free” in the Freedom House Freedom in the World Report. The report classifies countries as “free”, “partly free”, or “not free,” based on political rights and civil liberties. The data for elections and countries will come form the International Labor Organization, The University of Essex Database on Post Communist Eastern European elections as well as election results for the various countries from their respective election commissions. The countries to be included are: Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Lativia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine. I will look at the parliamentary elections for proportional representation systems, in the case of mixed systems; I will only look at those parties in the PR segment of the system.

Hypotheses and Methods

Given the nature of economic voting and volatility that we have discussed above several hypotheses can be made concerning electoral behavior in post-communist countries:

1. Countries with a higher GDP will have lower electoral volatility than those with a lower GDP.

2. As the performance of the economy increases, that is a GDP increase, electoral volatility will decrease.

3. If economic reforms are implemented volatility will be decreased, this is because the government in power is making strides to improve economic conditions. It is also a symptom of prospective voting, implying a sophisticated voter.

4. As unemployment decreases volatility will also decrease.

5. As the number of electoral reforms increases, electoral volatility will decrease.

Regression analysis will be used to estimate the effects of these independent variables on electoral volatility. Institutional factors such as district magnitude and effective number of parties, which could have a potential affect on electoral volatility, will be controlled for.

(1)The Pedersen Index for electoral volatility is V= ½ S|vp,t-vp, t-1|. vp,t is the percentage of the vote obtained by a party at election t, vp,t-l is the percentage of the vote obtained by the party at the previous election. To calculate electoral volatility take absolute value of the difference between a party’s percentage of the vote at election t and percentage of the vote at the previous election t-1. Sum the absolute differences and divide by half. An alternative proposed by Sara Birch and quoted in Tavits is to divide by the “sum of the fractional shares of the total vote at each election of the parties which are included in the calculus” (Birch, 2001, 4 quoted in Tavits, 2005) I would calculate both and use the one that gave the most efficient results.

Works Cited

Bielasiak, Jack. 2002. “The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States.” Comparative Politics 34:189-210.

Bohrer, Robert E. II, Alexander C. Pacek, and Benjamin Radcliff. 2000. “Electoral Participation, Ideology, and Party Politics in Post-Communist Europe.” The Journal of Politics 62:1161-1172

Cohen, Jeffrey E. 2004. “Economic Perceptions and Executive Approval in Comparative Perspective.” Political Behavior 26: 27-43.

Conover, Pamela Johnson, Stanley Feldman, and Kathleen Knight. 1986. “Judging Inflation and Unemployment: The Origins of Retrospective Evaluations.” The Journal of Poltics 48: 565-588.

Duch, Raymond M., Harvey D. Palmer, and Christopher J. Anderson. 2000. “Heterogeneity of Perceptions of National Economic Conditions.” American Journal of Political Science 44: 635-652

Duch, Raymond M. 2001. “A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies.” The American Political Science Review 95: 895-910.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964.” The American Political Science Review 65:131-143

Innes, Abby. 2002. “Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery.” Comparative Politics 35: 85-104.

Kelly, Jana Morgan. 2003. “Counting on the Past or Investing in the Future? Economic and Political Accountability in Fujimori’s Peru.” The Journal of Politics 65: 864-880.

MacKuen, Michael B. Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1992. “Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy.” The American Political Science Review 86: 597-611.

Muller, Wolfgang C., Richard S. Katz. 1997. “Nominations and Reflections: Party as linkage.” European Journal of Political Science 31: 169-178.

Pacek, Alexander C. 1994. “Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe.” American Journal of Political Science 38: 723-744

Roberts, Kenneth M. and Erik Wibbels. 1999. “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Exlanations.” The American Political Science Review 93: 575-590.

Travits, Margit. 2005. “The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe.” American Journal of Political Science 49: 283-298.

Weyland, Kurt. 1998. “Peasants or Bankers in Venezuela? Presidential Popularity and Economic Reform Approval, 1989-1993.” Political Research Quarterly 51: 341-362.

Term Paper- Explaining Partisan Attachment in Emerging Democracies

2008-04-19T11:47:00.003-05:00

The notion of representation is central to democratic theory. Elected officials are expected to represent the interests of their constituents; the evidence of this representation includes the types policies the government enacts. From a normative standpoint, democracy sounds like a great idea. In practice, however, democracy is a terribly inefficient form of government.

Political parties are a convenient means to streamline the system of representation and make it more efficient (Holler 1987). Parties decrease voters’ information costs by providing them with short cuts or cues that allow for the quick evaluation and classification of political information. They organize and aggregate collective interests, consolidate the lines of political conflict, serve as mechanisms of representation, and directly connect the voters to the government through the process of elections, thereby increasing government accountability to the citizenry (Desposato 2006). Parties also increase the stability of democracies. Research demonstrates that democratic systems with weakly institutionalized parties are less stable and have lower rates of survival (Gosolov 2003). Just as parties are important for democracy, they are also important for politicians. Parties provide elected officials with a brand name[1], campaign workers and funds, and, once elected, afford officials with access to pork (Mayhew 1974).

Given the necessity of parties to democratic regimes, it is important to understand how individuals acquire their partisan attachments and how these individual-level attachments shape aggregate-level behavior. While much of our understanding of the development of party affiliations and impact of partisanship on mass behavior comes from the American literature, it may be that these explanations do not always translate well to other countries with multiparty systems. This paper examines the explanations for how partisanship develops in new democracies with multiparty systems. In particular, it highlights some the reasoning behind the argument that the explanations for the development of partisanship and its subsequent impacts on behavior in the United States should not be treated as universal explanations applicable to all other democracies. Similarly, surveys conducted in multiparty systems that follow the lead of the American National Election Study in terms of how partisanship is measured may not be accurately capturing voters’ partisan attachments. Finally, this paper tests some of the dominant explanations for the development of partisan attachments in emerging democracies.

Parties, Partisanship, and Democracy

The concept of partisan affiliation has at least two implications for democracy. Since they represent the aggregation of the electorate’s interests, they are responsible for encouraging the electorate to participate. It was once thought that those who identified themselves as strong partisans were those most likely to vote and participate in party politics. However, it seems that the current trend is toward increased numbers of apartisans, individuals who are politically active but lack partisan attachments (Dalton 1984). This suggests that the importance of parties and, thus, the value of partisanship, may be diminishing.

In spite of the decline of parties thesis, most political issues are still presented in partisan terms and individuals are able to use the partisan cue as a short cut for evaluating and classifying information (Ray 2003; MacDonald, Listhaug, and Rabinowitz 1991). In order to partisanship to be helpful in orienting an individual to the political world, parties must represent distinct and competing sets of issues (Desposato 2006).

Parties serve to connect the government to the electorate (Desposato 2006; Rueda 2003). They provide a mechanism for citizens to choose people who represent their interests to create the national policies by which they will live. When elected officials switch parties for their own political gain, they seriously undermine this relationship. According to democratic principles, political parties were not intended to be instruments of reelection but the apparatus of representation.

However, the meanings associated with partisan affiliation and the role of parties in the political system are not the same across all democracies. Too often, the tendency is for researchers to compare the dynamics of other democracies to those of American democracy. If this area of comparative politics research is to progress, it will be important for researchers to recognize that partisanship comes in a variety of forms, from identification to general political orientation. Also, the ways by which parties influence the public, either in terms of behavior or mass opinion, may be different in a multiparty context than a two-party system. Different contexts will produce not only different types of partisanship but different impacts by the parties.

Competing Explanations for the Development of Partisanship

Early explanations asserted than an individual’s partisanship could be understood as some type of psychological attachment to a political party.[2] Within this framework, there are several explanations for how partisanship is acquired. First, Converse (1969) offers a temporal explanation in which partisanship results from socialization and experience. In terms of socialization, children are expected, at least initially, to mirror the partisan affiliations of their parents.[3] This suggests that if an individual’s parents were Democrats, for example, that said individual would also be a Democrat and convincing that person to support the Republican Party would be no small task. Further, individuals “practice” being partisans when they vote for a particular party over the course of several successive elections or when they use the partisan cue to orient themselves to the political world. Using the partisan cue in this way causes partisanship to take on a sort of historical significance for individuals, implying that partisanship is temporally stable. Thus, partisanship is inherited from one’s parents, strengthened through practice, and stabilized over time (see also Green and Palmquist 1990). While the Converse model, like most models of partisanship, was developed in the context of the United States, its basic premise has survived testing in Western European democracies. For example, Cassel (1999) found support for the model using data from Great Britain.

An alternative to the temporal model, generational theories suggest that young adults will be very sensitive to the political events taking place when they first become politically aware. The way an individual perceives reacts to, and experiences these events will help determine his partisan affiliation. Over time, the impact of issues diminishes, individual partisanship stabilizes, and switching to a different partisan affiliation in response to new political issues is less likely (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976). In this sense, an individual’s reaction to his political environment determines his partisanship.

Taking a slightly different approach, Billingsley and Tucker (1987) assert that partisanship is the product of operant conditioning. Operant conditioning is a process through which behavior is shaped via a series of reinforcements or punishments. If an individual responds to some stimulus and is subsequently rewarded for his response, the likelihood of that response being repeated when confronted with that same stimulus increases. Similarly, if an individual is punished for his response, there is a decreased likelihood that he will respond in that way in the future. For Billingsley and Tucker, partisanship is formed during early adulthood, at which time individuals first have the opportunity to participate in politics. Also, for the first time, individuals are confronted with the relationship between political decisions and the performance of the economy. Partisanship develops through a series of responses to political events and the economic rewards or punishments that an individual experiences based on those responses. Individuals use partisanship learned in this way to make political decisions over the course of a lifetime.

[Explanation of partisanship as a running tally goes here—basically, Fiorina (1978) argues that rather than having a stable psychological attachment to one of the major parties, voters are constantly updating their partisan preferences in response to candidates, issues, and the changing political environment.]

Studying the Development of Partisanship in Multiparty Systems

It is unusual for a modern democracy to have a two-party system similar to that of the United States. Additionally, given the electoral rules, the chance that a third-party candidate has of winning an elected office of any consequence is very slim. Since these characteristics are not shared by most other democracies, it may be that the models and methods developed for studying partisanship in the United States are not particularly well-suited for learning about partisanship in other democracies, especially those that have multiple parties.

In most cases, how individuals acquire particular partisan affiliations (or not) is studied using cross-sectional survey data. In particular, researchers at the University of Michigan have been pioneers in this field, conducting biannual National Election Study (NES) on political attitudes and issues in the United States for more than 50 years. It has only been recently that similar surveys are being conducted in European and Latin American democracies. While comparative politics can certainly benefit by increasing the amount of available quantitative cross-national data, a number of researchers caution against operationalizing and measuring concepts as they are operationalized and measured in political surveys conducted in the United States.

In general, there are two basic questions asked during the course of the NES that are designed to tap a respondent’ partisan attachments. First, the proverbial party identification question asks a respondent whether he thinks of himself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or as an affiliate with some party. A second question is used to assess the strength of that individual’s partisanship. The respondent is asked to place himself along a seven-point scale ranging from “strong Democrat” to “strong Republican”.[4]

Surveys examining political attitudes in other democracies contain questions aimed at measuring partisanship that mirror the partisanship questions on the American NES. For example, a typical party identification question asks survey respondents to choose, from a list of parties, the one with which they identify. “Independent” is always among the possible options. The party closeness question then asks respondents “which political party do you feel closest to?” After giving the name of the party, respondents are asked to indicate whether they feel “not very close,” “fairly close,” or “very close” to that party

Barnes et al. (1988) contend that the party closeness question is much more appropriate measure for cross-national studies of multiparty systems that the traditional party identification question.[5] The authors argue that many people who classify themselves as “independents” when asked the party identification question only identify as independents when presented with that option. When those same respondents are presented with the party closeness question, they indicate that they feel close to one of the parties. It may be that some individuals feel “close” to one of the parties but do not possess the cognitive attachments to that party such that they self-identify as partisans. Additionally, the party closeness question is a better measure of partisanship because it asks for a spontaneous response, which enables researchers to separate the apoliticals from those who simply do not consider themselves partisans. Further, in multiparty systems, the party closeness question is much easier to administer than they party identification question. This is an example of one occasion where a measure used commonly in the study of American electoral behavior does not translate well to other democracies.[6]

Richardson (1991) argues that researchers may also need to take a different approach to understanding partisan identification and stability in the context of multiparty systems. For example notes that Britain has been characterized as having weak party attachments in comparison with the United States, due to the low observed correlation between vote choice and partisan identification, low turnout, and increased support for minor parties. Using data from the Eurobarometer, Richardson finds that a large percentage of individuals are stable partisans. This stability is attributed to long-held views toward long-term party principles and party images, as well as persistent negative views of the opposing parties.

In Western European democracies, partisanship tends to be most stable among followers of old cleavage parties, like labor parties, social democrats, Christian democrats, and liberals. Richardson (1991) argues that these cleavages were not institutionalized in the American setting; thus, it is not that European party loyalties are less stable than those observed in the United States, it is just that citizens of European democracies have more choices (Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Bartolini and Mair 1984). Further, the context within which political parties developed in most European democracies is different from the United States. “[D]istinctive political contexts reflect distinctive types of partisanship” (Richardson 1991, 751).

Barnes, McDonough, and Pina (1985) argue in favor of a broader understanding of partisanship that goes beyond simple party identification and includes measures for attachment to political symbols that provide electoral guidance. This approach would be more appropriate for multiparty systems as it would be able to capture the individual partisan tendencies that would likely be overlooked by focusing on partisan identification only. They note that, in Spain, there are low levels of party identification among the electorate. However, there are high levels of attachment to party images and symbols. Enduring attachments to political images and symbols indicates the presence of stable political orientations, even in the absence of similar levels of partisan identification.

While a great deal of research has been conducted on partisanship in the United States and much of it has been path-breaking, researchers should be cautious when attempting to test models developed for a two-party system in a multiparty context. Further, researchers should also be aware that, historically, parties in other democracies have likely developed in different social contexts than the parties in the United States. This suggests that partisanship in these countries may be different. For example, there may be higher percentages of individuals with partisan leanings who simply lack the necessary feelings of attachment to the party that would prompt them to identify as partisans when asked. Such individuals may not necessarily be apolitical; it just may be the case that they possess a slightly different set of political orientations that those traditionally defined as “partisanship”. Understanding partisan attachment cross-nationally may require a broader definition of the term.

Partisanship in Emerging Democracies

In this section, I will examine various explanations for the emergence of partisan attachments in new democracies. It is important to note that the explanations offered below are applicable only to a single country or a small group of countries.

1. Moser (1999)- Russia- Partisanship develops first at the elite level as a tool for winning elections and then is transmitted to the electorate as the number of elites identifying with a party grows over the course of several elections.

2. Baker, Ames, and Renno (2006)- Brazil- Voters develop partisan preferences as a result of their social context, largely from opinion leaders, dominant perceptions within their communities (see also Sani 1976 for a slightly different version of this argument regarding Italy).

3. Brader and Tucker (2001)- Russia- The authors adopt the psychological attachment approach, noting that early evidence of partisanship is found in aggregate behaviors and attitudes (see also Iyengar 1976, for a similar explanation regarding partisanship in India)

4. Powell (1976)- Austria- The author offers a social cleavage explanation for the development of partisanship.

Theory and Hypothesis

While there are a variety of explanations for the development of partisan attachments, the dominant account (at least in the context of the United States) views partisanship as a psychological attachment to a particular political party. The foremost alternative to this explanation posits that partisanship is the function of a running tally of the impressions voters form of their political environment. Both of these explanations are derived from studies of partisanship in the United States, but they have been used, in some form, to explain the development of partisanship elsewhere. The treatment of partisanship as a psychological attachment suggests that time is needed to such an attachment to develop. Partisanship is passed from parent to child; it is something that one grows up with; it is not acquired overnight. For these reasons, the development of partisanship in new democracies likely is not explained as a function of psychological attachment.

The account of partisanship as a running tally should better explain the development of partisan attachments in new democracies. For example, Miller et al. (2000) argue that partisanship need not be a byproduct of childhood socialization (487). With the increasing availability of information, voters in former Soviet states are able to educate themselves about party platforms and identify the party which best represents their interests. As a result, they are beginning to develop stable partisan attachments. As Miller et al. demonstrate, partisan loyalties can develop in a relatively short span of time, an explanation that is more in keeping with the running tally model than the psychological attachment model. The running tally explanation is particularly attractive because it is likely generalizable to a broad range of countries. Earlier research regarding the development of partisanship in emerging democracies is limited in that there has not been a systematic attempt to apply a general theory to multiple countries.

Data and Methods

As of yet, I have been unable to find suitable data for testing the hypothesis that the running tally explanation for the development of partisanship accounts for partisan attachments in emerging democracies. As noted earlier, most earlier studies that examine this type of question focus on a single country. While a number of Western European democracies conduct national election studies and while the Eurobarometer contains questions that attempt to tap partisanship, new democracies are not included in these surveys. The data necessary to test the hypothesis would be composed of national election studies of former Soviet states and third wave democracies in Latin America. Of particular interest would be a party closeness question included on each survey (in keeping with Barnes et al. 1988).

Implications

If the running tally explanation of partisan attachment holds for emerging democracies, this would suggest that party loyalties could develop rather quickly. Further, we would not expect aggregate partisanship to be stable, at least during the early years of democratic governance. If, however, aggregate partisanship is stable in emerging democracies, this might suggest that partisan attachment is based upon affect for political symbols that have endured over generations or social cleavages, although this paper does not explicitly test these claims.

[1] Viewing the party label as a “brand” with which voters are familiar is generally thought to be important in the context of campaigns and campaign strategy.

[2] Barnes, McDonough, and Pina (1985) contend that partisanship should not be defined is such limited terms. They argue that partisanship can also be understood in terms of tendance (a general partisan orientation that may exist independently of some continuing attachment to one political party) or even an individual’s affect toward political leaders (insofar as political leaders are viewed independently of their respective parties).

[3] Particularly their fathers.

[4] The categories from which respondents may choose are “strong Democrat,” “weak Democrat,” lean Democrat,” “independent,” “lean Republican,” “weak Republican,” and “strong Republican”.

[5] While similar, the two measures are not the same. However, unless one is interested in studying the group of individuals who self-identify as independents, the two measures can be treated as interchangeable.

[6] Green and Palmquist (1990) would disagree with this approach, arguing that only the party identification question is capable of capturing an underlying enduring trait.

References

Baker, Andy, Barry Ames, and Lucio R. Renno. 2006. “Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil’s 2002 Election.” American Journal of Political Science 50: 382-99.

Barnes, Samuel H., M. Kent Jennings, Ronald Inglehart, and Barbara Farah. 1988. “Party Identification and Party Closeness in Comparative Perspective.” Political Behavior 10: 215-231.

Barnes, Samuel H., Peter McDonough, and Antonio Lopez Pina. 1985. “The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain.” American Journal of Political Science 29: 695-720.

Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair, eds. 1984. Party Politics in Contemporary Western Europe. Totowa: Frank Cass.

Billingsley, Keith R. and Clyde Tucker. 1987. “Generations, Status, and Party Identification: A Theory of Operant Conditioning.” Political Behavior 9: 305-322.

Bova, Russell. 1991. “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective.” World Politics 44: 113-38.

Brader, Ted and Joshua A. Tucker. 2001. “The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996.” American Journal of Political Science 45: 69-83.

Budge, Ian, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds. 1976. Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Canache, Damarys, Jeffrey T. Mondak, and Annabelle Conroy. 1994. “Politics in Multiparty Context: Multiplicative Specifications, Social Influence, and Electoral Choice.” Public Opinion Quarterly 58: 509-38.

Cassel, Carol A. 1999. “Testing the Converse Party Support Model in Britain.” Comparative Political Studies 32: 626-644.

Converse, Philip E. 1969. “Of Time and Partisan Stability.” Comparative Political Studies 2: 139-171.

Dalton, Russell J. 1984. “Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” Journal of Politics 46: 264-284.

Dancygier, Rafaela and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2006. “A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives.” American Journal of Political Science 50: 962-981.

Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies.” American Journal of Political Science 50: 62-80.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1978. “Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 22: 426-43.

Green, Donald and Bradley Palmquist. 1990. “Of Artifacts and Partisan Instability.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 782-802.

Gosolov, Grigorii V. 2003. “Electoral Systems and Party Formation in Russia: A Cross-Regional Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies 36: 912-935.

Holler, Manfred J., ed. 1987. The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics Ser. Vol. 17. Boston: Kluwer Academic.

Iyengar, Shanto. 1976. “Childhood Learning of Partisanship in a New Nation: The Case of Andhra Pradesh.” American Journal of Political Science 20: 407-23.

Luskin, Robert C., John P. McIver, and Edward G. Carmines. 1989. “Issues and the Transmission of Partisanship.” American Journal of Political Science 33(2): 440-458.

MacDonald, Stuart Elaine, Ola Listhaug, and George Rabinowitz. 1991. “Issues and Party Support in Multiparty Systems.” American Political Science Review 85: 1107-1131.

Mayhew, David.1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Miller, Arthur H., Gwyn Erb, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli. 2000. “Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction?” Journal of Politics 62: 455-90.

Moser, Robert G. 1999. “Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics.” Comparative Politics 31: 147-65.

Niemi, Richard G. and M. Kent Jennings. 1991. “Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification.” American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 970-988.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1976. “Political Cleavage Structure, Cross-Pressure Processes, and Partisanship: An Empirical Test of the Theory.” American Journal of Political Science 20: 1-23.

Ray, Leonard. 2003. “When Parties Matter: The Conditional Influence of Party Positions on Voter Opinions about European Integration.” Journal of Politics 65: 978-994.

Richardson, Bradley M. 1991. “European Party Loyalties Revisited.” American Political Science Review 85: 751-775.

Rueda, David. 2005. “Insider-Outsider in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties.” American Political Science Review 99: 61-74.

Sani, Giacomo. 1976. “Political Traditions as Contextual Variables: Partisanship in Italy.” American Journal of Political Science 20: 375-405.

Sinnott, Richard. 1998. “Party Attachment in Europe: Methodological Critique and Substantive Implications.” British Journal of Political Science 28: 627-50.

Tavits, Margit. 2005. “The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe.” American Journal of Political Science 49: 283-98.

annotated bib

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Daniel F. Chwalisz II
04.12.08
Dr. Guo
Pol 628
Anotated Bibliography

On Analyzing the Impact of the Electoral Systems on the Party Systems in Canada.
J.A.A Lovink Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Dec., 1970), pp. 497-516

This piece examines the impact of Canada’s single member districts, which are selected by a plurality, and the effect of these rules on the regional and social cleavages inside Canada. The author addresses the impact that this electoral systems has on sectionalism in different regions in Canada and the author hypothesizes that the electoral system is causing the Canadian political parties to act in a manner that seeks to increase sectionalism as opposed to reducing it.
In Canada there are strong regional loyalties that are strong enough to gain legislative seats in a single member district which has plurality elections. The author makes appeals for proportional representation to help alleviate this problem by allowing for a broader range of opinions to be represented out of a district. This would dilute some of the regional tendencies that are so prevalent in the current legislature due to the model of electoral systems.
The author also stated that the electoral system of single member districts where the representative is elected in a pluralistic has caused the political parties in Canada to take a posture in which they attempt to capitalize on the sectionalism that is present in the district. The author shows that the parties try to tap these sectional feelings in their policy positions as well as their political advertisements and campaigns. Since the parties need to reach out to the constituents in a district in order to win the seat, the parties have found that it is a successful strategy to try and play on the sectional sympathies to try and increase their vote percentage by eliciting these sectional differences and pride.

The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System J. A. Laponce. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Jun., 1957), pp. 318-339

The piece examines how an electoral system can protect the minorities inside of its jurisdiction. The piece acknowledges that no one system can protect the rights of the minority in every situation, but it does set forth what other characteristics must be present for an electoral system to protect the rights of the minorities.
The author goes through several of the different electoral systems and explains each of the systems strengths and weaknesses. He concludes that the strongest way to protect the rights of the minorities in an electoral system is to first establish a system that requires only a pluralarity for a candidate to be elected. This requirement allows for a representative to be selected without garnering the support of over half of the members of a district, therefore it there is a higher likelihood that a representative from a minority will be selected to the legislature.
As far as a preferred electoral system is concerned the author states that it matters on the nature of the minority in relation to the rest of the electorate. If the situation yields that the majority and minority work in the same parties; a majoritarian system with a pluralistic ballot would be preferred. This would help create a two party system where the minority would have a strong bargaining power in the party. If the parties line up along minority and majority lines then one of the different types of proportional representation is the electoral system that would best represent the needs of the minority. Lastly, the most important step an electoral system can make to help ensure the rights and views of the minorities are heard is to guarantee universal adult suffrage. To exclude any group from the ballot box would by definition serve to harm that minority that is being excluded. This seems very common sensical, but given the period in which the piece was written, this warning must be heard.

Candidate Selection in Ireland: The Impact of Localism and the Electoral System: Michael Gallagher : British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 4, (Oct., 1980), pp. 489-503

This piece examines the Irish electoral system and its consequences on how candidates are selected to be the nominee for a political party. The piece discusses the tensions that are present between the national and local parties and the friction that arises between these two groups inside the same party. The author attributes the unique situation that is found in Ireland to two different factors 1) the unique level localism that is felt in large portions of Ireland and the 2) the Irish electoral system itself.
The Irish political culture relies heavily on local service by its elected officials. Most of the elected officials are born in the area they represent and have lived there for their entire lives. It is this local loyalty by the voters and the use of the single transferable vote that author suggests are the cause of the candidate selection style that many of the Irish parties have adopted.
The single transferable vote places a challenge on the party of how many candidates to nominate for a district. This fact combined with the Irish political parties having very few policy differences if any in a particular district lead the national parties to yield a great deal of the powers of candidate selection to the local partisan elite. These elites possess a strong working knowledge of the district and are the best individuals to determine who and how many people that the party should recruit to run on the party’s ticket. In order to have a greater chance of electoral success the parties revert to local elite control of candidate selection as opposed to going to the regular party voters for their impute on the selection issue, or to yield to the national party who has far broader legislative goals for the entire nation.

The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System Andrew J. Nathan. Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 4, (Apr., 1993), pp. 424-438

The 1992 legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan were the first free, fair and open elections in Taiwan in many years and the electoral system allowed for there to be a peaceful transition of power and for there to be a development of national political parties. The system worked because the parties that were involved in this historic election believed in the legitimacy of the electoral system and its ability to help form a functioning government.
The electoral system helped to create a belief that it was in fact a legitimate system because it provided a manner in which both political parties were able to succeed and obtain their respective goals. The electoral system allowed for the opposition party to gain a strong foot hold inside the Yuan legislative body while only receiving less than one third of the votes that were cast. The electoral system also favored the strong ruling party by allowing it to rely on its strong local bases to maintain its power, and make it very difficult for the ruling party to loose majority control of the Yuan in the foreseeable future. This is due to the fact that the opposition party does not have the strong political machines that the ruling party already has in place in many of the localities. These factors lead the author to believe that neither party will feel disadvantaged by the electoral system and to seek to make any serious changes to the system.

Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies, Wilma Rule. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3, (Sep., 1987), pp. 477-498

This is a very fascinating article in that it examines which electoral systems are the most favorable to elect women to the legislature of the respective nation. This paper showed that there was a direct linear relationship with strong statistical significance between the district magnitude of an electoral system and the likely success of a woman who is seeking office. In fact it was found that the party list/ proportional representation systems had the greatest chance for electoral success for women.
These findings are intriguing especially since women unlike other minorities comprise a large portion of the population by nature. In fact, woman are usually near half of the population if not a majority, so you would figure that more majoritarian systems would benefit women but this is shown to be quite the opposite. Women benefit gain a strong benefit from proportional representation when compared to any of the varieties of single member districts. The findings show that the more representatives that are chosen out of a single district the greater womanhoods chances are for electoral success. As the number of seats per district increases the closer women get to electoral parity with men.

Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland's Electoral System, 1989-2001 Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2, (May, 2004), pp. 396-427
This article addresses the Polish electoral systems and the changes that have occurred to the electoral system. The author examines how the Polish political parties have taken positions and proposed potential future changes to the electoral systems of which they feel will benefit their respective party in the forth coming elections. This shows that the political parties are aware of the consequences and implications to changes in the electoral system. The piece examines the five periods of potential changes that occurred in the twelve short years from 1989 and 2001. In the recently democratized Poland the parties sought to achieve future electoral success by manipulating the institutional factors in their perceived favor. The piece shows that the parties engaged in seat maximizing policy and manipulation of the electoral systems. The research also shows that the parties grow bolder in these seat maximizing characteristics as the democracy matured until a level of stabilization occurred and the attempts to change the electoral system were reduced, and the seat proportions of the political parties seemed to stabilize.

Electoral Systems - Consequences

2008-04-13T23:42:00.000-05:00

This week’s readings detail a number of consequences that an electoral system can have for parties and for candidates. In particular under certain electoral systems candidates for office can “benefit by developing personal reputations that are distinct from those of their party” (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 417-418). The electoral system can also have an affect on the number of parties that participate in the electoral system (Lijphart, 1994, 75). Including an interaction of electoral and social factors, Neto and Cox (1997) attempt to settle the sociological versus institutional debate in determining the number of parties in an electoral system.

Carey and Shugart (1995) are concerned with the importance of a candidate’s personal reputation versus party reputation is to his electoral prospects. They argue there is a trade-off between personal reputations and party reputations, a tension between the two in which “electoral rules shape the extent to which individual politicians can benefit electorally by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their party” (418). They hypothesize that where access to the ballot is not controlled, votes are not pooled and votes are cast for a single candidate, a candidates’ incentive to form a personal reputation is high, meaning that candidates are running against each other regardless of party label for a single vote. Therefore, because a candidate is running against a competitor with whom he may share a party label, the incentive for the candidate to differentiate himself from his competitors is high. At the low end of the spectrum described by Carey and Shugart (1995), leaders control who and where candidates are placed on the ballot, votes are pooled across the party, and voters cast a single party vote. At this end there is no need to cultivate a personal reputation and the party reputation is of the most importance. Forming a personal reputation at this level would only bolster party reputation, and party reputation is of utmost importance to the candidate because it benefits his electoral prospects the most. Another aspect of Carey and Shugarts’ (1995) design is how the district magnitude affects the incentive for personal reputations. They argue that as district magnitude “grows in closed list systems, party reputation dominates the personal reputation of list members in drawing voter support” (430). But under all other seat allocation methods “the relationship is reversed… The importance of personal reputation actually increases with magnitude”(430). This is because, they note, a candidate must distinguish himself from the other candidates running.

Lijphart (1994) argues that another consequence of electoral systems is disproportionality (i.e. “the deviation of parties’ seat shares from their vote shares”(57)). His argument is that disproportionality will “reduce the number of parties and increase the chances of having majority party victories” (75). This is because of a number of factors he points to: namely, the translation formula of votes to seats (“d’Hondt is simply not as proportional a formula as LR-Hare”(64)) and voters “expectations about how votes will be translated to seats” (72). He finds that it is the case that disproportionality decreases the number of parties in a system, but multipartism increases disproportionality.

Neto and Cox (1997) take an alternative approach to the consequences of electoral laws. They interact electoral systems with social cleavages in an attempt to determine the number of parties in an electoral system. What they find is that sociological factors (such as ethnic cleavages or linguistic cleavages) do play a role in the number of parties by combining the effective number of ethnic groups (“a multiplicative rather than an additive function” (149)) with the logarithm of the median legislator’s district magnitude. They also notice that it plays a role in determining the number of presidential candidates. The role of ethnicity is important they find, “a polity can tend toward bipartism either because it has a strong electoral system or because it has few cleavages. Multipartism arises as the joint product of many exploitable cleavages and permissive electoral rules” (167).

The consequences and effects of electoral systems are many. Lijphart (1994) generally concluded, “electoral systems tend to favor the larger and discriminate against the smaller parties” (70). Under some electoral systems a candidate may have incentives to distinguish himself from the rest of the party and other candidates in order advance his political career (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 418). The cleavage structure of a given electoral system may contribute to the formation of the electoral system and may in turn affect the future of the electoral system (Neto and Cox, 1997).

Weekly Paper- Electoral System Consequences

2008-04-13T18:42:00.002-05:00

Alyson Kennedy
April 14, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Electoral Systems: Consequences

Electoral systems can have a wide range of consequences, from impacting the number of parties in a party system to structuring incentives for individual politicians. Additionally, and as we noted last week, electoral systems impact the diversity of viewpoints expressed in government. Arguably, a proportional electoral system with multiple parties allows for greater representation of citizens’ interests than does a disproportional system. Although, as Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) note, an electoral system with few effective parties does not necessarily imply a low level of representativeness. More specifically, this week’s readings note that electoral systems affect an individual politician’s decision to cultivate a personal vote, interact with social cleavages to determine the number of parties competing in a given system, and determine the degree of disproportionality in electoral outcomes (Lijphart 1994, 57). The purpose of this paper is to examine these consequences.

Carey and Shugart (1995) note that the incentives available to a given candidate from developing a reputation separate from that of the party depend on the electoral formula used to distribute legislative seats. There are instances when an individual candidate may want to set himself apart either from his party or from the other candidates running under his party’s label in an attempt to attract more votes. This is similar to the idea expressed by Mayhew (1974) in noting that congressmen will attempt to portray themselves as personally responsible for some desirable government action in order to make themselves more appealing to voters.[1] The combination of factors such as the extent to which party leaders control access to and determine how candidates are ranked on the ballot, district magnitude[2], how votes are pooled (either across the entire party or blocs of candidates), and the number and type of votes cast determine the value of a personal vote to candidates. In general, electoral systems that allow party leaders little control over the ballot, do not pool votes, and allow voters a single nontransferable vote generate the greatest incentives to individual politicians to cultivate a reputation distinct from that of the party. By contrast, systems that used a closed-list formula and permit voters to choose only between parties offer the least incentive for candidates to develop their personal reputation.

Carey and Shugart (1995) note that the presence of high intraparty competition and large district magnitude does not necessarily imply that individual politicians will engage in pork barreling if their reputations are dependent upon something other than pork (431). Future research might expand Carey and Shugart’s idea to examine the factors that influence how politicians build their personal reputations. It seems likely that the method by which one connects with voters would be conditioned by both social/cultural and institutional forces.

The degree of disproportionality in electoral outcomes and the degree of multipartism are also noted as consequences of electoral systems by Lijphart (1994). Highly disproportional electoral outcomes have the effect of reducing the number of effective parties in a given party system. Small parties will not want to waste resources by competing if they never receive seats in the legislature roughly commensurate with their percentage of the vote. Further, voters will be inclined not to “waste” their votes on parties that can never become part of a governing coalition.

Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) attempt to settle the dispute as to whether electoral rules or social cleavages are more important in determining the number of parties competing in a given system by claiming that both sets of factors play a role. They find that a model incorporating an interactive effect between electoral rules and ethnic heterogeneity best explains the degree of multipartism in a given system:

A polity will have many parties only if it both has many cleavages and has a permissive enough electoral system to allow political entrepreneurs to base separate parties on these cleavages…a polity can have few parties
either because it has no need for many (few cleavages) or poor opportunities to create many (a strong electoral system) (155).

Amorim Neto and Cox’s (1997) approach is welcome in that it attempts to integrate the sociological and the institutional approaches. No one would seriously argue that party systems are shaped solely by institutional forces. Similarly, no one would claim that only sociological factors are responsible (although, I attempt this every week). I am not convinced, however, that the authors provide a fair test of the sociological model. They measure social cleavages as ethnic heterogeneity, although they note that using a measure for the number of languages spoken within a country yields nearly identical results. Social cleavages can be and often are more than ethnic heterogeneity. Perhaps variables tapping other types of social cleavages, such as those between workers and owners or religious divisions, would have allowed their model assessing only the impact of cultural forces to perform better.

[1] Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[2] Carey and Shugart (1995) note that the impact of district magnitude (M) on incentives to cultivate a personal vote depends on the values assumed by other the other variables. “In all where there is intraparty competition, as M grows, so does the value of personal reputation. Conversely, in systems where there is no intraparty competition, as M grows, the value of personal reputation shrinks” (418).

Electoral System Consequences

2008-04-13T17:46:00.003-05:00

The focus of the subject matter for this week is on consequences of electoral systems. Lijphart (1994) lays out a detailed framework of consequences including disproportionality based on electoral systems. Two other articles incorporated consequences due to electoral systems into their theories. Carey and Shugart (1995) analyze the consequences of electoral systems in connection with incentives for a party versus candidate relationships with voters. Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) evaluate the impact of social conflicts and electoral rules in the number of effective parties. All three works try to describe electoral outcomes and systematic results but they do so with three different sets of independent variables.

Lijphart (1994) contends that disproportionality functions as a link between the electoral and party systems. This linkage occurs when mechanical and psychological factors give way to a disproportional electoral system. In addition, he examines the amount and type of changes in electoral rules among electoral systems by hypothesizing that the more proportional types of systems should increase the likelihood of more parties emerging in an electoral system.

Lijphart finds that as countries change to a proportional type of electoral system, there is a decrease in disproportionality because the effective number of parliamentary parties represents the majority. In regards to the effective number of parties, the effective threshold is most influential instead of assembly size. Therefore the differences in disproportionality in proportional representation type systems do not impact the effective number of elective parties, but the electoral system does impact the party system with relationship to the effective number of parliamentary parties. Using bivariate and multivariate analysis, Lijphart concludes that the effective threshold is the most significant variable for such disproportionality among systems.

Lijphart’s finding about proportional representational systems leading to less disproportionality falls in line with much of the previous readings for this semester where we have discussed representation of social cleavages. This conclusion fits in with the study conducted by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) who look at the influence of social divisions and electoral rules.

While Lijphart indicates that effective threshold is the best explanatory variable he does put forth some additional variables: ballot structure, malapportionment, presidentialism, and apparentement. Out of these four variables, the ballot structure seems to be the most important and could lead to the creation of another variable concerning just institutional factors that provide for disproportionality in electoral systems.

This chapter in Lijphart’s book leads one to believe that it is logical to think of the effects of institutionalism on ballot structures, which can lead to disproportionality, depending on the adoption of certain ballots. This line of reasoning is supported by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) who offer some support of how institutional factors such as electoral rules combined with social cleavages influence disproportionality. One might infer from all of this that not only do the goals and priorities of governments contribute to the establishment an electoral system that might be disproportional, so might party systems and the individual parties who make decisions regarding electoral rules (including ballot types).

Related to this, past research shows that proportional representation systems yield higher levels of government spending than do majoritarian systems. Sometimes researchers utilize district magnitude to develop this theory by indicating a positive relationship between it and government expenditure. Since higher levels of district magnitude augments proportionality, the reasoning follows that if proportional systems generate both higher levels of total government expenditure and public goods spending, then both kinds of spending should be positively correlated with district magnitude. However, does district magnitude adequately control for electoral system impacts on spending? Carey and Shugart (1995) maintain that the impact of district magnitude on government spending should be dependant on electoral incentives to cast personal votes. Motivations for legislators to go with personal votes are higher in systems where candidates for election must depend on personal reputation, instead of party reputation, to succeed and win. If this line of reasoning is true, then one should demonstrate whether the two traditional findings of the existing literature, that district magnitude is positively correlated with both total government spending and public goods spending, are legitimate when controlling for incentives to cast personal votes.

The shape of the party system, specifically the number of parties opposing one another, has also long been thought to be decided on by the electoral institutions and the social cleavages in the country. As usual, different scholars have stressed different factors. Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) contend that the effects of institutions and social cleavages hinge on each other. They argue that a large amount of parties will arise only when you have both a proportional electoral system and a fragmented society. A proportional system by itself is not enough to increase the size of the party system. Additionally, the number of cleavages will not translate into more parties if the electoral system is for the most part disproportional.

Since Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) find that cleavages and electoral rules influence the proportionality within the electoral system, it seems rational that perhaps such cleavages and electoral rules either support or keep these systems from changing. Is it plausible that a country with many social cleavages that currently has a majority type of electoral system be more likely to introduce electoral rules that supported a change in moving toward a proportional type electoral system?

The readings hint at the fact there may be many explanatory variables that contribute to consequences within and among electoral systems, but why is this important to the study of electoral systems? I would suggest that the determinants for how an electoral system is structured depend on both institutional and social factors. Certain consequences and even the number of consequences are contingent on how an electoral system is structured. These consequences then in turn translate into actions on the party and of candidates. Therefore, having a clear grasp on the consequences that come out of electoral systems allows scholars to understand and anticipate the actions of those participating in the electoral system.

2008-04-07T00:10:00.000-05:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz II
Dr. Guo
Pol 628
04.05.08
Weekly Paper

This week’s reading discussed the different types of electoral systems found in many of the worlds top democracies, and the implications that are associated with the implementation of these systems. The two major types of electoral systems discussed by Norris are the adversarial democracy and the consensual democracies. These two styles have different goals and approach democracy from very different directions. As a result, Norris states that it is rational for the elected officials in each of these systems to behave differently so they will be better able to achieve their goal of reelection.
The adversarial democracies are typically found to adopt an electoral system that is either majoritarian or pluralistic. This is the system that we as Americans are most familiar with. There is typically a very low district magnitude and these systems are almost always characterized by single member districts. In most of the world’s democracies that take this electoral style use a first past the post style in their elections, except for Australia whom has adopted an alternative vote system to run their elections. In these systems, the elections are candidate based since the electorate choose a single person to represent them as opposed to a slate or a party as is found in many of the other countries that use proportional representation.
This system as is instilled with adversarial competition. This competition is fueled by the single member districts or low district magnitude and it leaves the parties to strive and reach out and appeal to a large electoral base. The system also rewards this large base inside of the legislature by giving a disproportionate control to the large parties whom pull a large portion of the vote in a given election.
By having this majoritarian or pluralistic system it forces the elected official to be more responsive to the immediate needs of the individuals constituency and district. The elected official is a direct representative of the people and will work to be a strong representative whom represents the desires and feelings of the district. He is inspired to do this because of the adversarial nature of the system. If the representative is ineffective then he will face strong opposition from a rival party in the next election and is in danger of losing his seat to the opposing party.
One of the major criticisms of this style electoral systems is that it is very disproportionate in its representation. A low district magnitude, and to the extreme a single member district, eliminate proportionality. In this system only the winning party in any district gains a seat. This system also has the potential for “elective dictatorship”, where the majority runs over the desires of the minority.
The other major electoral system is the consensual democracies. These democracies are represented by the proportional representation systems. These systems seek to better represent the true feelings of the population by allowing for the representatives of a district to be decided in a proportionate method so that more interests are represented than just the majoritarian or pluralistic interests as in the other style of electoral style. Since it is a proportional system there is no way for this style of electoral systems to have a single member districts. They are by definition a multimember district and it has been found by Lijphart that the greater the district magnitude the better the proportionality there will be for the district. Since the goals of this style of electoral systems is to reach a true level of proportionality it would seen that a nation who adopts this style would also adopt a high district magnitude to help better reach the true proportions of the electorate.
There are many different varieties of this system that deal specifically with how seats are distributed inside a district. The different systems utilize different mathematical equations to attempt to reach a level of proportionality that is desired by the nation. These systems help to decide the quota that is required for a party to reach a substantive level in which to outright receive a seat in the legislature. Each system then has a method in which they allocate the remainder of the seats that have not been decided by parties who received a quota of the vote.
This system is effective to allow for a wide range of interests to be represented inside of a legislative body. Thus allowing for a greater proportion on the electorate to feel as if their respective interests are being addressed and heard by the government. This system does have its flaws. By allowing interests that are in a very small minority into the legislative process it allows for there not to be clear majority in the legislature, in fact the more parties that are present the more likely collaboration will be required for a majority to be reached to have an effective government. These small minorities will then have the potential to become king makers and force the legislature into the dominance of the minority. This can never be seen as a good sign for a democracy but it seems as if it is the trade off to have greater representation inside of the legislature.

Electoral System Classification

2008-04-06T22:46:00.002-05:00

The literature on parties and elections seems to have centered around a debate between social cleavages and institutions. Both viewpoints have built thorough and logical arguments about how their theory has greater explanatory power without any aid or support from other sections of the literature, as well as showing the development and subsequent changes of political culture and party systems within a state. Both viewpoints have also built distinctive theories that admit the other viewpoint may have some merit in certain situations, but they disagree on the causes of party (system) formation, change, etc.

The literature related to this subject generally proposes one of two assumptions. First, there are those who believe institutions permit social cleavages to arise and then there are those who believe that societal cleavages create political divisions which in turn develops institutions a certain way that makes the particular culture frozen. The authors for this week are concerned with the classification of electoral systems and the methods accessible that permit one to take an informed look at the different electoral rules. They present meaningful, albeit descriptive, information that assists in explaining the debate.

Norris (2004) attempts to describe and evaluate two specific approaches when studying electoral system classification. She regards rational-choice institutionalism and cultural modernization theory as “among the most pervasive and important theories” related to this topic (Chapter 1, p. 3). Once again, this ties in with previous research we have read in past weeks on the ongoing debate between the two camps. Those that adhere to rational choice-institutionalism believe that formal electoral rules have a considerable influence on the key incentives that politicians, parties, as well as the electorate meet, so that altering the formal rules has the ability to change political behavior. One main problem with this is line of thought it that it is unclear as to how much the formal rules and incentives matter or affect the electoral process, especially when compared to cultural tendencies that emerge from societal modernization.

Another issue that both authors analyzed was the actual goal of the electoral rules. Norris summarized the reasoning that advocates as well as detractors take issue with majoritarian and and consensus democracy. As evidenced in previous articles, an argument can be made that since elites negotiate the rules so that they might maintain and/or gain power, arguing over the differences between the two types and which one a state should employ, could be fruitless. If politicians are wanting what is best for them, and not necessarily for the state, then the power is in their hands and the majoritarian versus consensus issue lacks merit. According to, Lijphart (1994), all systems experience some form of disproportionality. Normally the disproportionality helps out the parties of a substantial size related to their contenders. So in the end, both types end up with the same results in this aspect.

One key critique of Norris’s work is something that she alluded to herself; the fact that her study only looks at “Anglo-American democracies”. There are several other countries this inherently leaves out (e.g. India) and includes (e.g. Belarus). If she were really employing the most different systems as opposed to the most similar systems design, it seems as if these other countries would have been included. It could be the case that the CSES dataset simply does not have data for all of the countries applicable to her research, but if it does, I would like to see what the analysis would look like with them all included. I am also not sure how her proposed cross-sectional design will be able to isolate the independent effects of intertwined institutions and social structures. That being said, I did think the chapters from her book illustrated what our class is finally coming to terms with, perhaps the meshing of the two viewpoints has more explanatory power than simply just the institutionalist or sociological approaches taken by themselves. Even though only the first part of the book was read for this analysis and I do not know the conclusions reached, it seems as if she should be commended for trying to use individual level survey data to test her institutional hypotheses.

In conclusion, I find that once again, while the various approaches to studying party politics and electoral systems are helpful, using both approaches allows one to overcome specific problems one might encounter when strictly coming from a particular viewpoint. A more comprehensive and perhaps better analysis would combine both to show that while elites are rational actors and react to incentives that are provided to them, behavior can also be driven by social and cultural factors.

Electoral Systems - Classification

2008-04-06T21:45:00.001-05:00

The classification of electoral systems has created much scholarly debate concerning the precise descriptions of an electoral system. Even the classification of the electoral formula, one of the dimensions of an electoral system, varies from between the two studies that are reviewed. The need to classify these systems is of great concern to political science because a great deal of variation occurs around the world. “Any classification needs to strike a difficult balance between being detailed enough to reflect subtle and nuanced differences between systems…while also being sufficiently parsimonious and clear so as to distinguish the major types that are actually used around the globe” (Norris, ch2, 1).

One of the most important aspects of classifying an electoral system in the method used to translate votes into seats, the electoral formula. Three broad categories can be distinguished that form the basis of a classification scheme. The first of these is the majoritarian formula electoral system in which the aim is “to promote accountable single-party government, by awarding the greatest representation to the two leading parties with the most votes” (Norris, 1, 1). The majoritarian electoral system discourages multipartism because parties “need to win a majority or a plurality of the vote in electoral districts” (Lijphart, 20). Lijphart finds that only three subcategories of this electoral system are present in his analysis and therefore distinguishes the plurality formula, the majority-plurality formula, and the alternative vote electoral systems. In Lijphart’s scheme, as well as Norris’s, the district magnitude, “the number of representatives elected in a district” (Lijphart 10), plays a crucial role in determining the electoral system. In Lijphart’s analysis, he finds that almost all the districts in majoritarian systems are single-member districts, in which one candidate is elected from the district. Moreover, Lijphart finds that “the number of districts in all majoritarian systems is large” (20). Under majoritarian systems Norris (2004) classifies several systems that Lijphart classifies differently. The Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) in Japan presents the difference between these two authors, Lijphart (1994) classifies SNTV as a semi-proportional electoral system (which will be the third category discussed below, along with Norris’s combined systems) on the basis of being viewed as a special case of the Limited Vote (LV) System (also classified as semi-proportional). This type of system is sufficiently similar to PR that they can be interpreted as PR systems. Norris (2004) argues that the SNTV and LV systems be classified as majoritarian systems because “candidates need a simple plurality of votes in their districts to be elected and there is no quota or requirement for proportionality across districts” (2, 4).

The second of these electoral formula categories is the proportional representation formula category. “The basic principle of proportional representation (PR) is that parliamentary seats are allocated according to the proportion of votes cast for each party” (Norris, 2, 6). Lijphart (1994) identifies seven PR formulas used in his analysis, which can be placed into three sub-systems of PR. The highest averages system, which includes the modified Sainte-Lague and d’Hondt formula, are list PR systems in which voters vote for lists of candidates and may also express preferences among those candidates (23). Norris (2004) defines the requirement of highest averages systems: “This (method) requires the number of votes for each party to be divided successively by a series of divisors, and seats are allocated to the parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total number of seats available” (2, 6). The difference between the two formulas relies on the divisors they use. Norris (2004) provides evidence of the use of a “pure” Sainte-Lague method used in New Zealand. The “pure” and the “modified” versions of Sainte-Lague differ in the assignment of the first divisor, the “pure” using odd number (1,3,5,7,etc) while the modified replaces the first divisor (1) with 1.4, the d’Hondt method uses divisors 1,2,3,4, etc (Lijphart, 23; Norris, 2, 6). The quota (or largest remainders (LR)) systems, which include the Hare quota, Droop quota and Imperiali quotas in Lijphart (1994), are also a list system like the highest averages system. But unlike the list systems of the highest averages, “Parties are given as many seats as they have won quotas, and any remaining seats are given to the parties with the largest remainder of votes” (Lijphart 23). This system rests on the division of the number of votes by the number of seats available (Norris 2,6). The Hare quota divides the total number of votes by the total number of seats to allocated, while the Droop quota raises the number of seats by one (1) “producing a slightly less proportional result” (Norris, 2, 6). The third subsystem Lijphart (1994) uses, is the single transferable vote. This is a preferential system that uses a quota for selecting candidates from votes. Norris (2004) also details this system in which candidates fill the seats based on their reaching a certain quota. If no quota is reached then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated and the votes redistributed according to second and continuing preference. The PR electoral system facilitates the emergence of multiple parties in a system by the parties in the system finding a niche and being representative of only a segment of the population. PR systems necessarily have multi-member districts because of the nature of proportional representation outline above. “[M]agnitde impacts the degree of proportionality and the chances for small parties very strongly” (Lijphart, 24). The electoral threshold (effective and formal) “can have an important impact upon the proportionality and opportunities for the minor parties” as well. (Norris, 2, 6). The electoral threshold sets a limit on what party can gain seats in a system according either to the electoral rules on the effective threshold imposed on the electoral system. Lijphart argues, “even in the absence of an explicit legal threshold, the district magnitude and the electoral formula, especially magnitude, effectively imply a barrier to smaller parties” (25). A “range of possibilities” exist as to weather a party is able to gain seats (25). Lijphart best explains his argument as “portraying these two thresholds [the upper and lower bounds in the “range of possibilities”] as a lower and a upper threshold: if a party passes the lower threshold, it becomes possible for it to win a seat; when it passes the upper threshold, it is guaranteed to win a seat” (Lijphart 25). The legal and effective threshold can effectively deter minor parties that have little chance of winning seats in the government because they cannot secure enough votes to qualify for being included.

The Third electoral formula system is the most troubling in classification scheme between the two authors. Norris refers to it as “Combined Systems” and Lijphart “Semi-Proportional.” Lijphart (1994) argues that most systems included in this classification can be “regarded as sufficiently similar to PR that they can be included in the comparative analyses of all PR systems” (39). Specifically the two authors differ on how to classify the Single Non-Transferable Vote systems and Limited Vote systems. As mentioned above Norris (2004) classifies this system as a majoritarian system (2, 4) while Lijphart classifies it as “unusual forms of PR” (42). Norris’s (2004) reasoning as stated above is “candidates need a simple plurality of votes in their districts to be elected and there is no quota or requirement for proportionality across districts” (2, 4). Lijphart (1994) argues on the other hand that SNTV is a special case of LV and “The more limited the number of votes each voter has, and the larger the number of seats at stake, the more LV tends to deviate form plurality and the more it resembles PR” (40). Lijphart (1994) argues that the difference is a function of magnitude and thresholds and that since it is so similar to PR, SNTV and LV should be included in a discussion of PR. The difference between the two on this matter is a difference of perception, Norris (2004) views the outcomes of the elections as determining the classification, while Lijphart (1994) views the structural components as factor in determining classification. The differences are a matter of research design and decisions made to facilitate the study of electoral systems.

Weekly Paper- Electoral System Classification

2008-04-06T18:56:00.004-05:00

Alyson Kennedy
April 7, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Electoral Systems- Classification

According to Lijphart (1994), an electoral system is “a set of essentially unchanged election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted in a particular democracy” (13). Developing a classification scheme for electoral systems is important for several reasons. First, it facilitates comparison both across countries and over time. Secondly, classification assists researchers in building parsimonious theories to explain why certain types of electoral systems develop in some democracies but not in others. Moreover, it makes determining the factors that contribute to electoral system development and change possible. This week’s readings examine both ways to classify electoral systems as well as the implications electoral rules hold for democracy.

Lijphart (1994) classifies electoral systems along four major and four minor dimensions. Electoral formula (whether majoritarian, proportional, or semi-proportional), district magnitude (the number of representatives elected from a district), assembly size (the total number of seats in the legislature), and the electoral threshold (the minimum number of votes or percentage of votes that a party needs to gain representation in the assembly) are important characteristics of electoral systems. Additionally, electoral systems can be characterized according to ballot structure, the presence of malapportionment, whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary system, and whether party lists are linked.

In general, Lijphart (1994) argues that particular combinations of these features impact the ease or difficulty by which minor parties can gain representation in the national assembly. For example, he notes that:

Low [district] magnitudes have the same effect as high thresholds: both limit proportionality and the opportunities for small parties to win seats; as magnitudes increase and thresholds decrease, proportionality and the chances of small parties improve. In other words, legal thresholds and district magnitudes can be seen as two sides of the same coin (12).

Similarly, since majoritarian systems favor large parties are cultivate an atmosphere in which it is impossible for minor parties to win unless they are geographically concentrated, they tend not to have legal thresholds. Electoral systems impact the diversity of views expressed in government. While a healthy democracy should allow for a diversity of viewpoints in policymaking, certain combinations of electoral rules will likely make this impossible.

As a final note on classification, as we discussed earlier in the semester, attempts at classifying party systems generated a certain amount of controversy, largely centered on the premise that party systems are best categorized by counting the number of parties. There seems to be less controversy surrounding the classification of electoral systems, with majoritarian, proportional, and semi-proportional (or combined) widely accepted as general categories or ideal types of electoral formulae. Both Lijphart (1994) and Norris (2004) allow for a variety of subtypes to exist within these three broad categories. While classifying electoral systems seems to generate less disagreement than classifying party systems, it is important to note that classification schemes for electoral systems could potentially experience some of the same pitfalls as those of party systems. Most notably, the majoritarian, proportional, and semi-proportional categories represent ideal types. There may be some electoral systems, particularly those in emerging democracies that do not fit neatly into one of these categories. Researchers should be wary of engaging in concept stretching, by attempting to force new electoral systems into existing categories that do not accurately capture the characteristics of those systems.

Examining the impact of electoral rules on the behavior of political actors seems to suggest (and Lijphart certainly employs) an institutional approach. As we have discussed throughout the semester, institutionalism argues that “formal electoral rules generate important incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political behavior” (Norris 2004, 3). However, Norris (2004) argues that the impact of electoral systems can be understood from a cultural or social perspective as well. Cultural modernization theory posits that “the process of modernization transforms society in predictable ways” and that this process impacts political culture (9). Political culture impacts behavior, not electoral rules. Not unlike the social cleavage argument advanced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) regarding party systems, cultural modernization theory maintains that changes in electoral rules are not likely to affect short-term changes in political behavior, although they may have long-term effects. As with the literature on party systems, the extent to which electoral rules can shape the goals and behavior of political actors remains an open question.

Norris’ (2004) suggestion that electoral systems can be understood from both an institutional perspective and a social or cultural perspective also raises a question regarding the origin of electoral systems. That is, do electoral systems arise from cleavages within a society or through the process of modernization or are they shaped by political actors seeking to maximize their goals? If electoral systems are the products of cultural forces, one could argue that political actors have little ability to shape or change them. Culture can be expected to limit change. However, if electoral systems result from rational actors attempting to realize their goals, then one could claim that electoral rules are both endogenous and exogenous. That is, they both shape and are shaped by political actors. If this is the case, presumptively politicians could manipulate electoral rules in order to maximize their chances of achieving their goals, whereas, if the cultural explanation holds, one would not expect to see this, as electoral rules are thought to be of little consequence. More to the point, how would we discern the correct explanation? As we noted during our discussion of party systems, the true answer is likely involves a combination of the institutional and cultural modernization explanations. While the institutional explanation is appealing because its impact is assessed more easily, researchers should continue attempting to operationalize measures to assess the impact of cultural modernization on electoral systems.

2008-03-31T00:24:00.000-05:00

Daniel Chwalisz
03.30.08
Dr. Guo
Weekly Paper
POL 628

This week’s reading discussed the emergence of political party systems in new democracies. The reading focused on three areas where new democratic nations were developing and trying to establish a system of political parties; the Former Soviet States, Eastern Europe and Africa. All of these areas have had challenging histories which lead from them leaving an authoritarian system to a new democratic emergence, but how will these nations develop lasting and strong sytems of political parties? Will they follow the traditional view that strong party systems will develop over time or will these nations be able develop a meaningful party system quickly in their evolution as a democratic nation? Then will these party systems fall along the same social cleavage lines that we see in most other western democratic nations, and if so what other factors including institutional factors will affect the outcomes of the party systems and the positions the parties in the system take.

The Miller piece contradicts the traditional view of party system development which states that emerging democracies will take a long time to fully develop strong party systems. He shows that in three former Soviet Union States, (Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania) political party systems are developing and doing so in a manner far quicker than expected by many academics. Miller examined all three of these nations for six years, from 1992 to 1998. He found, in all three countries, both the populace and the elites party identification has increased significantly over the period studied with the percentages of elites and populace being relatively equal, thus showing that the average person feels an equal amount of representation between the populace and the elites. This fact is a good indicator of a strong functioning political party system. This study further discredits the socialization theory to political party development showing that the highest level of growth in partisanship ‘fell among the young and middle class who should have been the least affected by the socialization of the previous communist regime.’ This finding helps to show the strength of the party system by showing party identification and loyalty is centered around real and salient issues as opposed to just socialized ideals.

The work of Miller sets up the developments in the understanding of how party systems develop furthered by Zielinski. Miller showed that party systems can develop quite quickly and it is possible for these systems to develop around salient issues and for the parties in the system to develop in a manner where it’s partisans have a strong identification to the party. Zielinski furthers this argument by showing that parties can choose which cleavages to cement around and make the entrenched divisions between the parties. The Zielinski piece helps to merge the competing ideas of the social cleave and institutional theories that have dominated our study to date. He shows how the parties utilize the institutional factors to consolidate the political parties and they also selectively choose which social cleavages to center around in the consolidation of political parties. This discovery helps to merge the two competing theories by stating that every social cleavage does not have to be politicized. Therefore the parties choose which cleavages to focus on. This finding is seconded by the work of Mozaffar et al who shows that party systems are affected by both institutional factors and social cleavages simultaneously, parties do this strategically. Mozaffar seconds the work of Zielinski, finding it in Africa as opposed to Eastern Europe.

The Zeilinski work also noted a fascinating point in that the Eastern European Nations may not develop along the same social cleavage lines that we see through out the rest of Europe. He shows that it can not be assumed that one of the if not the most important social cleavage is social class. It is theorized that politicized social cleavages develop out of the current situation as a party system develops. Since these emerging democracies developed after the class struggles that affected Western Europe, it seems that they may be immune to the class struggle cleavage. In these Eastern European countries we see that the membership of the political parties is centered around different lines other than social class.

Party System - Emergence

2008-03-31T00:12:00.003-05:00

Angrist Michele Penner. 2004. “Party System and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East: Explaining Turkish Exceptionalism.” Comparative Politics 36: 229-249.

Angrist examines the case of Turkey and the formation of its party system in a region that contains authoritarian regimes. She includes 10 cases in the study: Turkey, South Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. Two theories an external one and an internal one about Turkish pluralism state that externally, international Cold War influences affected Turkey or internally the “middle class is politically pluralistic,” Authoritarianism is explained by class structure, socioeconomic development and political culture (229). A third explanation is that “the nature of nascent part systems significantly affected the type of political regime” that emerged (229).

“Single preponderant parties,” parties that “exerted control in all (or nearly all) rural and urban areas,” along elite preferences and cultural norms, led to authoritarian regimes after either Britain or France left the region. This was the case of Tunisia, South Yemen and Algeria.

In the other cases, multiple parties were formed prior to independence by indigenous elites and survived independence. All the countries, except Turkey, became authoritarian eventually. The cases of Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Egypt and Syria all exhibited polarization of the parties. One segment of society, the Conservative forces, rallied for continuation of the political economic status quo, while the challengers wanted to alter it. This led to suppression of the challengers and eventual dissolving of democratic rule.

Turkey exhibited the same patterns as the previous mentioned multiple parties in which authoritarian rule was the result. Turkey differed, however, because unlike the previous cases, in which the challenger parties also defected from democratic rule to pursue other means of power, Turkey’s challenger party (Progressive Republican Party) did not defect. Other challenger parties (Free Republican Party and Democrat Party) arose to contest the Conservative status quo party (Republican People’s Party). In 1950, after the Democrat Party(DP) successfully convinced the Republican People’s Party(RPP) that DP’s followers were opposed to secularism and republicanism, RPP allowed free and fair elections. The challengers succeeded in gaining the support of other elites and elite networks that “opposed unchecked central government power” (242). Angrist concludes that using a class approach to the study of party systems because it uses agents to specify the party system, thereby bringing the actors into the study of the system and allowing for decisions to be made by those actors as to the course of the party system.

Bielasiak, Jack. 2002. “The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States.” Comparative Politics 34: 189-210.

Bielasiak evaluates the institutionalization of party systems in post communist countries by assessing the electoral volatility and fractionalization of parties in these countries. He uses two perspectives to view these countries, “tabula rosa” and the structure perspective. The tabula rosa perspective sees weak party systems as a condition of the rapid breakdown of communism. The structure perspective sees these countries as defined party systems, some weak and some strong. To address this debate Bielasaik assess the institutionalization of part systems. Institutionalization is defined as “the extent to which the process of party formation and electoral competition is ‘well established and widely known, if not universally accepted’” (191). He does this by looking at the electoral system (the “rules of the game”) and political actors and their supporters.

Bielasiak finds that the electoral system is being altered. He finds a trend toward proportional representation from single member districts. He also find that election rules have been altered with most adjustments taking place “ in the initial period of the transition for communist to democratized politics, between the breakaway and founding elections. He interprets this as support for the structure argument. He also finds that electoral volatility is higher in post communist nations averaging 28 percent, “twice that of earlier democratizers (28 versus 14 percent)” (198) with little change over time. These countries also exhibit higher number of parties than other party systems. Bielasiak concludes that the party systems are still being structured in many post communist states.

Mair, Peter. 1979. “The Autonomy of the Political: The Development of the Irish Party System.” Comparative Politics 11: 445-465.

Mair analysis the development of the Irish party system through the use of framework developed by Sartori. The Irish party system, Mair explains, has been difficult for researchers to crossnationally because to the development of the Irish party system. The system developed out of civil war and the two largest parties, Finna Fail and Fine Gael, developed because of this war and have unique social bases. Another majority party, the Labour party, is weak and has “not developed a level of voting support equivalent to most of its European counterparts” (445).

Mair divides Ireland’s party system history into three distinct periods. The first is what he calls a modified form of Sartori’s “polarized pluralism” which exhibited a relevant antisystem party (Finna Fail), center placement of a second party, extreme polarization, and “highly centrifugal competition between the two major protagonist, Finna Fail and Cumman na nGaedhel [Fine Gael]” (447). The second is a “moderate pluralism” system in which there was small ideological space and coalitional tendencies. The center was very small but “the party system stopped short of being reduced to simply a two-party system” (450). The final period was a predominate party system in which the Finna Fail was the majority party.

The assent of Finna Fail to the majority party required it to become essentially a “catch-all” party. It began as a party “primarily based among small farmers and petit bourgeoisie,” and extended is support base to encompass “all sectors of the population, from all regions of the country” (452). It did this by removing the cleavage structure from its foundations, and emphasizing its “ability to govern” over all other parties. When other parties gained enough votes to form a coalitional government, as was the case in 1950’s, divisions in the coalition strengthened Finna Fail claim to government, thus solidifying support for the party and solidifying the party system.

Rose, Richard, Neil Munro, and Stephen White. 2001. “Voting in a Floating Party System: the 1999 Duma Election.” Europe-Asia Studies 53: 419-443.

“The electorate can only hold representatives accountable if parties persist from on election to the next” (419). Rose, Munro and White examine the emerging party system in Russia and its prospects for stabilizing; specifically they look at the elections in 1999 and compare them to previous elections. They establish four criteria for a stable and accountable party system in which (1) parties compete nation wide, (2) these parties “persist from one election to the next,” (3) these parties win a significant portion of the vote, (4) these parties’ candidates affiliate with the parties they ran under (420-21). Under these criteria, the authors speak of Russia as a “floating party system” in which “parties competing for popular support change from one election to the next” (420).

In Russia the authors find that parties are unable to survive from one election to the next and most do not run nationwide, and are therefore unaccountable. They form instead to win single districts rallying around a single candidate. Candidates also change their affiliation after the election, and form new parties in the Duma to gain party privileges. This is done because the rules of the assembly define a party as “group to which 35 members affiliate” (425).
They also examine the electorate in Russia using the New Russia Barometer for the 1999 election. They find that because to the “floating system” respondents were unable to identify with a party. Using discriminate function analysis, the authors are able to discern 55% of the voters who voted for the six successful list parties in the 1999 election. The results highlight three areas that divide voters: evaluation of Russia’s political and economic transformation in the past decade, political values ideology and ideological antipathy and divisions on social structure and political personality.

Leff, Carol Skalnik and Susan B. Mikula. 2002. “Institutionalizing Party Systems in Multiethnic States: Integration and Ethnic Segmentation in Czchoslovakia, 1918 – 1992.” Slavic Review 61: 292-314.

Leff and Mikula examine the development party systems in Czechoslovakia during the first Czechoslovakia Republic (1918 – 1938) and postcommunist Czechoslovakia (1989 – 1992) emphasizing the role of ethnonational cleavages and the role of institutional factors that shaped competition in each system. Ethnic cleavages form voting cue for the electorate, especially in postcommunist electorates where “transitional class structures and anomalies of class under socialism are slippery electoral reference points for voter” (295). They also “focus voters attention on potent evocations of basic identity” (295). Institutional factors in newly formed systems can help and hinder the formation of ethnic parties.

The cleavages present in Czechoslovakia at the time of party formation under the first republic “could arise from either multinational diversity or socioeconomic asymmetry” (299). In the case of Czechoslovakia, two distinct regions taken from Austria and Hungry formed the new republic: Czech lands, which were industrialized and populated by German and Czech ethnicities, from the Austrian half; and Slovakia, which less populated and less economically developed, from the Hungarian half. Prior to formation, the Czech lands under Austrian authority had experienced party competition. Slovakia on the other hand had no such experience. When a provisional government was established, Slovakia was also excluded from the negotiations. As such, one faction in the newly formed state, the Slovaks, was heavily disabled in the party system. This led to unequal representation in government and fragmentation in the system, as well as heavier fragmentation among Slovaks.

Party System Emergence

2008-03-30T19:02:00.002-05:00

The authors of this week’s readings all analyze party system emergence. While most of them have different theoretical foundations for basing their arguments, they still use some of the same variables in their evaluations. Miller et al. (2000) takes into account the role of partisanship as being an element that contributes to party system emergence for mass and elite groups in post-Soviet societies. The article shows evidence of higher levels of party identification among the citizens in the post-Soviet countries. While the level of party id was extremely low at the beginning of the 1990s, it has clearly increased since then (Miller et al. 2000). However, it seems as if the method of measurement has a big impact on the outcome that one will find. The authors might not really be measuring what they are trying to measure when asking if any party expressed the respondents’ views better than any other party (Miller et al. 2000, footnote for Table 3, p. 469). In any case, a large amount of respondents state a party identification even though one might feasibly ask if this identification is really worth anything. However, it does express support for and closeness to a party. But what sets this group of partisans apart? Are they different from the rest of the population? Miller et al. do not seek to answer these questions as they report very little in the way of demographic differences. But I think this might be an interesting avenue for future research.

Miller et al. do find that information has a higher impact in supporting specific parties than socialization. The reasoning behind this is that the older members of the population in these areas have backgrounds in regards to the government than the current situation. Therefore, information on the new style of governance is likely to have a greater impact than socialization in developing partisanship ties. The article also shows evidence of parties representing varying issues that go hand in hand with social cleavages. These cleavages are typically centered on different issues in each country, for example education and income in Lithuania or gender and residence in Russia.

Sitter (2002) not only utilizes the idea of cleavages in illustrating party system emergence, but also the influence of party leader strategy on party system stability and change. This article maintains that along with cleavages, voting patterns, the organization of political parties, and institutions also affect the party strategy of mobilizing voters and building alliances. Once these alliances are made and voters are mobilized, stability or change can happen within a party system.

Sitter’s theory is tested by using party systems of Eastern Central Europe. After incorporating opposition and competition among parties to his theory, Sitter is able to show that competition predicated on the left-right dimension creates volatility for parties because personality of candidates is significant for voters. If parties engage in cross-cutting competition, voters are confused and are not sure on how they should align themselves. And the parties at the extreme left or right are shown to have a declining membership base. All of these different outcomes stimulated from the competitive strategies might usher in a change in the current party system.

Like Sartori, Zielinski (2002) notes that the theory of social cleavages is pretty unspecific about the conditions under which a cleavage is activated and political conflict grows or diminishes. Zielinski also believes that cleavages are important to the party system but he has a different point of view on how these cleavages and the number of parties affect party systems. Zielinski’s believes that the number of political parties in a political systems gives way for certain cleavages to be taken up by these particular parties. This in turn, causes political competition among parties and then a strong and stable party system arises.

And finally, Mozaffar et al. (2003) are interested in the uniqueness of African political party systems with high volatility and low fragmentation. Their article gives evidence proposing that African party systems are somehow different from party systems in the rest of the world. To me, this advances the idea of African exceptionalism; akin to how the South is sometimes treated when analyzing various aspects of American politics. Mozaffar et al.’s information is taken from 62 legislative elections in thirty-four different countries in Africa that held multiparty elections from 1980 to 2000. They sought to analyze how ethno-political cleavages and electoral institutions interact to determine party system size. It seems as if much of the newer literature is trying to mesh both the social and institutional framework when explaining a specific independent variable. In this case, it just happens to be party system emergence.

Mozaffar et al. show that district magnitude greatly decreases the number of electoral and legislative parties and that high ethno-political fragmentation is likely to decrease the number of parties in Africa. These findings are a bit surprising since much research has shown that in other regions of the world district magnitude and ethnic fragmentation actually increase party system size (Duverger 1954, Neto and Cox 1997). Such a reverse of several previous findings by other articles begs one to ask the question of whether Africa really should be treated differently from the rest of the world, or if the authors were wrong in their specifications. Is it okay to assume that all regimes in the region operate in the same way regardless of whether they are truly democratic or not? I have a problem believing that all of the elections they analyzed in 34 countries were conducted in the same way and in a democratic manner. This could have very well contributed to the reason why their findings run counter to past research. Perhaps future research would want to look at truly democratic elections (not just “emerging democracies”) and compare those results to the research that has been done in other parts of the world.

Weekly Paper- Party System Emergence

2008-03-30T18:48:00.002-05:00

Alyson Kennedy
March 31, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Party System Emergence

The debate between the institutional approach and the social cleavage approach to the study of party systems is one that is ongoing in comparative politics. The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of each approach, discuss, relative to this week’s readings, what each approach can tell us about the development of party systems in new democracies, and offer some comments as to how or whether reconciliation between the two approaches may occur.

The social cleavage approach argues that party systems result from social conflicts (or cleavages) that are played out over centuries (Ware 1996,186). These cleavages come to define the party system when political parties form around them. How the conflicts are resolved impacts subsequent conflicts, how those conflicts will be resolved, and the types of alliances that will form. For example, party systems in Western Europe formed around four major cleavages: the pre-industrial conflicts between the center and the periphery and the state and the church and the conflicts borne out of the industrial revolution between land and industry and owners and workers. Divisions among parties tended to reflect these cleavages.

The social cleavage approach has its theoretical origins in Lipset and Rokkan’s Party Systems and Voter Alignments (1967). In particular, this work introduces the idea that party systems become “frozen”. More specifically, Lipset and Rokkan find that the party systems of Western European nations in the 1960s reflected the cleavages of the 1920s, not the 1950s or 1960s. The social cleavage approach views institutions as endogenous to the party system, noting “they result from the interplay of social forces” (Ware 1996, 189). Adherents to social cleavage theory reject the idea that changing an institution would change political outcomes. That is, institutions do not cause a particular party system to develop.

By contrast, the institutional approach contends that party systems are shaped not by social cleavages but by institutions, like electoral rules or the structure of the state. For example, Duverger argued that “the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system,” whereas proportional representation prevents two-partism and encourages an increase in the number of minor parties (Ware 1996, 191).

Neither the social cleavage approach nor the institutional approach can fully account for party system development. Each approach tends to ignore what the other has to offer. For example, Ware (1996) notes that early institutionalists tended to focus on electoral systems at the expense of other institutions. As a consequence, the independent effect of electoral systems may have been exaggerated (often).[1] Similarly, institutionalists note that the social cleavage approach cannot explain the development of radically different party systems in countries that have similar sociological characteristics (e.g. religious homogeneity, common language, very small ethnic minority, industrialization).

This week’s readings apply the social cleavage approach and the institutional approach to emerging party systems in Africa and Eastern Europe. Generally, all the authors reach two conclusions. First, explanations for the development of party systems in Western European democracies do not perform well in terms of explaining the development of party systems elsewhere. Secondly, neither the institutional approach nor the social cleavage approach, taken alone, can adequately explain party system development in new democracies.

Of particular interest to this paper are three axioms of the social cleavage theory as developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). First, party systems are defined by the social cleavages present in a society. Secondly, party system development is a long process that takes many decades. Finally, at some point, party systems will “freeze”; after freezing, a party system will exhibit political divisions that correspond to the cleavages that defined a society decades earlier. This week’s readings note that these principles do not apply to emerging party systems.

With regard to the first axiom, that party systems reflect social cleavages, Sitter (2002) finds that party systems in Eastern Europe have been shaped by patterns of competition among the parties, not social cleavages. Parties in emerging democracies have been able to choose their strategy of opposition. Sitter identifies three possible strategies chosen by parties: reform parties sought to define themselves along the proverbial left-right continuum; anti-reform parties attempted to “revive pre-communist organizations or dimensions of competition (435); and other parties chose to establish themselves on the outskirts of the party system. Parties were free to experiment and choose one of these strategies and, by doing so, delineated the lines of political conflict. Rather than the translation of social cleavages into political divisions, Sitter finds that “the development of more or less stable party systems has been largely a party-driven process” (447). Similarly, Miller et al. (2000) find that the party systems of former Soviet states tend to be defined in terms of preferences for the old regime versus preferences for the new regime and a market economy.

Turning to the second axiom, the assertion that party system development is a long process, Miller et al. (2000) find that citizens in former Soviet states are beginning to develop partisan attachments. This suggests that party identification need not be a byproduct of childhood socialization (487). With the increasing availability of information, individuals are able to educate themselves about the platforms of new political parties and choose the party that best represents their interests. This suggests that a party system can develop in only a few years as opposed to a few decades.

Finally, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) also posit that, after a time, party systems will “freeze”. Zielinski (2002) notes that Eastern European party systems froze before the emergence of class conflict. This begs the question of whether class can be translated into a cleavage, if class conflict develops at some later point. Using formal logic, Zielinski argues that new cleavages can be politicized but only under a very specific and limited set of conditions (203). Thus, the class cleavage may never be politicized in Eastern European states, making their party systems different from their Western European counterparts. If Zielinski’s argument holds when tested against data, it would refute the notion that once a party system freezes, no new cleavages can be politicized.

As noted earlier, neither the institutional approach nor the social cleavage approach can fully explain the emergence of new party systems. Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich (2003) illustrate this point. They incorporate both electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages into their account of the development of party systems in Africa. Because Africa features a number of new democracies, candidates rely on ethnopolitical cleavages for information and support where political parties are weak. At the same time, electoral rules work to diminish the number of candidates competing for office. For these reasons, the authors find a curvilinear relationship between electoral rules and social cleavages (389).

Because earlier explanations of party system development in Africa had failed to take both cleavages and institutions into consideration, this relationship remained unknown. Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich’s approach exemplifies the utility of taking both cleavages and institutions into account. Encouraging overlap between these two research traditions may be particularly important to explaining the emergence of party systems in new democracies, insofar as the development of these systems may not mirror those of Western Europe.

[1] For example, with regard to Duverger’s Law, the causal link between electoral rules and two-partism is not necessarily clear. The suggestion that social cleavages drive the development of a two-party system is equally likely.

Party System - (In)Stability

2008-03-24T02:10:00.001-05:00

As noted by the opening lines of Ware (1996), party systems are durable; they do change, but they change slowly (213). This being said, there are several lines of explanation as to why party systems change: institutional explanations and sociological explanations. Several concepts also must be explored with regard to change, volatility and realignment.

The volatility of a party system is the significant shifts in the support of parties in a party system. But volatility does not necessarily preclude a political realignment, where there is a long-term shift of a subset of the electorate to support of a party. Both Scotto et al. (2004) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) show this is the case. Volatility also does not necessarily show that a change in a party system is evident. Ware (1996) points out the Danish case in which there was a “dramatic decline in support for the Radical Liberal Party and the emergence of the Progress Party and the Centre Democrats,” which had little impact on the party system in the long-term effect. This case suggests the durability of party systems. The question explored then, is what attributes to the stability and instability of party systems, which brings us back to institutional and sociological explanations mentioned above.

Institutional explanations of party system stability are found in Mair (1990) in an essay by Wolinetz and in Roberts and Wibbels (1999). Wolinetz argues, “Party alignments change when there are either significant changes in the number of parties competing or where there are substantial changes in the proportion of the electorate won by different parties” (Mair, 1990, 221). In examining Kirchheimer’s argument for the emergence of “Catch-all” parties, Wolinetz examines the same countries as Kirchheimer. He finds that three of the countries share “common legacies of disrupted political development;” and that France and West Germany share “legacies of crisis” and “changes in the rules of electoral competition,” all of which are institutional factors. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) show that volatility in Latin America is due to institutional factors, in turn causing instability in party systems. “Electoral volatility reflects broader patterns of political turbulence and institutional change or uncertainty” (585). Realignment of cleavages in Latin America is not evident in Roberts and Wibbels (1999), “class cleavages in Latin American clearly have not reached the level of organizational closure or structured partisan competition as they did historically in Western Europe” (585).

Evidence for the Sociological argument again deals with the cleavage structures in party systems. Where Roberts and Wibbels found that cleavages had not developed sufficiently for voter alignments in Latin America, Scotto et al. find this to be the case in Canada. Scotto et al. find a cleavage between Quebec voters and the rest of Canada along ideological lines. The voters in Quebec continue to support Bloc Quebecois (BQ), which is a minority party, and the Liberal Party continues to dominate. The voters for BQ have to found to vote their preferences for Quebec issues in elections and garner a sizable bloc of seats. This along with the emergence of distinct ideologies has led to a change in the party system of Canada from a “two plus” party system to a genuine multiparty system with a dominate party. The evidence of a unique “Quebec cleavage” attests to the sociological argument. Flanagan and Dalton (Mair 1990) argue that the “rise and ellipse of social cleavages” help to explain party system instability and in turn change trough models of realignment and dealignment. The major assumption of this argument, which is questionable (Scotto et al.), is that party systems reflect the social cleavages in a nation (232). The argument follows that resolution or emergence of cleavages may alter party alignment and in turn party systems. Flanagan and Dalton argue that over time the issues dividing parties diminish and parties positions begin to blur, which causes a “weakening of party attachments and increased volatility. This volatility can cause realignment as other issues become more salient. Likewise dealignment can lead to similar changes. Party system are dependent on the established parties in the system as to weather party systems change because of these cleavages, “weather a new-issue cleavage is represented by the existing parties, or new parties will depend, in part, on the established parties’ response to the new issue” (245). Ware offers some insight into the previous mentioned dependency of the party system on established parties and on the social cleavages. Ware sees parties as “office seekers” looking “to attract voters by what ever means they could and from whatever social groups they could,” a catch-all party. These parties would steal be vestiges of the old “frozen” class cleavages though (227). The composition of the electorate can also cause change the party system of a nation and I include it under Sociological explanations because they deal with new members of the electorate that share a common ground and cleavages can be potentially formed from these groups. The in-migration of new citizens has a affect on the party system by altering the existing cleavage lines and be incorporated into the existing parties or forming new parties (Ware 221). The same can be said of territorial change in a nation. The coming of age and dying of voter also alters the party system and can change the balance of support for the parties or in the long term the number of parties in a system can be affected in rare cases. The generational change though is very slow, as most voters entering the electorate are socialized by the previous generation, never the less party system change occurs (223).

Weekly Paper- Party System (In)stability

2008-03-23T18:38:00.001-05:00

Alyson Kennedy
March 24, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Party System (In)stability

With little exception, the party systems of Western Europe have been relatively stable over the past several decades. There are several reasons that this should be the case. Persistent attachments to existing political parties should help ensure that a party system remains stable. Wolinetz (1990) finds that “strong and persistent attachments to political parties put a brake on the emergence of catch-all parties” (221). Similarly, the continued electoral success of older parties imparts continuity and stability to party systems (Ware 1996). Institutions serve as an important source of party system stability. As Ware (1996) argues, institutions change slowly; any dramatic changes tend to come in response to democratic failure. “[P]arty systems tend to be preserved by the institutional context in which they were formed” (220). The transmission of partisan loyalties from one generation to the next is also an important source of stability. Children tend to inherit the partisan predispositions of their parents. However, as several authors note, generational replacement is also an important source of change, insofar as children orient themselves to the political system using different cues from those used by their parents.

That there are several factors which serve to maintain stability does not suggest that party systems are immune to change. As Flanagan and Dalton (1990) note, party system change can be explained either in terms of realignment or dealignment. There are several possible theories regarding the forces driving these two phenomena. For example, realignment may be attributed to shifts in voter loyalties, changes in the ideological leanings of the masses, or a rise in postmaterialist issues. The purpose of this paper is to examine these competing explanations for party system change.

Realignment is one possible explanation for party system change. The social cleavage model suggests that “change in party systems is attributable to the rise and eclipse of social cleavages;” realignment occurs “as parties and their electorates adjust their positions along a new cleavage dimension” (232). Party systems change as the cleavages that defined the original system decline in salience and are replaced by new cleavages. Unlike the frozen cleavages posited by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Flanagan and Dalton argue that increasing affluence has caused class cleavages to become less central to defining the party system. Generational replacement explains the weakening of the class cleavage—younger voters are less likely to use class to orient themselves to politics. In place of class, party systems are becoming structured around non-economic issues, like environmental protection. Flanagan and Dalton’s argument is not that old cleavages are disappearing, only that they are declining in relevance and are being overlaid by new, postmaterialist cleavages. While class-based voting has declined across advanced industrialized nations, there has also been resurgence in some traditional cleavages (e.g. ethnic and religious) that were not fully resolved before they were eclipsed by economic cleavages. Currently, postmaterialist issues are embraced most fully by younger generations; however, as the cleavages become institutionalized, they are likely to take on an identity with particular social groups.

While Dalton and Flanagan maintain that postmaterialist issues are driving realignment, Wolinetz (1990) contends that party system change is attributable to shifts in voters’ loyalties, but is limited to countries that experienced a disruption in democratic development or where partisan loyalties were weak. Beginning the late 19th and early 20th centuries, party alignments reflected a combination of organizational pressures (like those from churches or trade unions), class or group loyalties, and ideological predispositions (223). As long as these forces pointed clearly to the choice of one party, voters were likely to develop a durable attachment to a particular party that persisted over time and was passed from one generation to the next. Changes in party alignments should occur only if voters with substantially different loyalties enter the electorate or if voters shift their preferences.

Similarly, Scotto, Stephenson, and Kornberg (2004) find that shifts in ideology can produce realignment. Examining the situation in Canada following the 1997 and 2000 elections, the authors note that “the voter’s ideological positions on issues had a significant impact on the probability of their casting a vote for a particular party” (474). These shifts led the Canadian party system to transition from a two-party-plus system to multiparty system following these elections.

There are at least two possible criticisms of the argument advanced by Scotto, Stephenson, and Kornberg, however. First, the authors fail to provide their argument with a solid theoretical foundation. Indeed, they begin testing their hypotheses with an exploratory factor analysis. Rather than having some theoretical reasons for believing that particular ideological dimensions will be associated with each other, they simply perform a factor analysis using all the available data and then explain ad hoc why various ideological dimensions are related. This is not good social science. Good social science is driven by theory, not data. Secondly, the authors conclude after only two elections that Canada has developed a multiparty system. An equally plausible explanation is that these two elections were anomalies; it may be that 2003 witnessed election results that resemble the two-party-plus system. Perhaps their conclusions should be accepted with the proverbial grain of salt.

As an alternative to realignment, Flanagan and Dalton (1990) contend that dealignment may also explain party system change. Realignment views instability as a temporary state; eventually, new cleavages will be institutionalized as parties form around them. However, with regard to dealignment, instability may be permanent. Citing evidence for the decline of parties, Flanagan and Dalton note that parties eventually may be replaced by other institutions, like interest groups, that will link voters to government. However, interest groups are not parties. Interest groups represent a single issue, while parties represent a wide range of issues. Unlike interest groups, parties put forth candidates for election. Additionally, as quasi-public institutions, parties are subject to government regulations, whereas interest groups are purely private organizations. Given these important differences, it seems unlikely that interest groups could truly serve as replacements for parties. Flanagan and Dalton offer no evidence to support their claims.

Accepting realignment as the general explanation for party system change, one can conclude that party systems transform because they no longer meet the needs of advanced industrial societies. New political cleavages emerge and are reflected in the party system. Rather than the historical forces cited by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that shaped the original party systems of Western Europe, new party systems are shaped by the demands and pressures of and advances made by modern industrial societies.

Party System (In)Stability

2008-03-23T18:26:00.002-05:00

Tavits, Margit. 2005. "The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post- Communist Europe," American Journal of Political Science, 49(2), 283-298.

The author’s purpose is not so much to test her own theory of electoral volatility but to set three approaches against one another. She looks at the institutional approach which states that institutions make it easy for new parties to enter the system, older parties usually have less volatility, increased ideological distance between the parties means less volatility, and the more effective number of political parties equates more volatility. The next approach, economic voting, concerns the fact that if voters make decisions based on recent economic performance, volatility is highest when inflation is high. And finally, the cleavage approach states that “electoral volatility will be lower in societies with well-structured and salient social cleavages.”

She finds no evidence confirming that presence of cleavages had a stabilizing result on the party system in Central and Eastern Europe. She gives extra attention to the ethnic and urban-rural cleavages, and concludes that these cleavages only influenced electoral stability during declines in the economy. The nature of the party system therefore became fluid since the cleavages did not have the ability to construct party competition. The arrangement of parties and voters through cleavages had to be administered in a political environment without any previous sources of institutional and social identities.

One issue with this article could be that Russia is a major outlier when it comes to ethnic heterogeneity (and could be with other variables as well), given how much larger it is that the other countries in her study. A more in-depth analysis might have also shed some light on how her regression analysis showed insignificant cleavage variables. She could have considered how many potential winning coalitions were in each country, if there was a rural coalition or an anti-Russian majority. Then she could investigate whether or not each country’s cleavages overlap.

Heath, Oliver. 2005. "Party Systems, Political Cleavages, and Electoral Volatility in India: A State-wide Analysis, 1998-1999," Electoral Studies, 24, 177-199.

Heath presents persuasive survey evidence that electoral volatility in India can be illustrated by the extent to which social cleavages are politicized and polarized by the party system. His cleavage polarization index seeks to gauge the extent to which a distinctive political party depicts each social cleavage. States in which parties can produce cross-cleavage support are accordingly less polarized. To assemble his index, he analyzes the relationship between caste-community and the cluster voted for, and he utilizes an index of dissimilarity to calculate the extent to which political competition is polarized along these caste-community lines.

Mainwaring, Scott and Edurne Zoco. 2007. "Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies," Party Politics, 3(2), 155-178.

This article questions whether parties in new democracies are being institutionalized. After centering their analysis on electoral volatility, Mainwaring and Zoco discover that interparty competition in new democracies is not being stabilized over time. The authors maintain that parties in established democracies helped construct citizens, developing supportive networks and acquiring voter loyalty, therefore extending electoral stability. Parties in new democracies, however, have not had the same mobilizing and empowering effect and therefore have not bought about the loyalty essential for stable party systems. Mainwaring and Zoco are concerned that high levels of volatility signify a level of political uncertainty that endangers democratic consolidation. They demonstrate that there is little evidence to back the idea that parties in new democracies are being institutionalized. The evidence that time (the age of a democracy) does not induce less volatile party systems counters received wisdom. Path dependency and historical sequencing are shown to be the main explanations.

Bogaards, Matthijs. 2008. "Dominant Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Africa: A Comment on Mozaffar and Scarrit," Party Politics, 14, 113-130.

This article examines the work by Mozaffar and Scarritt in 2005 who identify different puzzling features of African party systems and tries to explain both the low fragmentation and high volatility aspects. The main puzzle is the unique combination of the two. But Bogaards has doubts about these particular findings for several reasons. First, he indicates that the analysis is founded on a database of electoral system features and election results that is only briefly explained and characterized, but seems to incorporate almost all sub-Saharan African countries with multiparty elections, regardless of the nature of the regime, the quality of the elections and ,the number of consecutive elections. But other studies of electoral volatility (including Tavits 2005) have either selected on regime type or controlled for regime type (Remmer 1991). Unfortunately, he points out that Mozaffar and Scarritt do neither of these and this may have skewed their results.

Ferree, Karen. 2005. “The Social Origins of Electoral Volatility in Africa,” Harvard University, Unpublished manuscript.

Ferree asks the question of why volatility varies, especially across young democracies. The two obvious answers to this question concerns institutions and social cleavages. While quite a bit has been written about electoral rules, federalism, presidentialism, etc., not as much has been focused on social cleavages after Lipset and Rokkan or other European analyses. Her paper is primarily concerned with social cleavages, and ethnic cleavages in particular, as an explanation in Africa.

Her model indicates that when no ethnic group (or more than one ethnic group) can form a wining coalition on its own, there will be high volatility and vice versa for when there is a single ethnic group that can form a winning coalition. If there are however multiple possible winning coalitions, volatility will be high. Her empirical test measures average volatility for each country and counts the number of possible winning coalitions in each country along. Interestingly enough, she does not account for other cleavages that might exist in the societies, only ethnic cleavages.

Party Systems - Differences

2008-03-16T23:44:00.001-05:00

Party systems differ in a remarkable number of ways; this week’s readings highlight this point. Ware (1996) suggests two approaches to discussing the ways in which party systems differ: the sociological approach and the institutional approach. The sociological approach emphasizes divisions or cleavages as an explanation as to why party systems differ, while the institutional approach looks upon electoral systems, state institutions, and rules. While the two approaches vary, they have reached some common ground; such as proponents of the sociological approach include institutional factors in their analysis. “Today many of the arguments originally made by the ‘sociologists’ are now accepted by the ‘institutionalists’ and vice versa; where they differ is in the weight they attach to the different factors that determine the character of a particular party systems” (Ware, 184).

The Sociological Approach emphasizes cleavages, both class cleavages and non-class cleavages. These different cleavages originated during different time periods and still have an effect on party systems today. Ware (1996) defines four lines of cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokken: centre-periphery, state-church, land- industry, and owner-worker. The first cleavage, the centre-periphery cleavage, originated over disputes as to weather a societies religion should be national or international (Roman Catholic) and conflicts over language in nation-states (using Latin or national languages). The second cleavage, the state-church cleavage, arose around disputes over issues, such as education of citizens, between the state and the church. The third cleavage, the land-industry cleavage, centered on conflicts “between agricultural and industrial interests” (Ware, 187). The final cleavage, the owner-worker cleavage, arose around “a conflict of loyalty… those of a commitment to an international revolutionary movement and those of the national polity” (Ware, 188). The sociological approach’s emphasis on cleavages “links the pattern of parties evident in particular countries to patterns on social cleavages” (Ware, 188). The lecture by Kriesi (1998) falls in line with the sociological approach outlined by Ware (1996). Kriesi argues that since World War II a new middle class has emerged which he divides into managers and sociocultural professionals at the extremes and technocrats in the middle. The managers, who are “employees in administrative hierarchies” (168) identify on the right while the professionals, who possess “specialized knowledge and expertise,”(168) identify on the left. This distinction between the professional and managers is similar to the owner-worker cleavage outlined above. The manager has a “high level of loyalty to the organization” while the professional is less likely to identify with the organization. Kriesi advances this cleavage into an argument for a “value cleavage,” where the sociocultural professionals developed ‘left-libertarian” values through their daily experiences at work, and the managers develop an adversarial role to the sociocultural professionals in a similar fashion. Kriesi’s analysis also identifies cleavages other than this class cleavage such as urban rural cleavages, religious cleavages and linguistic cleavages; all of which relate back to the previously discussed cleavages in Ware (1996). Using these lines of cleavage Kriesi shows that electoral systems within Switzerland differ greatly from canton to canton with cleavages overlapping. These cleavages in turn, following Ware (1996), allow for parties to draw upon these cleavages and manipulate them to their benefit, linking the party to a social group on one side of the cleavage.

The institutional approach, outlined by Ware (1996), is concerned with the role that institutions, rules, procedures and structures play in the differences between party systems. The most famous argument for the institutional approach was made by Duverger and is known as Duverger’s Law: “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” (cited by Ware, 1996, 191). This is a plurality electoral system with a single member district. Duverger also argues, “where there is proportional representation… and where there are second ballot systems…there is a tendency for multipartism to persist” (Ware 1996 191). Threshold rules and state institutions also affect party systems. Countries that are presidential or parliamentary or semi-presidential affect party systems, where presidential systems tend toward cooperation among parties. Coppedge’s article falls in line with the institutional approach by examining elections in Latin American party systems. Coppedge (1998) focuses on party competition, fragmentation and volatility as well as ideology in party systems across Latin America in the 20th century. His research is clearly more attune to institutional approach by looking at factors such as the parties as institutions, the rules of the system and state institutions that make up a party system. Among the ideology of parties he finds parties that are extremely ideological and those that are not. He finds highly fragmented and institutionalized and those that are not. What he finds is that Latin America is very heterogeneous with regard to differences in party systems. Party systems vary greatly among countries. Based on the effective number of parties (based on vote share)[ENPV] for instance, and the effective number of ideological blocs (ENB), Coppedge calculates the fragmentation and ideological diversity of different party systems and compares them. He finds that in terms of ENPV that Chile, Ecuador and democratic Brazil are more fragmented then the other countries of study while Chile and Ecuador are more ideologically diverse then other countries. This particular example shows the difference between the institutional approach and the sociological approach. Both approaches have their own merits. Institutions do matter but so do sociological factors. Ware (1996) argues that institutions become more important after the first few years of a newly formed democracy (200). Ware also argues that the sociological approach is better suited to explaining “variations between party systems at periods, and in regimes where, most voters have become tied to a party through identifying with a particular social group to which the party is linked” (201).

2008-03-16T23:33:00.001-05:00

Daniel Chwalisz
Dr. Guo
Weekly paper
03.16.08

The Differences in Party Systems

Ware shows three distinct approaches to the study of the differences between political party systems. The three models Ware uses to describe the differences found between various political party systems are the institutional, sociological and competitive approach.

The institutional approach to understanding the differences between political party systems relies upon a nation’s institutional factors. It uses these institutional factors to explain the differences and allows the scholar to make predictions concerning the type of party system that will develop in a nation knowing its institutions. One of the clearest examples of the institutional approach is from Duverger who states that a system that has single member districts and utilizes a simple majority system will naturally develop a two party system. This is due to the fact that in a system where a single member district and a simple majority naturally sparks a competitive environment where the parties must go head to head and only one may win in any given race. Therefore, two strong parties will emerge in order to try and compete with greater parity.

The sociological approach relies heavily on aspects of the society in which the society resides. It uses the history of the nation to explain the differences in the way political party systems develop. The different social cleavages which develop in a nation will effect the way in which the political party system take form. These historic cleavages will have a lingering effect on the political environment of a nation, and can potentially last well after the cleavage has dissolved. Kriesi discusses this cleavage in his piece where his examines the reduction of traditional cleavages in Western European nations. Some of these traditional, historic cleavages are based on different economic classes, the role of the church, differing religions and different ethnic groups. It is hypothesized that these traditional cleavages helped to set up and create the party systems we see in Western Europe and have held to the modern day.

While Kriesi uses the socialistic approach to explain the party systems of Western Europe and the finds that social cleavages are the most efficient tool for understanding these party systems, it can be argued that this theory does not travel. This is exactly what Coppedge finds in his piece which discovers that the socialistic model does not fit well with the study of party systems in Latin America. Coppedge finds through a long historic examination of a nation and party system is not effective in study of Latin America, this is due to the changing environments and regimes in Latin America. Instead Coppedge opts to a shorter term study and examines the party systems of Latin America on an election by election basis. He shows that these nations have a high volatility of party systems and can swing greatly during very short period so he speculates that there might be more case by case issues that infiltrate each electoral cycle as opposed to the historic cleavages argument.

Kriesi’s argument can be seen as potentially supporting the competition based approach. The party system which develops in a nation is affected by the competitive environmental factors in a nation. For example if there is a party that can dominate the government, then the nation will more than likely remain a dominate single party system until another party can compete with the party in power and as a result change the political party system currently present in the nation. This can easily be seen in several of the nations in the Latin American study of Kriesi, where a nation can have widely different partisan structures over a short period in some cases nations completely changed their party system over the period of a single electoral cycle.

Party System Differences

2008-03-16T16:40:00.001-05:00

Ware (1996) identifies two different explanations for why party systems differ. The sociological approach links the pattern of parties to patterns of social cleavages, which were brought on by how previous conflicts were resolved and the survival of parties depends on the strength of groups in society. Lipset and Rokkan distinguish between four different kinds of cleavages in the advancement of modern industrial societies. They claim that the cleavages linked an emerging party system to older divisions in society and that parties that survived in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century did so because they drew on the identities and interests of society.

The other approach to studying why party systems differ is institutional in nature. This explanation argues that a country’s institutions are the leading explanatory force when discussing the difference. Duverger saw a immediate link between the British type of electoral system (an institutional example) and two-partism. Duverger’s Law explains that plurality voting is likely to reduce the number of parties in a system if voters are primarily connected to a national political system and that proportional representation essentially inhibits a move towards two-partism.

Ware gives other examples of electoral rules that shape the type of party system. Some of these include the structure of state institutions (presidential, parliamentary, etc.), the threshold rule, informal procedures, and the nature of the party system (federalist, specific constitutional rules, etc). One thing that both institutionalists and sociologists omit is the significance of the function of politicians as “entrepreneurs”, that they may actually create these lines of division within society. Schattschneider points this out in his challenge to the sociological model. He argues that among these divisions within society, some will become dominant in that they form the focus of division between parties and other cleavages become overridden and irrelevant to political competition. Party leaders exploit cleavages that provide access to government for their party. These leaders force order through their attempts to acquire and keep power and therefore politics influences the formation of party systems as much as society does.

Both Ware (1996) and Kriesi (1998) seem to believe that the sociological approach is best able to explain variations between party systems. Kriesi attempts to show that even if cleavage politics has recently been on the decline, there is still not an “end of structuration of politics by social divisions” (165). I am not convinced however that Kriesi was able to be fully persuasive in his analysis. If one basis their analysis of cleavages on Lipset and Rokkan’s work, they are not allowing for change that might occur in society. Do these lines of cleavages supersede everything else over time? Could there be other changes in a given country that might actually create these cleavages instead of the other way around?

In his article on Latin American parties, Coppedge (1998) argues that the sociological view is insufficient when studying the region because their party systems develop and change quicker than the social cleavages. He maintains that the institutional elements are the prevailing determinant of party system changes in the region. Coppedge assembled a widespread classification of Latin American parties, evaluating ideological clarity, polarization, fragmentation, personalism, volatility, and the mean left-right position of parties in eleven countries. In several ways this latter analysis is attractive, mainly because it corresponds to our concepts of left and right in politics.

However, I am curious as to just how exclusive Coppedge’s theory is to Latin America. Perhaps party systems of democratizing countries are similar to one another and therefore institutional elements would be a big factor in all of them and not just Latin America. The occurrence of leaders trying to use and manipulate institutional factors in order to maintain power occurs in many places, for example in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Mair and van Biezen 2001). Political leaders from the old communist governments still tried to hold on to power and therefore built institutions in order to guarantee their own party’s safety as well as their own. While the sociological argument is interesting, there is no need in totally discounting institutionalism. Perhaps the integration of the two as Ware suggests would be feasible in explaining more, although at the expense of parsimony.

Annotated Bibliography- Party System Differences

2008-03-15T02:10:00.002-05:00

Alyson Kennedy
March 17, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Party System Differences

Dobell, W. M. 1986. “Updating Duverger’s Law.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 19: 585-95.

Earlier this semester, we discussed the notion that the development of a classification scheme for party systems would allow for cross-national comparison; such a scheme would make it possible to determine the factors which influence the development of two distinctly different party systems in countries with similar electoral rules, institutions, and societal conditions. Dobell notes that Canada and India have failed to develop two-party systems, even though they employ similar electoral rules and have similar institutions to other nations with two-party systems. These two countries are commonly cited as exceptions to Duverger’s Law, which says that when a country employs plurality rule with single-member districts a two-party system will develop.
Dobell suggests that Duverger’s Law needs to be revised in order to account for the presence of minor parties in Canada and India. Most notably, Durverger’s Law only accounts for the death of minor parties. That is, Duverger suggests that voters will be unwilling to “waste” their votes by supporting minor party candidates where the electoral rules are such that these parties could never gain control of government. Presumptively, when these minor parties consistently failed in their electoral attempts, they would disband and/or be absorbed by one of the major parties. Thus, Duverger’s Law accounts only for the dissolution of parties; it says nothing about the formation of minor parties.
Dobell considers two possible reformulations of Duverger’s Law. The first, posited by Rae (1971), claims that “plurality formulae are always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minority parties exist” (586). Riker (1982) notes a second possibility that:
plurality election rules bring about and maintain two-party competition except in countries (1) where third parties nationally are continually one of two parties locally, and (2) one party among several is almost always that Condorcet winner in elections (588-89).
Rejecting each of these reformulations, Dobell concludes that minor parties exist in Canada and India for three reasons. First, voters do not consider the major parties to be acceptable alternatives to one another (592). Secondly, Leftist parties refuse to unite with the more liberal of the major parties or with each other and insist on pursuing elected office under separate party labels. Finally, minor parties exist “because of the frequent absence of more than one party possessing the plausible image of being a national party” (594).

Gross, Donald A. and Lee Sigelman. 1984. “Comparing Party Systems: A Multidimensional Approach.” Comparative Politics 16: 463-79.

In an attempt to facilitate comparison of party systems cross-nationally and over time, comparativists developed a set of numerical indices of different party system attributes. While this approach makes comparison easier, requiring only that the researcher compare one value to another, it greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of party systems. Focusing on a single attribute increases the likelihood that party systems will appear similar when, in fact, they are not or that unexpected similarities will be ignored (463). Gross and Sigelman argue that a method for comparing party systems should take multidimensionality into account.
Party systems are structures of representation and articulation (464). Parties attempt to gain control of government by having their candidates elected to office. Once in office, parties serve an articulation function as well by enacting their policy or ideological program through government policy. A complete classification of party systems, then, should allow for comparison across various dimensions of representation and articulation. Gross and Sigelman posit a four-prong system of comparing party systems; party systems can be compared in terms of party fractionalization (the degree to which the party system is competitive), ideological fractionalization (the degree to which parties are distributed along the left-right continuum), the location of the ideological center of gravity (where does the ideological center of a party system fall along the left-right continuum?), and ideological polarization (the extent to which a party system has parties that are located at the extreme ends of the left-right continuum, with no or few parties occupying the center of the continuum). Accordingly:
every party system can be seen as occupying a position on the continuum representing each attribute. Moreover, the attributes are…separate from one another…Since we are dealing with four conceptually independent attributes, each party system is represented as a point in a four-dimensional space…[and] numerical quantities are assigned to the interpoint distances (467-68).
Taking this approach, forty-six party systems are compared. Data are taken from the 1979 Britannica Book of the Year; party systems that “contain more than purely token opposition” to the dominant party and that can be coded along the left-right continuum are included in the analysis (469). Using multidimensional scaling, the authors find that their four-part system of comparison is overly complex; rather, party systems can be compared along two dimensions, party and ideological fractionalization and polarization. Gross and Sigelman also find that “leftist-oriented systems tend to be more fractionalized and more polarized than do rightist-oriented systems” (476).

Inglehart, Ronald. 1984. “The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society.” in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flannagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 25-69.

While the argument advanced by Inglehart is not directly relevant to this week’s discussion of party system differences, it is the counter to or revision of the argument advanced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and, thus, is included here. Lipset and Rokkan argue that party systems are based on cultural and class-based cleavages that developed given a country’s history. By contrast, Inglehart argues that developing party systems are shaped by the demands and pressures of and advances made by modern industrial societies and that existing party systems are being transformed by these same forces.
Inglehart asserts that traditional left-right cleavages, which involved conflict over the ownership of the means of production and distribution of income, have been replaced in advanced industrial nations by cleavages that tend to cut across this left-right dimension. The new cleavages are structured along a materialist-postmaterialist dimension. “The rise of postmaterialist issues tends to neutralize political polarization based on social class” (28). Postmaterialist issues include the environment, nuclear power, the women’s movement, the consumer advocacy movement, and the peace movement. Differences between traditional party cleavages and contemporary issue cleavages place the party system under stress; at some point, a restructuring will occur. This restructuring may come in the form of new political parties or the selection of new elites to take over existing parties.
While political party alignments may have been stable for generations and continue to shape voting behavior, traditional cleavages will not provide individuals with the initial motivation for becoming politically active. Those mobilized by postmaterialist issues tend to come from higher income groups, but are dissatisfied with society and open to social change. Additionally, they tend to side with the Left. When postmaterialist issues become salient, they may stimulate a materialist reaction, whereby the working class will side with the Right to reaffirm materialist interests, like economic growth and national security. Clearly, this alignment of the working class on the Right and the more affluent on the Left is just the opposite of what occurred when parties were organized along class-based cleavages. These claims are tested by surveying a representative national sample of publics in nine nations in combination with a sample of 742 candidates running for European Parliament.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction.” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press, 1-64.

History causes party systems to differ from one country to the next. Lipset and Rokkan argue that history influences the development of social cleavages, which become political cleavages. These cleavages are ultimately expressed in the party system (2). Broad structural cleavages, based on culture, social class, and ideology, developed in the early part of the twentieth century along which alliances were formed. These cleavages resulted from both national and industrial revolutions. National revolutions forced individuals to choose sides based on territorial or culture identity, while the industrial revolution forced individuals to choose sides based on economic interests (14). The alliances that were formed along these cleavages reflected these territorial/cultural and economic distinctions. Territorial/cultural alliances were formed between people who were from the same region or who shared a common culture. Economic cleavages led to the formation of alliances among members of the same social class. Functional alliances were formed among individuals with a common ideology. These alliances were ultimately expressed in the party system via political parties. The impact of cleavages on the structure of the party system is the result of the ease or difficulty each coalition or alliance experienced in gaining representation within the political system.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1981. “Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability, and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies.” American Political Science Review 75: 861-79.

“The writings on democratic party systems concur in characterizing party systems with substantial extremist party voting as ‘weak.’ But theorists disagree on the desirable attributes of ‘strong’ party systems” (876). Powell examines competing explanations for determining the strength of a party system. The dominant view suggests “that a strong party system must be able to ‘moderate and channel participation of newly mobilized groups in such a manner as not to disrupt the system’” (861). Alternative conceptualizations argue that party system strength can be evaluated in terms of aggregative majoritarianism (the party system is dominated by one or a few parties), responsible majoritarianism (the party system is dominated by one or a few parties that are meaningfully different in terms of policy program), fractionalization (the party system lacks a dominant party or parties and parties do not have strong linkages to voters), and representation (the party system lacks a dominant party or parties but parties have strong linkages to voters and social groups).
Using these alternative views of party system strength and separating extremist from non-extremist party systems, Powell classifies the party systems of thirty democracies. He then compares them in terms of system strength and performance. System performance is measured by factors such as turnout, executive stability (if the executive’s tenure is ended prior to the next scheduled election for reasons other than death or retirement for health reasons), instances of riots, the number of deaths resulting from political violence, and whether democracy has been suspended.
Powell concludes that strong support for extremist parties is correlated with poor system performance. Additionally, there was no relationship between system strength and performance and death resulting from political violence or regime suspension, when controlling for environmental factors, like presence of ethnic minorities and level of economic development. Party systems where there are strong linkages between the parties and various segments of society demonstrate higher turnout. It is also interesting to note that representational systems experience less political violence and fractionalized systems experience the greatest amount of executive instability.

2008-03-02T23:58:00.000-06:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz II
Dr. Guo
03/02/08
Comparative Parties
Weekly Paper

This week’s readings concern the classifications of different political parties and the partisan systems in which the parties reside. The classical approach to party classification is to divide the systems along the two party, or multiparty systems. This classification structure relies solely on the amount of political parties that were relatively competitive in the system. If there were two competitive parties then the system was considered a two party system and if the system contained more than two competitive parties then it would be classified as a multiparty system. This system of classification has been largely relegated to be used as a simple explanatory tool for an elementary understanding of comparative politics.
The large majority of the field has evolved beyond the classification structure that examines only the number of parties that are in the system to a classification structure that allows for a more specification and will allow for an increased ability to compare the different partisan systems.
One of the most widely accepted modern classification structures for organizing the systems of political parties is the Sartori Schema. Sartori uses two main characteristics of the partisan system in his schema to help classify these systems. He uses the level of party fragmentation and the ideological distance between the main political parties in the system. By the use of these two variables, Sartori is able to create four different classification structures for party systems. These categories are the two party systems, the polarized multipartisian system, the moderate mulitpartisian system, and the segmented multipartisan system.
To Satori and other authors of this week's readings the ideologies of the political parties involved is a determining factor in which type of partisan system will develop. It has been found that if the parties are located at opposite ends of a philosophical spectrum this will lead to direct competition between them and if a party develops inside the same part of the political spectrum then it will split the vote of the those that fit in the part of the spectrum and as a result there will be electoral losses.
Another great factor that affect which type of partisan system develops in a country are institutional factors in that country. It has been determined that whether or not a country has a parliamentary system or a presidential system will have an effect on the style of partisan system will develop. As well, the electoral system that is in place in the country will have a strong effect on the type of partisan system. If a system creates strong competition between the parties by establishing a system where each election is a zero sum game, then it can logically be assumed that a two party system will develop. In this style of system where there is a zero sum game because it can be assumed that there is a fixed number of seats, and by having a fixed number of seats each gained seat by a party is at the loss of another opponent party as well any gain by an opponent is costly to the party in that it looses seats. This fact where control is made by having a majority of the seats will lead to a consolidation of all the parties into a two party system.
The authors this week also discuss how the party system a country adopts can evolve over time and they offer several historical examples. In Italy, the top two parties that developed were a communist party and a more western party. It is with this system that there grew great cooperation with all of the parties that opposed the communists and the dominant party adopted a more moderate position on most other issues in an opportunistic model to help maintain there dominant position in the coalition. The authors also discuss how a partisan system can evolve and they use the newly democratizing nations as an example. The nations examined are those of Central and Eastern Europe who are coming out of the post communist era and those newly democratizing nations of Africa. The authors show that it is quite common for a multiple party system to develop and then as the nation gains electoral experience it is quite common for the system to evolve into one of fewer dominant parties or even a two party system or one where the system is focused around one dominant party that controls almost all of the legislative body.

Annotated Bibliography

2008-03-02T23:36:00.002-06:00

Gross, Donald A. and Lee Sigelman. 1984. “Comparing Party Systems: A Multidimensional Approach.” Comparative Politics 16: 463-479.

Gross and Sigelman view party systems as a multidimensional concept that incorporates several different aspects to compare party systems. They hold that “party systems are structures of representation,” an assumption they say is basic to every party system classification. They also contend “parties also exist to aggregate and articulate certain political points of view.” With these two points of view they focus on comparison among competition among organizations and also upon competition among “ideological-programmatic outlooks.” From these two assumptions they form four variables for classification of party systems: party fractionalization, ideological fractionalization, ideological center of gravity and ideological polarization. Party fractionalization summarizes the distribution of seats among parties. Ideological fractionalization summarizes the distribution of seats among ideological positions. Ideological center of gravity is the midpoint on the ideological scale among various parties in a system. Ideological polarization is a measure of deviation of parties from the ideological center of gravity. Using these variable they are able to compare party systems considering the four attributes. They utilize this measure to compare forty-six different party systems. They find that a two-dimensional representation of party systems is just as clear as a four-dimenstional model. Party fractionalization and ideological fractionalization have no significant empirical difference furthermore they find that ideological polarization is very important to differentiating between party systems.

Molinar, Juan. 1991. “Counting the number of parties: An Alternative Index.” American Political Science Review 85: 1383-1391.

Molinar’s review of two indexes used to count parties finds that both of them are insufficient in differentiating between party systems. The effective number of parties index proposed by Rein Taagepera overstates the relevance of large parties in a system while the hyperfractionalization index or Kesselman-Wildgen index overstates the relevance of smaller parties. Molinar proposes a new index based of the effective number of parties index. The difference, he states, is the treatment of the winning party. The new model, called number of parties, counts the winning party, regardless of size, as one and weights the others by their contribution. In this way the problem of overstating the relevance of large parties in a system is overcome. The rationale of the model is that it considers the size of the winning party, the gap between the two largest parties, and concentration of minority parties in a system. This method effectively distinguishes between two-party, two-and-a-half-party, and three or more party systems better then the two review indexes.

Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1993. “Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger’s Mechanical Effect.” American Political Science Review 87: 455-464.

Taagepera and Shugart posit and prove a rule that Duverger observed previously that one seat district lead to two-party systems and that multi-seat districts lead to multi-party systems. They calculate the effective number of parties in a district for the number of seats of the district and in a related model the effective number of parties based on the magnitude and seats in national assemblies. They find that the district magnitude is related to the effective number of parties. The variables of district magnitude and assembly size help to define the party system of a country.

Blondel,J. 1968. “Party Systems and patterns of Government in Western Democracies.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 1: 180-203.

Blondel offers a categorization of parties based on the number of votes a party receives, the strength of the party, and the ideological position of the party. Six total groups of party systems are identified by this categorization. “On one extreme are the broadly based parties of the two party system countries” and on the other are multi-party systems with small ideologically divide parties. The notion of the two and a half party system is introduced and defined as a system with two large parties and one smaller party centre party also the dominate multi-party system is introduced.

McKown, Roberta E., Robert E. Kauffman. 1973. “Party Systems as a Comparative Analytic Concept in African Politics.” Comparative Politics 6: 47-72.

McKown and Kauffman include a classification of Party Systems with the categories of no effective party, one-party, one-party dominant, and multiparty in an attempt to assess the usefulness of party system categorization as a variable in the comparative study of African Nations. What they find is that the number of parties that were identified as multiparty party systems have declined this category included two-party systems. Their overall findings are that the structure of the party systems in Africa have no bearing on political, economic, or social chance

Classification of Party Systems

2008-03-02T19:34:00.003-06:00

Many scholars seem to believe there is a need for a classification system in regards to party systems, but they disagree however on exactly how the classification should be formed. When examining the literature related to this, one should look at the demand for a classification system and the different types of classification schemes put forth by scholars. After doing so one should ask the question whether it is clear that characteristics of certain classifications are better at categorizing party systems.

The reason behind constructing a classification system comes from the desire to illustrate how parties evolved into their current structure as well as functioning as a guide to party systems (Ware 1996). In his explanation of the formation of parties, Duverger looks at conflict among parties and differentiates between metaphysical and technical dualism as probable causes for the structures of parties. Duverger shows that all parties have factions and when these sides cannot concede there is a propensity to move away from dualism and the parties divide or members leave one party and form another, which sets the stage for a multiparty system (Mair 1990).

Once the foundation has been laid regarding how parties have evolved to their current formation, one can assess which parties should be included when setting up a classification of party systems. The literature seems to be situated on discussion this inclusion or exclusion of parties based on specific standards. Sartori’s method of doing so includes the potential coalition building and blackmail conditions. If a party meets neither of these conditions, the party’s tactics come into play. He suggests that these tactics may increase party competition or change the direction of the current competition among parties. If this is the case, Sartori believes the party should be included in his classification (Mair 1990). That being said, excluding some parties but not others may hamper the accuracy of classification systems. Since classification systems are employed to illustrate why parties act as they do as well as trying to predict the behavior of these parties and party systems, problems may arise out of leaving some parties out. A particular party that was excluded may not be important at that particular time, but could gain momentum and in the future become important political actors. When excluding these parties in we are not able to observe everything in a changing party system.

After figuring out which parties should be part of the classification system, one can then decide on what standards should be utilized in classifying the actual parties. It is here that much contention is found in this week’s readings regarding these standards and ultimately the number of parties within the system. Blondel’s classification is mainly based on the numbers of parties in the system but he also involves the strength of the parties, support, ideology, leadership, and organizational structure (Mair 1990). Dahl’s theory is akin to Blondel’s, but he takes into account not only the number of parties and organizational structure, but the concentration of opposition within a party system as well. As opposed to Rokkan and Sartori, both Dahl and Blondel apply elements of the general behavior of the party and party system instead of purely numerical classifications. Sartori employs party fragmentation and ideological distance in his classification. Within each of these two divisions he evaluates differences within parties which entails the intensity in how parties spread out into society, ideology, stance the party has towards government leadership, and number of parties in each system. In other words, party fragmentation illustrates the size and number of parties.

In an attempt to synthesize these separate notions of how party systems should be categorized, Bogaards (2004) integrates several classifications for eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. In his analysis, Bogaards discovers that the classifications put forth by Blondel, Ware, and Sartori, produce comparable results. Utilizing Sartori’s classification, he is capable of characterizing four types of multiparty systems in the African region: dominant, dominant authoritarian, non-dominant, and pulverized. This classification of party systems steers him to the conclusion that dominant parties are more prominent in this region in Africa.

Bogaards’ findings help bring about a few interesting questions for future research. If the political structure is controlled prevalently by dominant parties, these parties are could very well cause problems for developing democracies. Here is an excellent example of why one should study party classification and/or why it is important in political science. Next, although Bogaards gives a convincing case for using Sartori’s classification, there is always a need for more research on classification systems. The standards used by Sartori may need to be changed a little in order to offset the revamping occurring within parties and party systems.

I also find the cutoff points used in vote and seat shares to be problematic throughout the literature. For instance, Ware proposes a minimal vote share of 40% and a minimal seat share of 45% for parties to be considered dominant (other authors propose their own cutoff points). These cutoff points are typically presented ad hoc without additional reasoning or justification. What is the reasoning behind a party with 39% of the vote being treated differently than one that has 40% of the vote? Furthermore, why exactly should vote shares matter to start with? As mentioned previously, why should parties that always gain a plurality or majority of seats but have vote shares below the proposed threshold be left out? The assumed effects of a party’s eminence or lasting control of government described by some of this week’s authors are clearly not a direct function of its vote shares.

And finally, several of the readings suggest the inclusion of a divided opposition, or a minimal distance between the largest party and the second largest when characterizing single-party dominance. Here again, some of the suggested separation points could be viewed as almost random. In other words, does opposition or party system fragmentation inevitably decide a party’s bargaining position? Would there be a difference for a party holding a majority of the seats if there were two opposed to eight other parties? Or do these numbers even matter?

Weekly Paper- Party System Classification

2008-03-02T18:18:00.001-06:00

Alyson Kennedy
March 3, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Party System Classification

Party systems can be understood as the grouping of parties within a state. Party systems are often highly complex. As Ware (1996) notes, classifying party systems simplifies this complexity and allows political scientists to draw conclusions about why a particular party system developed based on the characteristics of its individual parties. In this sense, classifying party systems allows for cross-national comparison; if party x in a given country has several features that are similar to those possessed by party y in a different country, and yet those two countries have radically different party systems, political scientists could then examine the conditions that led to the development of different party systems where individual parties are similar. However, and as this week’s readings make clear, classifying party systems is not easy. Determining the number of parties in a party system is particularly difficult. The purpose of this paper is to first discuss the criteria by which party systems are classified and then turn to the problem of determining the number of parties in a given system.

Ware (1996) recognizes four criteria that are useful for building a classification of party systems. First, party systems differ in the extent to which parties penetrate society (or how involved parties are in the lives of voters). The degree of penetration affects competition in terms of the ease by which new parties form. Weak penetration makes it easier for new parties to form. Conversely, a high degree of penetration means that most parties will concentrate on maintaining their following, simultaneously reducing the likelihood that these parties will become catch-all organizations and that new parties will develop. Secondly, the ideology of the individual parties must be taken into account when classifying party systems. Some party systems will exhibit a wide range of ideological leanings while others will have a relatively narrow range. Third, some party systems may include anti-system parties- parties that do not accept the premises of liberal democratic governance. If such parties gain control of government, they will attempt to “change the rules” (Ware 1996, 153). Finally, and most controversially (at least given this week’s readings), party systems can be classified according to the number of parties they contain, leading researchers to define party systems as two-party, multiparty, or something in between.

Ware’s criteria provide a good starting point for determining what should be considered when developing a typology of party systems. However, I wonder whether, in practice, they actually lead to a simplified understanding of reality. That is, I can imagine that trying to classify parties according to four criteria could lead to many different combinations of degrees of penetration, range of ideology, stance toward legitimacy, and the number of parties. Given this, I wonder whether there would be more than one or maybe two party systems per category. In the interest of parsimony, it might be better to select a single criterion for classification, although determining which one presents its own set of difficulties. Certainly, several of this week’s authors seem to suggest that the number of parties is the appropriate criterion.

Turning specifically to the issue of counting the number of parties in a given party system, there is little agreement as to how this should be done. That is, researchers disagree as to which parties should be included as members of the party system and which should be left out. For example, Blondel (1990) contends that the number of parties should be determined according to electoral performance. By contrast, rather than counting the number of effective parties, Bogaards (2004) notes that party systems in emerging democracies, like those in Africa, are best understood by using Sartori’s rules for counting (coalition potential and blackmail potential). Alternatively, Dahl (1990) that only competitive parties, those that are able to gain electorally at the expense of their opponent(s), should be included as party system actors.

Early attempts to classify party systems based on the number of parties led to parties systems being labeled things like two-party, two-and-a-half party, three-party, and multiparty (presumptively more than three parties). How one determines which parties to count (like in terms of electoral performance, for example) determines the number of parties one finds in a given system and, thus, how one classifies that system. For example, Blondel (1990) concludes that multiparty systems are those in which two parties obtain 2/3 or less of the national vote and two-party systems are those in which more than 90% of the national vote is split between two parties. Similarly, a three-party system would be one in which the national vote was more or less evenly among three parties (although this has never been witnessed in a liberal democracy). Rokkan (1990) finds evidence of a two-and-a-half party system which is understood as “two large parties running neck and neck for the majority point but generally thwarted in their endeavors by the persistence of one small above-threshold party” (311). This brief review illustrates Sartori’s (1990) observation that there is little agreement on how classification should work, with the result being that every researcher develops his own classification scheme, which does not serve to move political science forward.

As Sartori (1990, 316) notes, counting the number of parties is meaningless. That is, the number of parties in a given system matters, but simply counting may not allow us to understand exactly how it matters. Earlier research considered any party system having more than three parties as a multiparty system. Arguably, there are also types of multiparty systems. Sartori attempts to address this concern by considering ideology and party fragmentation in order to differentiate between types of multiparty systems. In doing this, Sartori identifies four different types of party systems- two-partism, polarized multipartism, moderate multipartism, and segmented multipartism.

Sartori’s method of classifying party systems goes beyond simply counting the number of parties; it indicates how the number of parties, the ideological distance between the parties, and the party composition of the legislature interact to form a particular type of party system. This interaction offers some suggestion as to why the number of parties is important to classifying party systems. At various points throughout the semester, we have criticized party classification schemes for being applicable only to Western European democracies. Sartori’s classification scheme may be especially useful in that, at least according to Bogaards (2004), it is applicable to party systems in emerging democracies outside of Europe. This wide range of applicability may suggest that Sartori’s method should be adopted by future researchers.

Just to prove that I'm not making this stuff up...

2008-02-25T22:18:00.002-06:00

Here is the citation for the book I mentioned today in class that uses Australia as a most similar case to explain why the United States has never had a labor party. Seriously, I'm not just making this stuff up.

Archer, Robin. 2007. Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States? Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Annotated Bib.

2008-02-25T00:16:00.000-06:00

Daniel Chwalisz
Dr. Quo
02/23/08
Annotated Bibliography

Bendix, John, Bertell Oilman, Bartholomew H. Sparrow and Timothy P Mitchell (1992) ‘Going beyond the State?) American Political Science Review. 86: 1008-21.
This article challenges the assertions made concerning the nature and definition of a state made by Mitchell in his work ‘The Limits of the State’ in 1991. They ask fundamental questions about the nature of a state such as how its power is derived and how and why the state uses this power. One question that must be asked is the state like other associations in that it exists in order to serve as the governing body of its membership, or is the state different since membership in the state is not voluntary and the state is not checked by any other organization. Additionally, the state reserves the sole power to legitimize other organizations. Another question that needs to be addressed is what is the motivation that the state uses to access how to use their power. Does the state serve the purposes of its constituent groups, or does it serve as the protector of its members or is the state passive and controlled by its members.

The Limits of the State: Beyond Statistic Approaches and Their Critics
Timothy Mitchell The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 1. (Mar., 1991), pp. 77-96.
This piece deals with the nature of the state and how it has never clearly been defined. Is the state defined solely on the organizational structures and formal government or is there a greater social aspect that helps to define the state. Is the populace attached to the formal aspects of the state such as the land and the institutions or is there a greater civic loyalty to other sources such as political parties, other organizations, and cultural attachments?

Straddling the East-West Divide: Party Organization and Communist Legacies in East Central Europe
James Toole Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 1. (Jan., 2003), pp. 101-118.
This reading examines the evolution of political parties in three post communist Eastern Block Countries Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines how parties developed in these countries to be very similar to the political parties of Western Europe in their belief in the Democratic Rule and even on issue stances and platform agendas. But there are differences in the organizational structure of the parties of these countries. Toole determined that the parties of these Eastern European Countries are driven by the elites and party leaders. Toole stipulates that these Eastern European Countries choose this elite driven model for their political parties partly as a hang over effect of the nation’s previous traditions in the communist system. Under the communist system, the party leaders held great control over the direction of the party and in fact the direction of the government and the nation.

A Comparison of the American and British Party Systems
James K. Pollock, Jr. Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Mar., 1930), pp. 207-221.
This reading, although a bit antiquated being written in 1930, is a great piece which discusses the strengths and weakness of the political party organizations found in the United States and the United Kingdom. The author Pollock goes into great detail on the organizational structures of the political parties of the two nations. He does a great job explaining how the environment in which the parties operates dictates how the party will organize. Pollock then discusses that the parties choose to operate in a manner that is best suited to meet the restrictions placed on them by the laws and culture of the nation in which they are operating. He shows this by examining the constitutional factors that affect the development of parties and helps to shape their membership. As well the laws and election styles of the respective country will decide the organizational style the parties take. These laws and the traditions of the nation also affect how the parties will nominate the candidates and how the role they take in the society which they reside in.

The Impacts of Party Membership Size: A Cross-National Analysis
Alexander C. Tan The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Feb., 1998), pp. 188-198.
This work examines the relationship of the size of the membership of a political party and its relative effect on the organizational structure of the party. The work examines how participation is affected by the size of the party’s membership as well as how the organizational complexity is affected. Additionally, the piece examines how the centralization of power is affected by an increase in the size of the membership of the political party. As a party increases in size it becomes more difficult to have a method of democratic control of the party, therefore the party is required to find some form of representative control for its members. Additionally, as a party increases in size there is a great deal more administrative and executive needs that must be met. The parties are then forced to deal with this by adding layers of complexity to handle these new demands. In addition to the demands increase there is also an increase in the need for centralization for the party. The party must become more responsive and focused to be able to better handle and meet the demands of a larger membership, the intuitive and easiest way to address these demands is to centralize power inside the power. By resting more administration power to a few top leaders of the party it makes it far easier for the party to be responsive to the demands and issues that a larger party would face than it would be feasible for a more representative method of party leadership.

Political Institutionalization and Party Development in Post-Communist Poland
Paul G. Lewis Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 5. (1994), pp. 779-799.
The article address the development of political institutions in Poland after their rejection of the Communist system and the Eastern Block of Europe. The Polish people had to face many challenges in developing a new democracy, such as what type of parties to develop and how to get the electorate involved after so many years of deprivation from the political process caused by the authoritarian control of the Communist Party. There have been many criticisms of the path that the Polish have taken such as the political parties were not developed enough to sustain a government after the first general election for the legislature of Poland. As well there has been a low voter turnout in Polish election since it has transformed their government. The Polish people have tremendous challenge in their efforts to develop a party system that meets their needs as a newly developing country.

Parties - Organizations

2008-02-24T22:41:00.002-06:00

The organizational makeups of political parties differ in many respects, and many different typologies have been advanced to portray these differences. This weeks reading outline several of these organizational typologies that help our understanding of political parties and their development. Four different approaces to studying political party organizations from this weeks readings are discussed below.

Ware (1996) outlines three different approaches of studying party organizations. The first is the “electoral competition” models based on Duverger and Epstein. Though they differ in how the structural components of parties change, they both acknowledge, “that party organizations change in response to the demands of electoral competition” (Ware, 1996, 102). In other words competition breeds adaptation by the political parties. This relates somewhat to the notion of “Cartel parties” in both Koole (1996) and Katz and Mair (1995 and 1996). Koole asserts that, “the idea of a cartel is that it involves all major competitors in a ‘market’ (Koole, 508). Koole says that Katz and Mair (1995) idea of a cartel of parties is not new and summarizes them by asserting they view that established parties collaborate with each other to “prevent the entry of newcomers into the party system” with the help of state resources (Koole, 1996, 515).

The second approach is the “institutional” model. Panebianco argues that parties are constrained by their past as to what changes they can make to their organizations. He links the past, conditions of when the party was founded, to “patterns of power relations with the party (and between the party organizations its external environment) that could develop after its founding” (Ware, 1996, 100). Duverger does not deny that past plays an important role in how a party changes its structure; in fact the past is partly a basis for which he builds his typology, but he asserts that electoral forces will cause change. Specifically that caucus structured organization (related to cadre, elite based parties) will be forced to change to a branch structured organization (mass based parties), or a hybrid between a branch and caucus structure, to compete for votes. Epstein, on the other hand, views “party organization as nothing more than a response to the competition for votes” (Ware, 1996, 97). Panebianco does not deny the power of electoral change either, the difference between the two lies in the importance of different factors. In Panebianco’s argument parties are more constrained by their past.

The third approach, the "sociological" approach, is based on the importance of resources to party organizations. The availability of resources can influence the way in which a party organization forms its structure. An example is that the importance of a charismatic leader can be considered a resource in that the leader “might conceivably be available to an otherwise resource-poor party but not to a party that was ‘rich’ in both money and members” (Ware, 1996, 106). Epstein and Duverger incorporate this idea of resources into their argument. Epstein says parties need money to acquire services such as television airtime, and opinion polling (Ware, 1996, 97). Duverger says the organizational form of the Socialist Party, a form of mass based or branch structured political parties, was “superior because of the greater opportunities it provided for acquiring resources” (Ware, 1996, 96-97). For both Duverger and Epstein, the logic of competition is at the heart of their argument. The difference mentioned above between Epstein and Duverger plays out here. Duverger views the mass as the key to getting resources; the more members a party had the more resources, like money and labor, it could obtain (97). Epstein views a large membership as a constraint on the party. His view is that money to buy services is “more easily acquired from interest groups and individual donors than through seeking to recruit large mass membership” (Ware, 1996, 97). He argues that party leaders are more flexible to make decisions without the constraints of a large membership (97).

A final approach to studying party organizations come from Wolinetz (2002). In his approach he distinguishes between vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking parties and orients them within a triangle. Vote-seeking parties emphasize maximizing votes to win elections while policy-seeking and office seeking emphasize issues and holding office respectively. Parties can be positioned to incorporate more than just one emphasis on the triangle (i.e. a party can be both vote-seeking and office-seeking). But their organizations are developed to try and maximize their particular “niche.” In this view the party is structured to the goal of their objectives.

Weekly Paper- Party Organization

2008-02-24T18:56:00.000-06:00

Alyson Kennedy
February 25, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Party Organization

All parties need an organization of some type and degree in order to be able to utilize resources. The type of organization adopted by a party varies from one country to the next and even one party to the next, depending, in part, on the political environment (which conditions resource availability, for example), the extent of electoral competition, the party’s history and social context, and the party’s degree of institutionalization. For these reasons, it may be very difficult or even impossible to develop a general classification of party organization types.
The tendency seems to be to cling to the classification scheme that was developed when parties and party organizations first caught the attention of political scientists. In addition to these original categories, political scientists have attempted to update the typology by introducing new categories to cover new types of party organizations (like Katz and Mair’s (1995, 1996) cartel party, for example). This adherence to the original categorizations with occasional updates to include new types of party organizations may not be desirable. The purpose of this paper is to explore this idea as well as highlight some of the problems and potential solutions of classifying party organizations.
Political scientists want to classify party organizations in order to compare parties within a country, across countries, and over time. Rather than studying each individual party in isolation, this sort of comparison allows conclusions to be drawn about a broad class of phenomena. The difficulty in classifying party organizations is reminiscent of a similar problem that we discussed earlier this semester, that of creating an overarching typology of political parties. Efforts to categorize party organizations are plagued with the same problems as those attempts to classify political parties. Wolinetz (2002) notes three reasons that classifying party organizations is problematic. First, several of the classification schemes were created more than 50 years ago and, therefore, may not be able to accommodate the significant changes that parties and party organizations have undergone due to modernization and advances in technology. Secondly, in an effort to facilitate comparison across countries and over time, existing categories are often stretched to include parties that do not exhibit a tight fit with the definitional criteria for that category. Finally, most of the existing classification schemes are based on Western European parties, and those concepts may not travel well to new democracies, such as those in Latin America or Africa.
Ware (1996) cites three different ways to categorize (or explain variation in) party organizations- electoral competition, institutional, and sociological. Duverger and Epstein have argued that certain types of party organization develop as a result of competition for votes between parties. Panebianco, by contrast, claims that party organizations are conditioned by the relationships of actors within the party. Finally, the sociological approach contends that party organizations develop in response to the resources available to the party. There are problems inherent in each of these classification schemes. In particular, Ware criticizes Duverger’s and Epstein’s categorizations as failing to recognize that a variety of resources are necessary for a party to be successful, not just those resources associated with mobilizing voters. Similarly, Ware critiques Panebianco’s approach as being “overly-theorized” and for overestimating the power of the party’s central leadership. While these are valid criticisms, it is also valid to note that Duverger’s approach suggests that the mass party possesses a superior organizational scheme to that of the cadre, branch, or caucus parties. Duverger assumed that all modern parties, in order to be successful, would organize into mass parties. In this sense, Duverger’s theory cannot explain the success of cadre parties, like those in the United States and Canada.
Katz and Mair’s (1996) cartel party represents an attempt to add a new category to the existing classification scheme in order to include parties that have developed in modern societies. As a category, cartel parties, in part, are those that collude with each other to control resources and inhibit the rise of new parties (Ware 1996, 108). Ware (1996) notes that Katz and Mair cite state funding of parties and the growing importance of electronic media in political campaigns as evidence for this. Relative to this paper, Katz and Mair (1996) argue that the cartel party has become sufficiently common as to merit the classifying it as a separate type of party organization.
While this may provide greater accuracy than simply trying to squeeze the cartel-like parties into existing categories, it also may signal a problem. More specifically, at what point do existing categories become irrelevant? Given that several of this week’s authors referenced the creators of earlier categories, like Duverger and Panebianco, it certainly seems that the mass party and the electoral professional party are still relevant to understanding modern party organizations. However, if a new category is created for each new party type that emerges, then classification is essentially meaningless. That is, classification is only useful if we can find characteristics that the included parties have in common and if we can draw some broad conclusions about those parties based on those characteristics.
Koole (1996) notes the need to have a classification scheme that allows for the existence of several types of parties simultaneously. This would certainly help with the problem of concept-stretching in that it would allow researchers to avoid trying to fit new parties within the dominant paradigm. However, this could lead to the creation of a new category for each new party type, which would not enhance the clarity that a classification scheme is supposed to provide.
Developing a general classification scheme of party organization would be useful because it would provide ease in comparison across parties. However, it may be unrealistic to think that such a classification is possible. Crafting broad, general categories in which every party, even those emerging in new democracies outside of Europe is no small task. Doing so may cause unique characteristics of individual parties to go unnoticed. It also may encourage the sort of concept stretching that Wolinetz (2002) and others have cautioned against. In spite of these potential problems, however, there does not seem to be an alternative.

Party Organization

2008-02-24T16:38:00.002-06:00

Much of the literature on political parties deals with organization and structure, or the relationship between militants and their leaders. The position of members within parties is analogous to that of the people within a democratic state. In neither case can the masses directly control the organization that acts in their name. All large groups, including political parties, are run by a band of interested person united by a common set of beliefs or desire for power, or both.

One approach to the study of political parties it to identify states in their evolution, corresponding to the development of the societies in which they function. Von Beyme (1996) distinguishes between the elite parties, mass parties, catch-all parties, and parties of professional politicians, also called cartel parties. These states in the evolution of parties correlated roughly with the period before mass suffrage became general, class conflict engendered by industrialization, the rise of consumerism and decline of ideological conflict, and the emergence of a post-modern society wherein the political elite establishes direct contact with the people through television and other mass media.

Most recently the research on party organizations has led to this latest theory on party organization, that of the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995). The cartel party has been described as being the last stage in the evolution of parties and has developed out of increased state support to the party, which has changed the orientation and direction of parties. From this week’s readings, Koole (1996) and Wolinetz (2002) offer their critique of the cartel party theory, while Katz and Mair (1996) respond to some of these criticisms.

Koole (1996) raises several interesting points concerning the cartel party argument to include that the relationship between the state and society variables are misguided. He posits that while the boundary between the two is not clear, this does not mean that there is a greater distance between the party and society. When Katz and Mair respond to this in their 1996 article, they maintain that while Koole is correct, previous research actually offers some reasoning as to why the hypothesis that the party is becoming detached from the society was put forth to start with. One reason was that state resources given to parties allow the parties to distance themselves from society and that society perceives this exchange of resources as creating such a distance.

Koole also argues that neocorpratism has moved the state and civil society to convergence and parties are the binding factor instead of parties being disengaged from society like Katz and Mair maintain. The latter once again agree with Koole that the parties may bind the state and society, however they contend that if Koole were to look into the future his model would be similar to theirs in that the state and society would continue to move towards one another until the party is contained within the state.

This dialogue between Katz and Mair and Koole appears to be a battle of semantics. While they disagree on the relationship between parties and the state, they still arrive at the same conclusion. On one level, it seems irrelevant that the party may be completely enclosed within the state as Katz and Mair predict, because the party will still not be dissolved even if this were to happen. Koole predicts that the party would still act as a binder for society and the state. The main difference is that the state might have more influence on the party. But if society already perceives a greater relationship between the party and state and the distance between the party and society has increased, the society could very well already braced themselves for this change so this entire argument might be irrelevant.

Ware (1996) identifies another set of ways as to how parties differ in their organization being. Ware concurs with Duverger’s electoral competition theory in how parties address competition impacts their organization, however Ware also mentions that there is more to it than what Duverger proposes. Ware argues that party organization alters because it is centered on competition and the known weaknesses or strengths need to beat out the competition. Another differentiation between parties is in institutionalization. Ware maintains that Panebianco puts too much emphasis on how the party’s organization structure was formed. Alternatively, Ware suggests that more thought needs to be given to the changes made in regard to party organization over time due to electoral strategies. Ware’s third example of how party organizations differ is based on sociological reasons and while logical, I do not think it offers much insight into what type of structure emerges.

Lastly, Wolinetz (2002) believes that research on party organization is problematic because it has concentrated on Western European party systems (such as Katz and Mair 1995) and changes instead of explaining the differences or similarities among party organizations. Wolintez argues that one should focus on the intricacy of organizations, power or the lack thereof, and associations among parties and other groups. This last proposal of looking at the associations or relationships among parties is actually what Koole suggested as he when maintained that Katz and Mair were wrong by not looking at the impact of international groups and neocorporatism as being influential in party organization. Wolinetz’s model is interesting because his article goes along with the previously mentioned party types (Ware 1996). For instance, the catch-all and electoral-professional type parties could be seen as equivalent with Wolinetz’s vote-seeking party and the cartel party along the same lines as his office-seeking party.

I thought this week’s readings on party organization all tied in together nicely. Competing theories were reviewed (Ware, Katz and Mair) and criticized (Koole) in such a way that it seemed as if the articles were talking to one another. One article (Wolinetz) even appeared to use the same reasoning as another (Ware) when developing its own classification system for party organizations. I find Katz and Mair’s findings very persuasive but recognize the value of Koole’s criticisms, especially since Katz and Mair were able to address these issues in their 1996 article. Party organization appears to vary on a party-by-party basis. Some parties are highly unified, while others are collections of factions that may not have a great deal in common except their commitment to share power. Some parties are very democratic organizations, not only permitting but encouraging intra-party competition, while others permit no internal competition at all and are simply organizations dedicated to following and supporting a single individual’s political advancement.

week 4

2008-02-17T23:33:00.001-06:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz
Dr. Guo
Comparative Politics
02/17/2008
Weekly Paper
Week 4

This week’s readings concerned the membership of parties in Europe. The major focus was on how membership inside of political parties is evolving with the development and implementation of different technological advancements in the current political environment.
The political environment has changed significantly since the invention of the political party. Parties originated during the struggle to form a democratic style of government. The mass public, in its efforts to check and balance the power that the monarchy and the aristocracy had horded, invented parties to collectivize their action and instill their voice as the political process and dialog of the respective country. Since this period of social turmoil there have been great advancements in suffrage and social and economic equality. With these advancements, there has been a reduction in the need for the political party to serve as a tool to achieve these goals of social and electoral equality. In this void of an overwhelmingly important and pressing single issue that would catch all of the population into a specific party membership in these types of class based political parties have waned. The electorate, in the absence of these critical class based issues, tend to take the democratic process for granted and therefore decline in the membership of major “catch all” political parties.
The electorate also is tempted away from membership and participation in the major and primary political parties by an increase in competition for the electorates voting and personal attention. With the reduced need for social change the mass populace can deviate and cast their membership to other smaller and more specific political parties that develop in this new democratic environment. The populace has the fortunate opportunity to commit themselves to these other parties or to more specific special interests or single issue organizations. It is only expected with an increase in the competition for the attention of the electorate, the mainstream political parties would suffer a decrease in their membership roles.
The political parties are also facing an increase in competition from non political actors. The political parties must compete with the electorate’s careers and personal lives. As more opportunities arise for the electorate to engage and spend time in such an increase level of work and recreation hours it can only be logically assumed that this increase in competition would result in the political parties having to endure a decrease in the level of activity that it’s members contribute to the parties activities and goals.
On the counter side, political parties decrease in membership and activity can be attributed to the technological advancements in the means of political communication. As the level of mass communication has increased the elites of the political parties have found it easier to reach the electorate and spread their message through the use of television. With the increased ease of contacting and influencing the electorate the political elite have a reduced need to rely on the mass membership of the public inside their party. The elites can reach the general voter by more efficient means and have a reduced need for the man to man communications previously used as a means of influence by the parties. With this reduced need of massive personnel heavy organization the parties have been able to afford to reduce their activist membership numbers. The parties no longer have to use this personnel intensive method and therefore, as an effort to consolidate the power of the elites, the parties can reduce the amount membership they maintain.
There is also a reduced need for the electorate to be an active member of the political party. There is an ever increasing power shift inside the party to the voting membership. More and more power is being given to the electorate and being shifted away from the party activists such as the ability to select candidates and to help set the issue agenda of the party. With the decreased power allotted to the activists, there is a directly correlated reduction in the benefit to the electorate for sacrificing their limited resources by allocating the time and energy required to be an activist.

Parties - Members

2008-02-17T19:42:00.003-06:00

The point of interest among this week’s readings is that of membership and the level of activity among those members. Different conceptualizations among parties of membership yield different levels of activity among members. Some parties have loose knit membership and are independent from other groups that form the party; others have tightly knit membership and are dependent upon other groups in the same party. Duverger(1990) defines this conceptualization of the structures of parties. These structures are classified as caucus and branch. Duverger also defines two separate types of parties, cadre and mass parties. Cadre parties correspond to the caucus structure, which are independent groups that do not actively recruit new members. Mass parties correspond to the branch structure, which are centralized groups that actively recruit new members.

An important difference between the two structures is the level of activity each exhibits. While the caucus structure (associated with cadre parties) is active during election periods, it “lives in a period of hibernation … meetings are neither frequent nor regular” (Duverger,1990, 39). In contrast, the branch structure (associated with mass parties) “remains important, and above all regular, in the intervals between ballots”(39). In the branch system, which is related to the mass parties, the organization mobilizes, politically educates and recruits leaders among the working class. It also is reliant upon its members financially by spreading its financial burden among the largest number of members (41). The caucus structure and cadre parties are associated with the “party of individual representation”, while the branch structure and mass parties are associated with the “party of integration” outlined by Neumann (1990, 47). Membership in the former is limited and the organization is dormant between elections. Membership in the latter is characterized by “increasing influence over all spheres of the individual’s daily life (47). Neumann argues that a hybrid of these two types of parties is called for in modern democracies, one he terms the “party of democratic integration” (48). This party assures the individuals place, but also integrates the individual into society. Another type of party is presented by Kirchheimer (1990), in which he terms it the “catch-all party.” With respect to membership activity this party seeks to downgrade the role of individual members (58) but also continue to express widely felt popular concerns (57).

In non-liberal democracies, Ware (1996) points out that membership and activity can take many forms. Parties can be repressed or free, this depends on the regime, the particular country and opposition that a regime faces. The party and its members may be exiled, in which case membership is highly restrictive (137). The alternative is a party may be in a capacity to contest elections but the democratic regime is periodically replaced by an authoritarian regime, in which case membership is open, but membership is stifled by perceived danger (135). In other cases there can be costs associated to membership to the parties. A large membership based on incentives can destabilize the party on ideological grounds and corruption within the party could become a problem, such as in one party systems (137). In authoritarian regimes, parties can be outright banned or parties can survive. In the case where parties survive, it is usually to confer legitimacy to the ruling regime, but the opposition parties have no power. In this case membership is stifled by the party itself or by the regime. The party will be unwilling to expand for “fear that the party may become infiltrated with member and activists who have only superficial commitment to the party’s goals”(138). The regime may repress radical ideologies and members may pay a higher cost in joining the opposition party (138).

Research on European democracies has shown that party membership is and has been in decline (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Seyd and Whiteley, 2004). Mair and van Beizen (2001) compare twenty European democracies’ total party membership to see if party membership in the electorate of those countries has declined since the 1980s. They find that among major parties, membership has declined substantially. When divided into long established democracies and relatively new democracies, party membership in established democracies has fallen 60 percent from levels recorded in the 1980s. By contrast party membership in the relatively new democracies of Hungary, Slovakia, Greece and Spain have increased substantially, though this does not include all new democracies; the Czech Republic exhibits the same patterns as established democracies. Their overall conclusion from this data is evidence of “widespread disengagement from party politics” (6).

The major goal in this piece was to update and confirm a trend of decline in party membership among European democracies in which they succeed. Their method of data gathering is suspect, relying on political parties own admittedly skewed estimates of membership. This skewed estimate diminishes their conclusions, yet they do make no far-reaching conclusions and admit the data is flawed. In what they set out to do, they do succeed.

Seyd and Whiteley (2004) find that party membership is in decline in Britain and has been the case, “particularly since the 1980’s” (356). They note that between 1994 and 1998 that the Labour Party increased in membership. They attribute this to Labour’s willingness to provide incentives and emphasizing the social organization of the party, much like that of Duverger’s “mass party.” They argue that declining membership can be turned around with producing the right incentives to join the party (357). They provide several explanations for the decline in membership numbers. They divide them into supply side and demand side explanations. On the supply side they argue that (a) people have options other than parties to become politically active, (b) time pressures such as work have reduced the pool of individual members, (c) socioeconomic and demographic changes have reduced potential members (357-358). On the demand side they argue, “party leaders now have less need for individual members” (358). They find that members level of activity have declined as well as time devoted to the party. The authors outline the benefits and consequences to the parties of declining party membership. On the benefits side the parties will reduce financial costs and decision making time on the consequences side they will lose electoral support, potential leaders, and human resources. The parties will also find it more difficult to link mass opinion to policy goals.

While the authors do draw some conclusions about the decline in member’s activities they do not address their supply and demand side arguments. Instead they focus on the decline of previously active members and activists. They also draw conclusions on the availability of potential members from the supply side argument without any test or display for trends as evidence for this conclusion.

Annotated Bibliography

2008-02-17T19:08:00.002-06:00

Koole, Ruud. 1994. “Dutch Political Parties: Money and Message,” in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance among the Democracies, pp. 115-31, Boulder, CO: Westview.

Koole maintains that Dutch political parties should be viewed as modern cadre parties because the proportion of their supporters who they sign up as members is quite modest, and the parties are chiefly agents for active members. He suggests that the characteristics of the modern cadre party includes the dominance of the professional leadership groups, but with a high degree of responsibility to the lower classes in the party. This kind of party also has a low member/voter percentage, even though members continue to be important as a source of money, as a means of recruiting candidates for political office, and as the bodies who are essential just to keep the party in working order. Another characteristic is a strong and wide range orientation toward voters, but with a method which is neither catch-all, on the one hand, nor concentrating on a classe gardee on the other. The final characteristic he points out is the dependence of financial resources on a combination of both public subsidies and the fees and donations of members. All of this is practical when distinguishing between contemporary Dutch parties from earlier cadre or mass parties, but brings up the questions about how one should categorize other parties which also differ from nineteenth century cadre parties.

Ware, Alan. 1987. Citizens, Parties, and the State: A Reappraisal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ware attempts to deal with the matter of classifying parties by improving Duverger’s distinction and differentiating between elite centered and mass membership parties. Elite based parties, such as the British Conservatives, can have a considerable number in membership, but their main feature is domination by a fairly small group at the center. On the otherhand, membership centered political parties are those in which members are more than a workforce and have some say or ownership in the party. Therefore it is no size of membership which makes a difference, but instead the degree to which they are expected to participate. Both big and small parties (such as the Greens and other parties on the left) could be membership centered. One can take Ware’s distinction either as a paraphrasing of Duverger’s writings or as the addition of a second dimension, extent of membership involvement, to the primary dimension, and size of active membership.

Skocpol, Theda. 2002. “United States: From Membership to Advocacy.” in Robert D. Putnam (ed.) Democracies in Flux. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skocpol proposes that the United States is moving towards a society where normal citizens are becoming less likely to be mobilized into parties and civic groups and instead, the wealthier Americans are again and again called upon to “write checks”. Skocpol contends that the classic America of balanced civic life and broad participation has seen its day in history. This unique design of state-society relations involved mass public education and opportunities for social mobility, democracy, and a multi-layered democratic government that intentionally and unintentionally urged federated voluntary associations. This permitted a highly participatory society, where markets and government developed without encompassing civil society. For the future, Skocpol sees the manifestation of a civic order that is predicated less on membership in traditional voluntary associations than on the work of professional nonprofit organizations that are more corporate than associative in nature.

Von Beyme, Klaus. 1996. “Party Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Postmodern Party State?” Government and Opposition 21(2): 135-159.

In his analysis of parties in continental Europe, von Beyme proposes that there have been and still are fast changes in the organization of and functions carried out by political parties across different European parties. These revisions describe a convergence in the ideological policy identities of major parties, which in turn produces more space for interest groups and single issue parties to attract more support among those citizens who feel strongly about specific issues. Traditional purposes of the party joined with the education and mobilization of voters are being affected by electronic communications such as TV and the internet. Mailings, videos, database marketing, and interactive websites weaken traditional campaigning and permit party leaders to speak to voters over the heads of party activists, further sidelining them. Party members become much less important to fundraising and campaigning than in the previous kinds of party development, while campaign managers, media advisers, marketers and design consultants become the significant players in what is a “permanent campaign”. This new type of media or professional party brings about a leadership which is increasingly free of the party membership and more and more dependent on the management of visibility through media constructions of favorable images and of policy.

Tan, Alexander. 2000. Members, Organization and Performance: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Party Membership and Size. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.

This work looks at Western industrial democracies and their membership sizes. The independent variable here is the party membership size while the dependent variables include centralization of power, intra-party democratic performance, and organizational complexity. Tan’s research shows that as party size increases so does the centralization of power, complexity of the party, and levels of participation. But that being said, size does not affect the level of democratic performance. The author comments that party membership is on the decline, but that this decline in membership should not be a big issue because parties are just changing. In the past, parties were contingent upon mass membership, but they are transforming into more professionalized parties. In doing so, the influence of parties has not changed.

Weekly Paper- Party Members

2008-02-17T18:15:00.001-06:00

Alyson Kennedy

February 18, 2008

POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

Party Members

Early political parties (cadre parties or parties of individual representation) had very few members. Their successors, mass integration and catch-all parties, by contrast, boasted large memberships rolls. The transition from relatively small cadre parties to catch-all parties is one dominant theme evident in this week’s readings. A second theme involves the decline in party density and in the number of party activists across nearly all liberal democracies. Most authors agree that societal changes, such as greater suburbanization, near-full employment, deindustrialization, and the rise of mechanisms of mass communication, have contributed to this decline. The purpose of this paper is to examine these two themes.

Parties in Transition

Broadly, a problem in many liberal democracies prior to World War II was the failure to integrate class-based parties into the political system. While, in the early 1900s, socialist parties facilitated the transition from an agrarian lifestyle to an industrialized one for their members, other political system actors were not willing to recognize the working-class parties as equals. War and the economic burdens thereof politicized the masses more than participation in elections, the struggle for suffrage, or the coming together of those similarly situated in parties or unions. However, Kircheimer (1990) notes that politicization is not integration. Bourgeois parties had not advanced from parties of individual representation to parties of integration. Parties of individual representation limit membership to elites and exist only for the purpose of electing candidates to office (Duverger 1990; Neumann 1990).

Following World War II and in response to factors like economic depression, the war itself, and decolonization, mass parties began to replace the particularistic bourgeois parties. Mass parties were able to exchange depth (the degree to which the party permeated every aspect of members’ lives) for breadth (a wider audience and electoral success). Due to a growing need for broad-based consensus, parties became catch-all organizations, trying to embrace the widest possible variety of groups. Becoming a catch-all party involves disposing of ideological baggage, downgrading the role of the individual party member, and deemphasizing class and denominational differences. Parties must be sufficiently different so that voters can distinguish between them; but they are likely to converge in many ways because all are trying to attract the greatest number of voters.

Parties in Decline

Many scholars of American politics have lamented the decline of political parties over the past several decades. Interestingly, this decline is taking place across most liberal democracies, not just in the United States. Initially, scholars had argued that party membership itself was not in decline; rather, party membership was not keeping pace with population growth. However, Mair and Van Biezen (2001) note that since the 1980s that “party membership, expressed in both absolute numbers and as a percentage of the electorate, is now markedly in decline” (11). Similarly, Muller (1997) notes that “the balance of costs and benefits of party membership is shifting and membership has become less attractive for both party leaders and members” (171).

There are several factors that might explain the decline of membership in political parties. Ware (1996) notes that material and solidary incentives are less effective for parties in attracting members than they once were and that using purposive incentives has become risky. Mair and Van Biezen (2001) cite a general decline in social capital as the culprit for decreasing party membership. Seyd and Whiteley (2004) note that there are both supply side and demand side explanations for the decline in party membership. On the supply side, as individuals’ lives become increasingly busy, other pressures compete for the time they could devote to party work. On the demand side, members are less central to the parties’ mobilization efforts due to innovations in mass communication methods and also are less important as a source of funding due to increases in corporate contributions.

These explanations for the decline in parties should be accepted with some caution, however. None of the authors of this week’s readings explicitly test their claims regarding why levels of party membership and activism have declined. Arguably, the data needed to test these competing explanations may not be available. This reality may excuse all the authors except Seyd and Whiteley (2004), who use original survey data. Presumptively, these authors had the opportunity to ask respondents why they choose not to engage in party activities or even become a party member, which would have allowed them to directly test their supply side and demand side explanations. However, while they data they present (raw percentages of party activity and party membership) indicate that these activities have declined, they are silent with regard to causation. In other words, Seyd and Whitely (2004) draw conclusions that are beyond the scope of their data.

Some scholars have argued that the purpose of political parties is to gain control of government by electing their candidates to public office. It would seem that cadre parties could fulfill this task. Tracing the process of the development of the catch-all party begs the question of why parties would seek to expand their membership base. Ware (1996) cites several reasons that parties need members. Members serve as a source of money and labor for parties. Members often perform mobilization activities that are essential for the party’s electoral success. Additionally, a large membership lends legitimacy. While some parties have their ideological roots in the notion of mass participation, party leaders may have incentive to build membership; for example, if the party is linked closely to another organization, leaders of that organization may have the opportunity to dominate the party. Parties create communities of people who share the same ideology in order to insulate them from competing ideologies. Parties utilize a variety of incentives (selective benefits) to attract and retain members and activists.

weekly paper

2008-02-11T00:30:00.000-06:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz
02.09.08
Dr. Guo
Comparative Parties
Weekly Paper
Week 3

Political Parties and their respective successes is dependent upon the make up and mentality of the electorate of the country in which the party resides. A party’s success is dependent on the electoral turnout in any given election. The voter turnout helps to shape where the median voter’s ideology is located. The turnout by the electorate affects how the median vote moves as a mathematical function. If one or more groups either turnout to vote or choose to abstain from voting, this will affect the sum of the vote. This change in the voting electorate can potentially shift the median vote one way or another on the left-right political spectrum. With this potential shift of the median voter, there is an affect on the outcome of a majority based election. If the median party moves to the left then the net effect of the election will be that the legislature will also reflect this movement by having more officials from the party on the left elected, or the more conservative party will have to compensate by shifting its agenda and ideology to the left in order to compensate for the shift in the electorate. Bohrer concludes that the turnout in an election has a definite affect in the out come of an election, as proved through the use of newly developed post communistic countries in Europe. This phenomenon is particularly important when an increase in turnout is expected in a specific demographic of the population. If this demographic is likely to vote for one of the parties in a disproportionate amount then this change in the turnout could have quite a significant effect on the outcome of the election. Since the turnout of an election can have an effect on the outcome, does this also have an effect on the governmental policies of a country.

The turnout of an election can shift the median vote of a country and can possibly influence the outcome of an election but does the outcome of an election effect the policies that are adopted by government in power. There is inconclusive evidence that the policies that are adopted and implemented by a government are at all affected by the left and right leanings of a government. Therefore, since we can say that it is potentially likely that there is some affect on the output of the policies that a government embraces due to the ideological make up of the government, it there is the potential for the turnout in a given election to have an affect on the tract that the government takes and the style of policies that this government adopt and implement.

If the electorate can implement changes in the outcomes of the policies adopted, is there ever a fundamental change in the median vote and would this as a result possibly change the outcomes of the policies adopted by the government? The Kim piece shows the political leanings of the electorate does shift over time and that these trends tend to coincide amongst all of the Western World. If the political leanings of the electorate shift, is this potential caused by an increase in the turnout of specific groups? This would be a very unique item of study to examine if the mindset of the average voter actually shifted one way or another on the political spectrum or if the statistical median is shifted due to a significant change of the make up of the electorate due to potential change in the turnout of the elections for a country. Is the average person actually altering their political positions during these times of net ideological change or are there simply other factors at play that cause the make up of the electorate to change and as a result of this change the inferential statistics also change and with it the potential of a change in the electoral success of the political players and parties in a specific period of elections.

If these shifts in the median vote occur, do they have an effect on the policies of the government in there respective countries? Since it has been proven that the ideological leanings of the government have potential to affect the policy outcomes of a government, and that a shift in the median vote could have a potential change in electoral outcomes, it is foreseeable that these changes could affect the policies of the country. So it is quite possible that voter turnout in a specific election could have such a reaching impact that it could affectively alter the potential policy outcomes of that country.

Parties and Ideology

2008-02-10T21:20:00.000-06:00

The concept of ideology as stated by Kim and Fording (2003) “are a set of ideas that relate to the social/political world that provides a general guideline for some action.” This concept is usually defined on a left to right spectrum upon which the position of voters and parties can be calculated. With respect to parties, development and change of ideology has useful theoretical underpinnings that help explain the ideology of a given party that relate to voters and to the origins of the party.

Ware (1996) gives a broad theoretical overview of two schools of thought of party ideological development. One views parties as able to “adapt their ideology to the opinions and values of their likely supporters” (18). The second says parties have “some capacity for adaptation” to their supporter’s views and opinions, but it is limited by the ideology the party was founded upon (18). Klaus von Beyme developed the framework Ware (1996) utilizes for studying the ideology of parties. Von Beyme developed this typology for studying European liberal democracies and identified nine “families” of parties: Liberal and Radical parties, Conservative parties, Socialist and Social Democratic parties, Christian Democratic parties, Communist parties, Agrarian parties, Regional and ethnic parties, Right-wing extremist parties and Ecology parties. Ware argues that these “families” can help to identify types of parties by ideology in various liberal democracies outside of Europe today. His overall argument is that parties ideologies at their founding persist but change over time because “there will be ‘ideological space’ to fill” (47).

This leads to questions such as what impact have ideologies of political parties had on government policy, a question that is explored in Imbeau et al (2001). They face two conflicting theoretical schools of thought regarding this subject. The ‘convergent’ school argues that twentieth century industrial societies have grown increasing similar, facing the same types of problems and implementing the same kinds of solutions. Supporters of the ‘politics matters’ school argue, “there is a correlation between partisan variables and policy outputs” (1). Imbeau et al. look for support for the partisan theory through examining 43 research articles with 693 parameters. They perform ‘meta analysis’ by counting the number of successes and failures in each article (parameters) and the articles themselves. They also perform a regression on the “vote-counting” results. These test produce statistically insignificant results, neither able to confirm nor reject the null hypotheses (convergence) of no party impact. This research suffers from a small number of cases and from a large percentage of cases coming from the same source. By eliminating articles by Castle alone, which was 26 percent of their parameters, their results significantly change.

Another question deals with party ideology and voters. Kim and Fording (2003) address party and voter ideology across 25 western democracies. They develop the ideology of voters through vote shares of parties in elections for the period of 1945-1998. They assume the theory of Anthony Downs with is outlined in Ware (1996) when calculating the ideology of voters. A voter will vote for a party that is nearest to their own ideological view. Kim and Fording assume that voters for a party fall with in a range that extends from the midpoints between the party voted for and the party to the left and right. They also assume that party manifestos will give an accurate reading of a parties ideology. They find that there are significant differences between countries in western democracies and that over time trends change. The assumptions made in Kim and Fording (2003) limit the strength of their model. The assumption that party manifestos give an accurate reading of the party’s ideology may give a false reading of the ideology of the party and leaves out may aspects of the party. “[T]here are aspects of [the party’s] ethos and their values that either are not articulated or are believed by those active in the party to be not worth stating” (Ware, 1996, 20).

Bohrer et al. (2000) address the question of vote shares as well. Among post-communist European nations “do shifts in electoral participation affect vote shares for different types of political parties in volatile environments?” They postulate that increased turnout benefits that left and confirm this hypothesis. They also observe that formerly communist nations are conforming to “established patterns of Western liberal democracies. The interesting finding in this piece is that increased turnout is benefiting ex-communist parties on the left. The left is very dependent of the increased turnout and it is translating into gains. This piece provides insight into the beginnings of parties and observations of transition to liberal democracies. It is a good starting point to continue research into the area as time progresses and parties expand their ideological bases.

The final question is about ideology of parties in parties outside of liberal democracies. Ware (1996) finds that in regimes outside of liberal democracies, control of the state has been used to promote the party ideology. This is not true of liberal democracies. In these regimes there is greater input into the state by the party and in some cases, such as regimes where the communist party is in control, parties are able to regulate adherence to the party ideology. In other instances ideologies vary wildly within the party such as Mexico’s PRI which ruled until the 1990’s.

Parties and Ideology

2008-02-10T17:43:00.000-06:00

Research has shown that political parties can play significant roles in several important respects in the process of political development. First, parties encourage and facilitate political participation, they help to stimulate a sense of governmental legitimacy through the campaign process. Parties also give a sense of national integration and play an important role in conflict management within the polity. Finally, political parties play an important role in the political socialization function in society, helping to transmit attitudes and values from one generation to another (LaPalombara and Weiner in Mair 1990).

As evidenced in Ware 1996 (Chapter 1), just as interest groups were seen to be a political structure that assists in the representation function in the political world, so too the political party serves as a linkage mechanism in passing along public opinions from various groups in the electorate to government officials. The degree to which parties serve these several functions depends upon the individual party organization and the political system within which it is found. Depending upon the number of political parties in a system, the degree of party discipline found in the political system, and the ideology and constituency of the party in question, the role of the party will vary.

This leads to the question of whether or not it matters which party controls the government? Officially, different parties seek different policies and this made clear from official statements. But in reality, official policy goals may also be sought to bring about political credibility, which is essential in parties’ competition for electoral support. Establishing a reputation may be in the rational self-interest of party leaders, but political leaders cannot always get what they want. They are not the only actors engaged in public policy. Interest groups, the bureaucracy, and the voters have considerable policy interests too. Party leaders are also often constrained by economic or institutional factors, which may leave very little room for change. Political parties are therefore far from being supreme actors, but they are, as noted by Ware, pervading players in politics. It seems logical to assume that parties will have an effect on public policy.

The idea of whether there is increased voter turnout for parties holding certain ideologies is the subject matter for Bohrer et al’s article. In particular, post-communist Europe is examined from 1990 to 1999. The authors found that there is actually an increase in voter turnout in parties on the left (when the total voter turnout is increased as well). This research suggests that post-communist structures are starting to mimic liberal-democratic regimes in that the left is gaining support. Since these types of parties include more blue collar voters there is likely to be a shift in the types of policies implemented in these countries as well.

Research on the partisan cycle hypothesis usually calculates the direction and the strength of the relationship between the ideological orientation of governments (which basically is a measure of discourse) and their action, measured most of the time through public spending. While Kim and Fording illustrated how party manifesto data can be used to determine the electorate’s position, but they cannot be used to determine the position of individual voters, Imbeau et al showed that the influence of party ideology is not significantly different from zero. The former article conducts research using Western democracies to find that there has been a shift to the left in ideology during the 60s and a shift to the right in the 70s. Despite these shifts on the aggregate level, some democracies (including the United States) have kept a stable ideology.

The partisan cycle literature was the basis of Imbeau et al’s article which found that 71% of the statistical tests used in research on this relationship during the 21 year time span fails to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, most of the tests refute the partisan cycle hypothesis therefore asserting that dissonance is dominant. In general I believe, this is a reasonable record, accounting for the simplicity of many of these studies (58% are bivariate). Additionally, as this article explains statistically, the primary evidence of partisan policy effects comes from multivariate analyses of samples after 1973, examining government “size” in terms of revenue, spending, employment, or social welfare effort. But even though there is no significant correlation between party composition and policies there are circumstances were party composition may be likely to effect policy outputs. Some of these circumstances include the choice of multiple variables, sample size, and policy domain within studies.

Some have speculated about the future of political parties and whether they can continue to be as central a political structure in their respective political systems as they have been in the past. The continual growth of executive power in political systems all over the world, combined with greater public attention to politics and increasingly aggressive media, means that traditional assumptions about political parties and party behavior have to be rethought.

Weekly Paper- Parties and Ideology

2008-02-10T17:16:00.000-06:00

Alyson Kennedy
February 11, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Election

Parties and Ideology

An ideology is a set of ideas or framework for viewing and understanding the political world. According to Kim and Fording (2003) “ideology is a set of ideas that relate to the social/political world and that provide a general guideline for some action” (97). Political parties adopt an ideology in order to attract voters. This week’s readings raise important questions regarding the causes and implications of adoption and evolution of party ideology. How does the pressure to attract voters affect a party’s ideology over time? Are parties always able to adapt their ideologies to remain electorally competitive? Is ideology merely an electoral tool or does it have implications for the types of policies a government produces? The purpose of this paper is to discuss possible answers to these questions suggested by this week’s readings.

Given that ideology is a tool for achieving electoral success, a party is likely to alter its ideology as the opinions and values of voters change. Such adaptation is necessary if the party is to achieve electoral success. With regard to how the need to succeed electorally impacts party ideology, Ware (1996) suggests that are parties are often compelled to “water down” their ideology in order to have broader based appeal among voters. For example, early Liberal parties advocated universal suffrage, which was not a feature of their original party program, in order to attract the support of the middle class. Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s, Social Democratic parties moved further away from favoring public ownership of the means of production and turned toward advocating a continuation of protecting the economically disadvantaged through state-funded welfare programs and toward “controlling the excesses of private economic power” (35). Bohrer, Pacek, and Radcliff (2000) note that former ruling Communist parties succeeded in attracting working class votes by “positioning themselves as defenders of the disadvantaged during the painful economic transition” following the fall of Communist regimes (1163). In this sense, parties can and do adapt their ideologies in an attempt to appeal to voters.

By contrast, Ware (1996) also notes that parties are, to some extent, “prisoners of history” and that “aspects of the ideology a party had when it was founded persist, even after the conditions in which developed have changed, and the party’s history shapes how it adapts when it is able to do so” (18). This suggests that parties are not always able to adapt their ideologies when necessary in order to attract mass support. I take issue with this portion of Ware’s argument. He seems to be suggesting that parties are strictly endogenous to the political system and ignoring the idea that they are exogenous as well. If parties both shape and are shaped by the political system, it seems disingenuous to argue that parties are “prisoners” of their political system and that there may be circumstances under which they would be unable to adapt their ideologies in response to electoral pressures. A better argument is that there may be circumstances under which a party may choose not to adapt its ideology. For example, if the party fears alienating core (and perhaps more ideologically pure) supporters, it may choose not to waver from its original ideals. That parties are “prisoners of history” does not seem to be among the best explanations for failure to adapt.

Further, if one considers the argument advanced by Imbeau, Petry, and Lamari (2001), one might argue that ideology is no more than an electoral tool and, as such, it is to a party’s advantage to continually adapt its ideology in order to attract voters. Imbeau, Petry, and Lamari find little support for the claim that change in the ideological composition of government translates into change in policy outputs. These authors contend that the empirical evidence supporting the notion that advanced industrialized nations “have become increasingly similar, facing the same kinds of problems and applying the same kinds of solutions” (1) is substantial.

Additionally, Ware (1996) notes that many former Communist parties changed their names and their ideology after the fall of the Soviet Union. If one accepts the idea that since Communist parties are toward the extreme left of the ideological spectrum; that, by virtue of being more extreme, are more ideologically pure; and that the legacy of Communism truly might render these parties “prisoners of history”, then one can conclude that if these parties are willing and able to adapt their ideology in order to survive, all other parties should be able to do the same.

To take the preceding discussion in a slightly different direction, most of this week’s readings suggest that voters choose which parties or candidates to support on the basis of ideology (Kim and Fording 2003; Bohrer, Pacek, and Radcliff 2000; Ware 1996). This need not be the case. These authors assume that the left-right ideological continuum is a meaningful organizational tool for voters. Ideology is only one of many possible explanations for vote choice. For example, some voters may continue to vote for a party’s candidates election after election because partisanship is a stable, psychological attachment (see Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960, for example). Others may choose based on a single issue. In particular, Kim and Fording claim that “voters evaluate parties on their net ideological position with respect to the left-right dimension” (98). That ideology is the sole or most important determinant of vote choice is a big assumption.

2008-02-03T23:47:00.001-06:00

Daniel F. Chwalisz
Dr. Guo
Seminar in Comparative Elections
Weekly Reading Assignment
Week 2
02/03/2008

The reading this week focused on the reasons political parties were created, how that they were established, and why they continue to exist in the modern day political arena. Once the reading establishes why political parties formed, the reading ventures into far greater explanation of the different potential types of political parties. The reading further explains the role the parties take inside of their respective political cultures.

Political parties were created out of a necessity of human nature. Aldrich explains in depth the mathematical advantages for parties to form inside a political environment. Aldrich does this by placing the creation of parties inside the creation of the United States and the formation of the American two political party system.

Aldrich explains the mathematical advantage of forming political parties through the use of the collective action problem. When members of a legislative body are faced with problems concerning the issue of distributing a limited good they are faced with a definitive problem of determining how to maximize the gain of their constituency while minimizing the possibility of incurring a potential loss. As Aldrich explains, this is best achieved through the formation of a political party to further the goals of the individual.

Parties are created by a common long term coalitions between two or more members of the legislative body. The main goal of this style of political party is to achieve a coalition that is exactly one vote greater than the minimum required vote to achieve a majority. Doing this in this exact manner would allow for the maximum advantage for the partisan members by having the fewest members that are required to have while still retaining a controlling vote inside the legislative body.

Aldrich further explains this phenomenon, which justifies the formation of political parties inside of a legislative body, by expanding it to the electorate as a whole. A coalition of individuals inside the electorate can influence the legislative body in a manner to increase the benefit of the individuals involved while collectively reducing the damage that they are forced to endure is the exact reason why political parties are established.

Once it is accepted that political parties are a natural and functional part of a democratic society, then the question hinges on what or which types of political parties are best for the political environment of the country where they are being formed. Gunther classifies the type of and style of a party that can take on. To classify the types of potential and historic political parties, Gunther uses three areas of focus: formal organization, the party's pragmatics commitments, and the tolerant and pluralist tendencies. These areas of focus are used by the respective political party to classify the party into fifteen different classifications which cover the spectrum from the catch all types of parties, to the political parties based on religious fundamentalism.

Political parties can vary from the highly organized, organizationally "thick" to the organizationally "thin". Thick groups have a large leadership base which have many local and personal leadership positions. While the thin style of organizations uses the mass media to limit the amount of leadership required to achieve the same results in the electorate as the thicker varieties of political parties.

The second area of focus a political party must decide in order to effect the political environment in which they exist is the level of pragmatisms they maintain. Some parties seek to completely revolutionize the culture they are involved in. The European Communists parties are a strong example of this. These parties are highly selective of who they allow into their membership. They are also willing to break the established rules of the jurisdiction in which they reside since they do not plan on a continued existence in the current environment. Whereas other parties are happy with the current environment and do not want a complete electoral revolution, consequently they are far more open in their membership and realize the benefits of following the established rules governing politics as well as mutual respect of the other political parties.

The third focus examined by Gunther is the level of tolerance towards opponent parties the examined party takes on. As mentioned previously, parties who want to establish a dramatic change in the political environment are far more likely to be hostile towards the opponent parties. This differs from the parties who are content with the current situation and who realize that it is not advantageous to be hostile to the rival parties since they have to plan on continued relations with the rival organizations.

Daniel Chwalisz
407 415 6485
dfchwali@olemiss.edu

2008-02-03T17:03:00.000-06:00

Origin of Parties

Political parties are typically viewed as the chief organizations in democracies that seek voters even though they can only offer collective benefits. Parties also try to acquire stable governmental majorities. Therefore, it is on the political party, out of all the democratic institutions, that theories of party formation hit on most directly. Aldrich gives a nice explanation of these theories as they have been applied in specific situations but also gives a compelling and original explanation of the development of political parties.

Aldrich’s theory of political parties appears to be based on rational choice. He examines how ambitious politicians who try to achieve their objectives and create and develop parties to overcome the social-choice problem of unstable majorities like the collective-action problem of mobilizing the electorate. He highlights the importance of institutions and historical context in understanding parties. Therefore political parties are examined in terms of the multiple objectives of political elites, the institutional rules which they work under, and the historical context within which political elites make their choices. I find this meshing of the two approaches very useful and persuasive.

Aldrich demonstrates why and how political actors form parties as a rational reaction in pursing their own goals and how, as conditions change, these parties also change. He sees parties as endogenous institutions which gives a worthwhile alternative to theories that view parties as reflections of social cleavages. On the downside, this theory is solely American in nature with no discussion of parties outside the US (p. 45, 56). But one could argue that because the US provides such a negative setting for parties, Aldrich comes close to offering a general theory for all parties in democracies.

In contrast, Duverger believes that social forces were a major driving force behind the origin and subsequent multiplication of parties. He sees political parties as a reflection of social forces which are comprised of individuals with a set of socially regulated common interests. Duverger posits that as social developments give rise to the number of politically mobilized social forces, the number of parties will go up as well. Electoral institutions limit the influence of social forces on the formation of political parties. Social forces create more or less pressure for the multiplication of political parties and electoral laws either permit these pressures to be realized or they constrain them by discouraging the formation of new parties.

His theory is pretty clear cut and suggests that the number of parties should be an increasing function of the number of politically prominent social forces and that this relationship between social structure and the party system should be closer when electoral laws are more tolerant compared to when they are not. This theory is somewhat intertwined with Weber who observes that parties were, at first, mainly followings of the elites, formed according to class interest, family traditions or for ideological reasons.

Gunther and Diamond put forth a new typology of the world’s parties. They suggest five general species of political parties that are based on organizational characteristics as well as smaller and or specified kinds of parties rooted in their ideological character and strategic orientation. Their article introduces a couple of new party types, including the ethnicity-based party. It is not a mass party because, usually, it is organizationally very limited and more interested in assessing state resources than in ideology or policy. This kind of party is mainly concerned with just one ethnic group and can primarily be found in Asia and Africa. Another new party species, the electoralist, has a very interesting sub-type called the personalistic party which can be applied to parties like the Thai Rak Thai Party.

Overall this typology is a good improvement in getting one to think in a more systematic way about how parties vary. The drawback is that it still remains in some ways oriented to just the Western world and all of the categories represent ideal types but current parties usually tend to spread across them. For instance, many of the so-called ethnic or multi-ethnic parties in Africa are principally just vehicles for individual political leaders, though these are hardly the professionalized organizations deduced by the term electoralist.

Much of the literature on political parties seems to deal with organization and structure, or the relationship between militants and their leaders. The position of members within parties is analogous to that of the people within a democratic state. Another approach to the study of political parties is to identify stages in their evolution, corresponding to the development of the societies in which they function. I find this latter approach useful with the discussion of elite parties, mass parties, catch-all parties, and parties of the professional politicians. These states in the evolution of parties correlate roughly with the period before mass suffrage became general, class conflict engendered by industrialization, and the rise of the post-modern society. But how useful is it to view parties in the perspective of the modernizing process? I think the typologies illustrated in this week’s readings (especially Gunther and Diamond 2003) is a very useful starting point when studying if there is a decline in parties or party government. The formation of parties can be used to illustrate the direction of the party and whether it will see a decline in membership, party identification, change in goals, etc.

2008-02-03T16:23:00.001-06:00

Weekly Post - The Origin of Political Parties - Chris Bailey

The origins and classification of political parties has been debated for some time now. The origins of a political party help to identify how parties should be classified. In this paper I review Gunther and Diamond's (2003) "Species of Political Parties" and Aldrich's (1995) "Why Parties Form."

The theme for this weeks reading is the origin of political parties. Aldrich (1995) forms his argument in terms of collective action and social choice. He says that parties form because of uncertainty and "The reason to enter a party is to win more and here that means reducing the uncertainty over future outcomes." He explains the
collective action problems in terms of independent legislators forming coalitions that benefit both actors. His explanation of the social choice problem is that when given a choice voters (in his example legislators voting on amendment, bill, or status quo) will choose the preferable outcome.

The voting behavior Aldrich outlines in the social choice problems set the stage for the median voter theorem outlined by Duncan Black, where the "ideal point of the median voter in a behavioral equilibrium. The substantive contribution of this work to party formation is it outlines, through theoretical underpinnings, conditions for party formation among individuals. The incentives for candidates to affiliate with a party, Aldrich says, are to have a "brand name." This allows candidates to express some of their positions to voters with out much work; it also allows candidates to reach a larger audience then going it alone.

Gunther and Daimond (2003) argue that the theoretical framework of classifications of political parties has fallen short of encompassing all parties; that "existing models of political parties do not adequately capture the full range of variation in party types." A criticism they have of the literature is that it does not include temporal, geographical and technological contexts. Another is the emerging parties have been mislabeled as a result of "concept stretching" (i.e. "emerging parties whose characteristics depart markedly from those which went into the original definition of the party system.").

Pulling from developed literature they develop five broad types of party organizations, and form subcategories of these party organizations as types of political parties; forming a type of "family tree" for political parties. This theoretical path helps to distinguish different categories of parties and allows for the inclusion of more parties in the future under subcategories. From this research they are able to identify 15 types of parties throughout the world and through different time frames.

A criticism Gunther and Diamond identify of their work is the complexity of their system. Their main interest is to design a model that could include all political parties in the world so they can be comparatively studied. In some situations there is overlap that can make it a little confusing, which takes away from the overall strength of their model. The five categories they classify all political parties under are Elite Parties, Mass-Based Parties. Ethnicity-Based Parties, Electoralist Parties and Movement Parties. The strength of this model is that it is very inclusive and allows for temporal changes in parties. The weakness is that it can become confusing and there is overlap in some of the definitions of the party organization categories. Gunther and Diamond advance this area of research by developing and inclusive model of party typology and defining the conditions of inclusion under different categories and subcategories. This model allows for more
subcategories and possibly categories to be created and revised on the basis of development of more parties.

Though these two pieces are different in their focus, they fit together to form a picture of the formation of political parties. Aldrich (2003) explains the formation of political parties in a technical sense through theory of individual behavior forming a party. Gunther and Diamond model for classification helps explain formation of parties from the aspect of how they originated and under what circumstances weather it be ideological or elite driven formation.

2008-02-03T15:37:00.000-06:00

Alyson Kennedy
February 4, 2008
POL 628- Comparative Parties and Elections

The Origins of Political Parties

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1998. “From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon.” Comparative Politics 30: 293-312.

Earlier research has noted two competing explanations of the formation of Christian Democratic parties. One explanation argues that these parties have their roots in the Catholic Church and were created as a tool to reinforce Catholicism among adherents. Alternatively, it may be that Christian Democratic parties are merely Conservative parties in disguise (see Duverger 1966, for example). Kalyvas argues against both of these possibilities, alleging that the founding of Christian Democratic parties does not conform to the expectations of his model of party formation.

The Church was threatened by the growing of power of Liberal parties. In response to this threat, it chose to organize by forming an electoral coalition with the Conservatives. Church leaders believed that Liberal parties were not likely to survive for long, and, therefore, were willing to risk losing control over some of its membership in order to fight Liberal policies over the short term. The conditions of the coalition were such that the Church would officially remain outside the political arena but encourage its followers to support the Conservative parties. In return, Conservatives parties would defend the political interests of the Church. However, Conservatives had their own political agenda and would have preferred that the Church engage in a participatory strategy whereby church members would become members of a Conservative party. This would have prevented the Church from using electoral support as a bargaining tool.

Kalyvas’ model predicts that, at this stage, the Church should pull away from the Conservative parties and form a confessional party, which would better enable it to protect its interests and exercise control over its congregation. Citing evidence from Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany, Kalyvas notes that this did not occur, contrary to the expectations of the model. He contributes this deviation from the model to Catholic activists who had become involved with the Conservative parties. It was these activists rather than the Church itself who became the founders of Christian Democratic parties. In sum, Christian Democratic parties formed because the protective strategy of the Church went awry and opportunistic congregation members took advantage of that occurrence to further their own political agenda, which did not involve continuing to be coalition partners with Conservatives.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1997. The Radical Right in Western Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Kitschelt (1997) explains the rise of Radical Right parties as a consequence of structural changes in society that have led citizens to have different political preferences and caused different issues to become salient. The rise of Radical Right parties depends on three conditions. First, political actors must choose to address the demand for right-authoritarian politics; their ability to address this demand, however, will likely be constrained by the extent to which existing parties are satisfying this demand. Even if the political opportunity structure is favorably disposed to the emergence of a Radical Right party, leaders of rightist parties may fail to choose strategies that would permit them to take the greatest electoral advantage of the established parties or otherwise exploit the opportunities presented to them by the party system. Finally, Kitschelt argues that Radical Right cannot succeed by focusing on only a single issue; economic crises and immigration can serve as catalysts for the rise of a Radical Right party but, ultimately, the party will need a broader message.

Kitschelt examines variation across Radial Right parties in Western Europe in terms of issue appeals, preferences of party activists, the power gap between party leaders and the rank-and-file, and the social groups supporting Radical Right parties. Kitschelt also contrasts Radical Right parties with leftist and centrist parties. Variation in the success of Radical Right parties is explained, in part, by whether Radical Right parties’ competitors perceive them as being a viable coalition partner as well as when Radical Right parties appeared on the political landscape.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1988. “Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems.” World Politics 40: 194-234.

The emergence of Left-Libertarian parties can be explained as a function of structural change and resource mobilization. In terms of structural change, Kitschelt argues that since societies are constantly changing; existing institutions may not be able to keep pace with this change; such failure may cause citizens to become dissatisfied. “Structural transformation promotes collective mobilization around new issues and new lines of conflict” (196). Resource mobilization depends on the skills of individual actors and the openness of the political opportunity structure. Left-Libertarian parties are more likely to emerge in economically advanced, small, corporatist welfare states. The success of these parties depends on whether there is already a leftist party that has been in government for an extended period and whether the supporters of such a party feel that the party is representing their interests.

Lucardie, Paul. 2000. “Prophets, Purifiers, and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties.” Party Politics 6: 175-85.

Parties generally have to overcome many obstacles before being recognized as legitimate by voters and gaining a place in government. Lucardie recognizes three broad classifications of parties; classification is based on the reasons behind the party’s formation. This first category of parties recognized by Lucardie are prolocutors. These parties form around the notion of alleviating some particular social problem may be largely non-ideological. Purifiers comprise the second category of parties. Parties aimed at purification tend to be founded by “dissident members of an established party which has revised its ideology” (177). Purification parties seek to return to a given ideology’s roots and advance public policies that are in keeping with the true nature of that ideology. Prophetic parties, the final category, attempt to build new ideologies around new issues, like global warming.

Lucardie then examines the electoral challenges that will present each type of new party and suggests strategies by which each might succeed. For example, he notes that new parties will have to mobilize resources, like money and media attention, in order to attract voters. This is likely to be easier for purification parties, as voters already have some familiarity with the ideology they espouse. Attracting voters will be the most difficult for prophetic parties, because they will have to educate voters about their new ideology.

Moser, Robert G. 1999. “Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics.” Comparative Politics 31: 147-65.

The legacy of communism has left Russian voters and elites alike with a general distaste for parties. Moser notes that the political parties that have formed under the Russian Federation are weak and that partisan candidates often cannot be distinguished from independent candidates. Using data from the 1993 and 1995 elections, Moser hypothesizes that political parties begin in urban centers and are founded by individuals who “have been removed from state power” (149). That is, parties are formed by elites. Eventually, the parties expand their membership to include voters in rural areas. Increased partisanship among elites should also lead to increased turnout among voters.

Elite partisan activity is measured as the percentage of candidates running under a party label, the percentage of partisan candidates who win election, and the number of polarized districts (districts where there are candidates representing both reformist and anti-reformist parties) (151). Moser finds that the number of candidates who identify themselves as partisans increased from 1993 to 1995 and that this increase is strongly correlated with higher voter turnout. However, he finds no link between party formation and rates of urbanization, suggesting that parties do not form in urban areas and then proliferate into the countryside. One possible explanation for this is the presence of a party based in rural areas that enjoyed some success in the 1993 and 1995 elections. A second possible explanation involves the relative unpopularity of urban-based reformist parties among rural voters during this time.

Norris, Pippa. 2005. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Earlier explanations for the formation of Radical Right parties argue that these parties were essentially protest parties and/or that they grew up out of resentment for the existing political order. To some extent, this is likely true. Radical Right supporters tend to be racist, xenophobic, nationalistic, and distrustful of the existing political institutions. Thus, Radical Right parties form because supporters do not feel that they are represented by the mainstream or existing parties. Not surprisingly, Radical Right parties have enjoyed electoral success with appeals to immigration, unemployment, and economic insecurity. However, both the protest politics and politics of resentment arguments suggest that Radical Right parties form (and voters ultimately support them) for purely negative reasons, such as dissatisfaction with government performance over immigration issues or feelings of alienation, leaving no room for any positive motivation for support (152).

Using data from the 2002 European Social Survey and the 1996 to 2001 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Norris finds little support for these arguments. The Radical Right draws support from petite bourgeoisie (self-employed professionals, small merchants) and from the skilled and unskilled working class. This cross-class coalition suggests that the Radical Right should not be regarded as “purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment” (147). Additionally, Norris finds that Radical Right supporters may not always be dissatisfied with government; their degree of dissatisfaction depends on whether Radical Right parties are included or excluded from power (163-64). Where parties are included, supporters tend to be more positive about government. While Radical Right supporters tend to be less trusting of legal and political institutions, Norris notes that distrust of institutions has grown in advanced industrial democracies, so this may not be a good explanation for increased Radical Right support.

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2008-01-27T18:55:00.001-06:00

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Daniel Chwalisz
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dfchwali@olemiss.edu